Cloud BI: A Multi-party Authentication Framework for Securing Business Intelligence on the Cloud by Al-Aqrabi, Hussain
  
Cloud BI: A Multi-party Authentication Framework for Securing
Business Intelligence on the Cloud
 
 
Item type Thesis
Authors Al-Aqrabi, Hussain
Downloaded 13-Jan-2019 02:44:19
Link to item http://hdl.handle.net/10545/615020
  
UNIVERSITY OF DERBY 
 
Cloud BI: A Multi-party Authentication 
Framework for Securing Business 
Intelligence on the Cloud 
 
 
 
Hussain Al-Aqrabi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Doctor of Philosophy            2016
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
LIST OF FIGURES                                                                                                                                      VIII
LIST OF TABLES                                                                                                                                         XII
ABBREVIATIONS                                                                                                                                      XIII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS                                                                                                                          XIV
ABSTRACT                                                                                                                                                   XV
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION                                                                                                                    1
 RESEARCH BACKGROUND                           11.1
1.1.1 Business Intelligence on the Clouds 1
1.1.2 Cloud Computing Security and Business Intelligence 4
1.1.3 Research Problem 5
 MOTIVATION 81.2
 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 91.3
 POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION 101.4
 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 121.5
 MAIN PUBLICATIONS 141.6
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW                                                                                                      15
 MULTI PARTY AUTHENTICATION IN CLOUDS 152.1
 CLOUD COMPUTING AND ITS SECURITY CHALLENGES 232.2
 CLOUD COMPUTING DOMAINS 242.3
2.3.1 Software as a Service 25
2.3.2 Application Service Provisioning 27
iv 
 
 
2.3.3 Infrastructure Resource Provisioning 28
2.3.4 Configurable Cloud Resource 29
 THREATS AND SECURITY RISKS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 302.4
2.4.1 Privacy on the Cloud 31
2.4.2 Component Level Security on the Cloud 34
2.4.3 Personnel Level Security on the Cloud 35
 SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR CLOUD COMPUTING 362.5
2.5.1 Transferring the Risks 37
2.5.2 Absorbing the Risks 38
2.5.3 Avoiding the Risks 38
 COMPLIANCE AND ITS MEASUREMENT 392.6
 SUMMARY 402.7
CHAPTER 3: BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE ON THE CLOUDS                                                             42
 BACKGROUND 423.1
 A REVIEW OF BI WITH OLAP ON CLOUD COMPUTING 443.2
3.2.1 BI and OLAP Framework 44
3.2.2 BI and OLAP on Cloud Computing 47
3.2.3 Benefits of Cloud BI 50
 BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE SECURITY ON THE CLOUD 513.3
3.3.1 BI Security on the Cloud 53
3.3.2 BI Security Challenges and Controls 53
3.3.3 Securing BI on the Cloud 60
v 
 
 
 SUMMARY 623.4
CHAPTER 4: PRIMARILY: MODELLING AND SCENARIOS                                                             64
 INTRODUCTION 644.1
 RESEARCH METHODS 644.2
4.2.1 OPNET Architecture 68
4.2.2 Simulation Projects in OPNET 68
 DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIOS CREATED IN OPNET 704.3
4.3.1 Cloud Security 70
4.3.2 BI on the Cloud 76
4.3.3 BI Security on the Cloud 80
 SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 854.4
4.4.1 Cloud Security 85
4.4.2 BI on the Cloud 89
4.4.3 BI security on the Cloud 93
 DISCUSSION 964.5
 SUMMARY 1064.6
CHAPTER 5: MULTIPARTY AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM (MAS)                                             107
 INTRODUCTION 1075.1
 MULTIPARTY AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK IN THE CLOUD 1075.2
 MULTIPARTY AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM FOR SECURING BI ON THE CLOUD5.3
 109
 EXPERIMENTS 1125.4
vi 
 
 
5.4.1 Experiment on OPNET Modeller 112
5.4.2 Experiment on Eclipse 117
 MULTI-PARTY AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 1245.5
5.5.1 Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 124
5.5.2 BAN Notations 124
5.5.3 Rules of Inference 126
 CORRECTNESS PROOFS FOR THE PROTOCOLS 1275.6
5.6.1 Protocol 1: Session Approval 128
5.6.2 Protocol 2: Adding a User to an Existing Session 132
5.6.3 Protocol 3: Accepting a New Session User 136
5.6.4 Protocol 4: Leaving a Session 140
5.6.5 Protocol 5: Ending a session 143
 ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT 1475.7
5.7.1 Analysis of the Protocols 147
5.7.2 Analysis of the Key Management 150
 EVALUATING AND PRESENTING ANALYSIS RESULTS 1535.8
5.8.1 Analysis of results 153
5.8.2 Empirical Evaluation 164
5.8.3 Validation Results 170
 RISK ASSESSMENT 1705.9
 ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1715.10
 SUMMARY 1715.11
vii 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS                                                             173
 INTRODUCTION 1736.1
 MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 1736.2
 CONCLUSIONS 1746.3
 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 1776.4
REFERENCE LIST                                                                                                                                     179
APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL CONFIGURATION IN ECLIPSE                                                196
APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL CONFIGURATION IN OPNET                                                204
 
 
  
viii 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: A simple representation of Business Intelligence in a business organisation
 ............................................................................................................................ 2
Figure 2: XML based knowledge externalisation process flow (Huang and Tseng 
2009) ................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 3: Hierarchical key structure in cloud computing ........................................... 16
Figure 4: Hierarchical authentication structure in cloud computing .......................... 17
Figure 5: Hierarchical multi-party structure in Multi-cloud computing ....................... 18
Figure 6: The multiparty session authentication concept.......................................... 21
Figure 7: The NIST model of cloud computing( NIST 2011) 'content removed for 
copyright reasons' ............................................................................................. 24
Figure 8: Application service provisioning on cloud computing ................................ 27
Figure 9: The BI and OLAP framework .................................................................... 46
Figure 10: A federated data-warehouse system to facilitate distributed security ...... 56
Figure 11: Distributed security controls in an OLAP cube comprising viewing ......... 57
Figure 12: Database appliances in self-hosted environment .................................... 60
Figure 13: Database appliances in cloud environment ............................................. 61
Figure 14: Simulation project management process flow ......................................... 68
Figure 15: The main screen of the first model .......................................................... 70
Figure 16: The application cloud object .................................................................... 73
Figure 17: UTM cloud components .......................................................................... 75
Figure 18: The main screen of the second model .................................................... 76
Figure 19: The BI on the cloud architecture ............................................................. 77
ix 
 
 
Figure 20: The Extranet domain comprising six corporates having 500 OLAP users in 
each corporate .................................................................................................. 78
Figure 21: The Model A of BI security on the cloud comprising access of BI users 
through    a UTM cloud offering security-as-a-service ....................................... 80
Figure 22: The BI server arrays forming a cloud infrastructure ................................ 81
Figure 23: The Model B of BI security on cloud computing with the UTM cloud 
eliminated and all users directly connected to the BI application servers on the 
cloud ................................................................................................................. 84
Figure 24: Application response times ..................................................................... 85
Figure 25: A sample of overhead requests count from one of the user LANs 
indicating the encryption overhead using direct data placement (DDP) protocol.
 .......................................................................................................................... 86
Figure 26: A sample of queuing delays between two inter-cloud links ..................... 87
Figure 27: Query load on the RDBMS servers ......................................................... 89
Figure 28: Query task processing time by the RDBMS servers ............................... 90
Figure 29: Performance of Model A of BI security on the cloud ............................... 93
Figure 30: Performance of Model B of BI security on the cloud ............................... 95
Figure 31: Proposed multiparty session authentication framework in cloud 
environment .................................................................................................... 108
Figure 32: Multi-party authentication system for securing BI on the cloud ............. 109
Figure 33: Multi-party authentication model ........................................................... 113
Figure 34: SAC program main screen .................................................................... 118
Figure 35: Cloud user connecting to service .......................................................... 118
Figure 36: Use case Multiparty authentication system diagram ............................. 119
Figure 37: Classes of session authority cloud ........................................................ 120
x 
 
 
Figure 38: Cloud class diagram .............................................................................. 121
Figure 39: Service class diagram ........................................................................... 122
Figure 40: A Business Scenario ............................................................................. 123
Figure 41: Simplified system for BAN Logic ........................................................... 128
Figure 42: Session approval protocol ..................................................................... 128
Figure 43: Adding a new user to an existing session ............................................. 132
Figure 44: Protocol for accepting a new session user ............................................ 136
Figure 45: Protocol for leaving a session ............................................................... 140
Figure 46: Protocol for ending a session ................................................................ 143
Figure 47: A worst case scenario-1 (session approval) .......................................... 148
Figure 48: A worst case scenario-2 ........................................................................ 149
Figure 49: The best case scenario ......................................................................... 150
Figure 50: The case without employing multiparty authentication system on cloud 151
Figure 51: The case with employing multiparty authentication system on cloud .... 152
Figure 52: Executing the simulation ....................................................................... 153
Figure 53: TCP sessions initiated by the node “A” ................................................. 154
Figure 54: Overall performance metrics and behaviours of the authentication protocol 
tasks on the network ....................................................................................... 155
Figure 55: Delays investigated at the transport layer ............................................. 156
Figure 56: Response times of the individual phases of the authentication protocol 157
Figure 57: Indicating progressive reduction of instances count when introducing a 
timeout ............................................................................................................ 158
Figure 58: After initial attempts, IP packets from the hackers’ machines are dropped
 ........................................................................................................................ 161
Figure 59: Authorized tenant LANs established and ran DB sessions ................... 162
xi 
 
 
Figure 60: Multi-party authentication system on cloud ........................................... 165
Figure 61: Scalability of the Multi-party Authentication System .............................. 166
Figure 62: Database query response time ............................................................. 166
Figure 63: HTTP object response time ................................................................... 167
Figure 64: Performance comparison of ES1 and ES2 ............................................ 167
Figure 65: Performance comparison ...................................................................... 168
Figure 66: Cloud users connecting to multiple services ......................................... 198
Figure 67: SAC services state ................................................................................ 198
Figure 68: Accessing a SAC services after exchanging public the key .................. 199
Figure 69: Creating a new session ......................................................................... 199
Figure 70: Cloud services request .......................................................................... 200
Figure 71: Joining a session ................................................................................... 201
Figure 72: Accept or deny a joining session by Cloud user .................................... 201
Figure 73: Creating a session ................................................................................ 202
Figure 74: Session created by Cloud user (Creator) .............................................. 203
Figure 75: SAC services and sessions state .......................................................... 203
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xii 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: The Modelling of the LAN object as the server object ................................ 74
Table 2: The Database query settings to emulate OLAP query load on the databases
 .......................................................................................................................... 79
Table 3: The OLAP application profiling ................................................................... 79
Table 4: The algorithm steps are configured as individual protocol tasks in OPNET 
tasks creator object with no timeout ................................................................ 114
Table 5: Timeout introduced in each phase of the authentication protocol ............. 115
Table 6: Configuring the profiles object for executing the applications ................... 116
Table 7: The Client DB sessions on Tenants’ LAN ................................................ 160
Table 8: Application, database and security services modelled in OPNET for 
applying to server objects in the cloud hosted BI group and the UTM ............ 204
Table 9: Profiles created in the OPNET model for BI security on the cloud ........... 204
Table 10: Creating the two applications–Protocol_Tasks (for all nodes), and 
database ......................................................................................................... 205
Table 11: Destination preferences of A and F ........................................................ 205
Table 12: Destination preferences of SAC-SH ....................................................... 206
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xiii 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
BI   Business Intelligence  
CCA   Cloud Certification Authority  
Cloud BI Cloud-based Business Intelligence 
DDL  Data Definition Language  
DML  Data Manipulation Language  
DSS  Decision-support systems 
DDOS  Distributed Denial of Service 
ES1  Experimental System 1 
ES2  Experimental System 2 
ETL   Extracting, transforming, and loading 
IDPS  Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
IPS  Intrusion Prevention System 
LDAP  Lightweight directory access protocol  
MAS  Multiparty Authentication System 
NIST   National Institute of Standards and Technology 
OLAP  Online Analytical Processing 
OLTP   Online transaction processing 
OSCL  Object Security Constraint Language  
RADIUS  Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service 
RDBMS Relational Database Management System 
SAC   Session Authentication Cloud 
SDO  Secure Distributed-OLAP aggregation protocol 
SSL  Secured Socket Layers  
TACACS  Terminal Access Controller Access Control System 
UML  Universal Modelling Language 
UTM   Unified Threat Management 
XOLAP  XML based OLAP 
xiv 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I wish to express sincere appreciation to all those people who made this 
thesis possible and an unforgettable experience for me. 
First of all, I owe debt of gratitude to my PhD advisors Professor Lu Liu and 
Professor Richard Hill for their contributions of time, ideas, and funding to make my 
Ph.D. experience productive and stimulating. I also remain indebted for their 
constant support and patience during the difficult time I experienced while presenting 
the final draft. 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof Nick Antonopoulos, Dr. 
Victoria Carpenter, James Hardy, Prof. Jianxin Li, and Prof. Zhijun Ding and also to 
all of the Department faculty members for their help and support.  
Finally, I am indebted to my wife Sumaia and our three children for their 
wonderful support during this study and to my parents, family and friends for their 
continued encouragement, support and patience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
xv 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Business intelligence (BI) has emerged as a key technology to be hosted on Cloud 
computing. BI offers a method to analyse data thereby enabling informed decision making to 
improve business performance and profitability. However, within the shared domains of 
Cloud computing, BI is exposed to increased security and privacy threats because an 
unauthorised user may be able to gain access to highly sensitive, consolidated business 
information. The business process contains collaborating services and users from multiple 
Cloud systems in different security realms which need to be engaged dynamically at runtime. 
If the heterogamous Cloud systems located in different security realms do not have direct 
authentication relationships then it is technically difficult to enable a secure collaboration. In 
order to address these security challenges, a new authentication framework is required to 
establish certain trust relationships among these BI service instances and users by distributing 
a common session secret to all participants of a session. The author addresses this challenge 
by designing and implementing a multiparty authentication framework for dynamic secure 
interactions when members of different security realms want to access services. The 
framework takes advantage of the trust relationship between session members in different 
security realms to enable a user to obtain security credentials to access Cloud resources in a 
remote realm. This mechanism can help Cloud session users authenticate their session 
membership to improve the authentication processes within multi-party sessions. The 
correctness of the proposed framework has been verified by using BAN Logics. The 
performance and the overhead have been evaluated via simulation in a dynamic environment. 
A prototype authentication system has been designed, implemented and tested based on the 
proposed framework. The research concludes that the proposed framework and its supporting 
protocols are an effective functional basis for practical implementation testing, as it achieves 
good scalability and imposes only minimal performance overhead which is comparable with 
other state-of-art methods.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Research Background  1.1 
1.1.1 Business Intelligence on the Clouds 
Business intelligence (BI) is a process of extracting analytical knowledge from 
discovered data clusters created by using data aggregating techniques mixed with domain 
knowledge for extricating data from various databases. The system comprises of data 
warehouses, data marts, online analytical processing, and ETL (extracting, transforming, and 
loading) tools. The BI user dashboards comprise a framework for presentation of analytical 
knowledge in the form of interactive graphics designed as per the business domain and for 
solving management and technology problems (Huang and Tseng 2009). 
The process of extraction, transformation, and loading is an end-to-end process flow 
comprising the steps listed below (Huang and Tseng 2009): 
(a) Data preparation 
(b) Data selection 
(c) Data transformation 
(d) Data mining 
(e) Knowledge discovery 
(f) Knowledge identification 
(g) Knowledge representation 
(h) Knowledge accumulation and storage 
(i) Knowledge transfer 
(j) Knowledge mining 
(k) Knowledge presentation and application 
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The following figure presents a simple presentation of BI framework in a business 
organisation. The transactional data is extracted from the transactional databases of the 
organisation, like SCM, accounting, finance, HR, and marketing. The data is cleaned for 
eliminating errors, duplicates, inconsistencies, and non-standard forms and transformed as 
per the structure defined in the data warehouses used for running Online analytical processing 
(OLAP) reports, data mining for specific usage, and generating mass reports for decision 
support. The decision maker may use a combination of the three (OLAP, data mining, DSS 
reporting) for analysing scenarios and making decisions (Giovinazzo 2002). 
 
Figure 1: A simple representation of Business Intelligence in a business organisation 
Internet enabled business intelligence needs to be deployed on distributed data 
warehouses with distributed servers and logically integrated data stores (Giovinazzo 2002). 
BI on distributed systems is achieved using XML based externalisation process achieved 
through refinement of knowledge following a standard document for standardisation, that 
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takes five categories of information as inputs, refines them as per information characteristics, 
XML characteristics, and knowledge model characteristics, and stores them in a pattern 
needed by management workers. The management workers use data analysis techniques for 
using the analytical knowledge in decision-making scenarios (Huang and Tseng 2009). 
Figure 2: XML based knowledge externalisation process flow (Huang and Tseng 2009) 
'content removed for copyright reasons' 
 
The XML based knowledge externalisation process flow presented by Huang and 
Tseng (2009) employs XML data warehouses and XML based online analytical processing 
(OLAP) (Mahboubi et al. 2009). XML based data warehouses and OLAP systems can be 
implemented on web services architecture. The document modelling structures of XML 
serves as web-based relational databases. The XOLAP (XML based OLAP) can be used to 
conduct OLAP operations (like roll-up, drill down, and slice and dice) on XML databases. 
The OLAP cubes can be multi-dimensional XML documents having the attributes at the 
nodes and facts as branches.  
XML based data warehousing and XOLAP can be hosted on web 2.0 architecture on 
cloud computing. The components needed for implementing BI on cloud computing are web-
based workflow engines (like Hadoop or Google App Engine), XML data files stored on 
cloud based clusters of servers, XOLAP engines, ETL on XML databases, web-based 
business rules, web-based dashboards, plug ins for browser interfacing, and management 
interfaces (Wu and Qin 2011). The key advantages of hosting BI on clouds are on-demand 
self-service, rapid elasticity, resource pooling, and on-demand broadband network access 
(Stipic and Bronzin 2012). 
Web-based BI has more security challenges than BI frameworks hosted on private 
LANs (Grabova et al. 2011). There are many security challenges in cloud computing 
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accessed over Internet, and hence BI can be affected by them. This problem is reviewed in 
the next sub-section. 
1.1.2 Cloud Computing Security and Business Intelligence 
Cloud computing has some prominent threats that are not prevalent in self-hosted 
LAN based IT infrastructures. As per Gartner report on cloud security, cloud computing has 
the following security related threats (Che et al. 2011): 
(a) Abuse of resource pools of clouds 
(b) Insecure application programming interfacing 
(c) Vendor controlled risk management with an unknown risk profile per customer 
(d) Identity theft and services hijacking 
(e) Insecure boundaries between tenants using the same resources pool 
(f) Privacy breaches 
(g) Data loss or theft 
(h) Protection of user privileges 
(i) Segregation of data 
(j) Location of data 
(k) Inadequate forensics support 
(l) Inadequate regulatory compliance 
(m) Unclear recovery strategies 
(n) Unclear long-term viability 
 
Business intelligence on the cloud can be implemented in the form of a multilayer 
architecture, having a data layer, a logical layer, and an access layer. The design, 
construction, and population of data warehouses can be done at the data layer. At the logical, 
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data can be modelled, managed, and grouped in the form of data marts. All the ETL 
procedures can be executed at the logical layer. At the access layer, the application interfaces 
(user and programming) and the middleware can be enabled. Users may access the decision 
support tools (information mining, OLAP, querying, and reporting) at the access layer. 
Programmers may access this layer for developing BI applications as per the needs of 
management workers. This model may be owned by enterprises using cloud hosted BI or 
service providers offering BI as software as a service (Ouf and Nasr 2011).There can be 
security threats at each layer of the BI framework in cloud computing.  
1.1.3 Research Problem 
In modern times, the majority of high value / high profit business industries all are 
utilize and benefit from Internet based computing. Cloud based systems are a focal 
technology in this regard that provide utility and ease with regard to universal availability and 
timely access. However Cloud computing has its own constraints and security considerations 
that need to be taken into account with regard to its effective application. 
Business Intelligence has been identified as a major commercial and technological 
development that cloud computing can host and enhance. Business Intelligence provides a 
way of analysing data in a meaningful manner so as to facilitate decision making aimed at 
increasing productivity and enhancing business performance. Currently, distributed 
applications in business are encompassing an increasing level of computerisation and a 
similarly increasing level of enthusiasm. In a multi-tenancy setting, there is dynamism in 
most cloud based Business Systems which means authentication interfaces should also be 
dynamic. Nevertheless, in an environment where the domains of Cloud computing are shared, 
Business Intelligence is more vulnerable to rising security and privacy risks as valuable 
business information may become more accessible to both hackers and competitors. 
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Businesses can enrich themselves from the dynamic and flexible cross-institutional service 
based company procedures. Nevertheless these attributes also bring another dimension in 
security problems. 
Generally a business procedure should be flexible in both application and method to 
enable dynamic business response. An effect of this is that the execution sequence of a given 
process may not be predictable for all circumstances even to the extent that sometimes, the 
real process of execution can be a “one-of-a-kind” (Xu et al. 2012). Thus, the services and 
applications employed in a procedure are characteristically heterogeneous and might be 
offered and maintained by various unrelated organizations. Companies have their own 
homogenous security mechanisms and policies to protect their local resources against 
security threats but applications residing on the resources of different organizations operate in 
numerous different heterogeneous security realms.  
A Security realm may be viewed as a group of principals (like, people, services, and 
computers) registered with a certain authentication authority (a trusted principal) and 
controlled through a consistent set of security processes and policies to permit access to 
services and resources. An authentication authority is a principal that is considered 
universally trusted and can be relied upon to execute trustworthy authentication functions. As 
shown by this explanation, authentication is vital for each security realm and before a 
principal can have a right to use the resources controlled by a security realm, verification of 
its identity must be confirmed by the authentication procedure of the security realm in order 
to ascertain the principal who it purports to be. To identify a principal during the process of 
authentication, the principal has to announce credentials that were provided to it by the 
authentication authority of the security realm. 
In view of the fact that services and organizations can adopt a collaborative process in 
an extremely vibrant and flexible manner, direct cross-realm authentication relationship is not 
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simply a means of joining the two collaborating realms. A verification process of the 
credentials provided by the authentication authority has to be performed in the other security 
realm where there is a direct cross-realm authentication relationship linking two security 
realms because of the existence of an interoperable authentication mechanism. A likely 
solution will be locating some intermediate realms that will connect a pair of separate realms, 
hence serving as an authentication path for collaborating the pair of different realms. 
Nevertheless the cost of creating the authentication path for the two disjoint realms is 
significant as it may involve a lot of other processes for credential conversion that will need 
extensive invocations to intermediate services. 
The lack of authentication path connecting two security realms will necessitate two 
security realms, when working together, to follow a more traditional and long route that will 
involve creating a mutual trust entailing entering into contractual agreements, multi-round 
cooperation and human intervention. Nevertheless it is very hard to achieve a cross-realm 
authentication in an extremely dynamic service-based business procedure, without negatively 
impacting service applicability in cross-organizational E-commerce. 
The multi-party session oriented authentication protocol enables authenticating 
service instances that participate in a session to solve the problem. However the protocol 
provides a commonly shared session secret for all services. Such a group authentication 
protocol requires sharing of a number of security attributes, e.g. secrets for group session key, 
secrets for private keys, secrets for key duplication, secrets for session forwarding to other 
clouds, and secrets for control of keys.  In some cases, it is challenging for a session user to 
determine and verify whether the service instance it contacts is a member of the same multi-
party session (Hada and Maruyama 2002).  This leads to severe session management 
vulnerability that could potentially be exploited.  
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Motivation 1.2 
Business intelligence with OLAP, data warehousing, and data mining solutions are 
key requirements for any business in the modern world. Given the dynamics and uncertainties 
in modern markets, business managers need decision aid systems for making informed 
decisions. Hence, BI has become a necessity in modern businesses. In addition, BI needs to 
be Internet enabled for ensuring multi-location access for decision makers (Giovinazzo 
2002).  
In self-hosted environments it was feared that BI will eventually face a resource 
crunch situation because it won’t be feasible for companies to keep on adding resources to 
host the never ending expansion of data warehouses and the online analytical processing 
(OLAP) demands on the underlying networking. 
Given the significant advantages of cloud computing (Che et al. 2011), and the 
deployment readiness of BI using web services architecture (Ouf and Nasr, 2011), the 
disadvantages of traditional BI can be eliminated by hosting it on cloud computing. As 
described by Ouf and Nasr (2011), the biggest hurdle in growth of BI has been the cost of its 
infrastructure and the rapid growth of capacity demands. A business entity need not make 
capital investments in IT infrastructures and capacity on cloud computing. Clouds offer 
resources on demand (rapid elasticity, as suggested by (Che et al. 2011), and hence 
businesses can grow their BI as per the business requirements.  
The business systems running on clouds are dynamic and hence the authentication 
interactions need to be dynamic as well. However, in the shared domains of Cloud 
computing, BI is exposed to security and privacy threats. This is because an unauthorised 
user can gain access to highly sensitive consolidated business information in a BI system. 
The business process contains collaborating services from multiple heterogeneous security 
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realms which need to be engaged dynamically at runtime, if the security realms do not have 
direct authentication relationships it is technically difficult to enable secure collaboration. In 
order to address these security challenges, thus new authentication mechanisms and protocols 
are required to establish certain trust relationships among these service instances by 
distributing a common session secret to all participants of a session. 
Given this opportunity in deployment and growth of BI on cloud, a number of 
researchers have contributed to this area. From the literatures on deploying and managing BI 
on clouds (for example, the three studies by Ouf and Nasr 2011), it was clear that BI on 
clouds will be very complex. Hence, the security components for securing BI on the clouds 
must be deployed within complex cloud security architectures. The opportunity was evident 
given the evolving solutions on securing cloud computing platforms. Hence, there was 
significant motivation to study this largely unaddressed research area for invoking a thought 
process in the academic world in this direction.  
Research Aim and Objectives 1.3 
The aim of the PhD project is to improve the security of BI on Cloud Computing 
by developing a multi-party authentication framework for dynamic authentication 
interactions in a distributed environment, addressing the following research question – 
“How to dynamically secure BI on the Cloud?” 
In order to achieve this aim, the objectives of the PhD project are defined as follow: 
• To investigate existing Business intelligence security solutions on the Cloud and 
identify the key security challenges for implementing BI on Cloud Computing 
• To develop a multi-party authentication framework for dynamic authentication 
interactions between users and BI services in multiple Cloud systems located in 
different security realms 
10 
 
 
• To model the proposed framework and verify the correctness of proposed 
framework by using BAN logics 
• To evaluate the performance of the proposed framework by using simulation and 
develop a prototype authentication system based on the proposed framework 
 
To achieve the above mentioned objectives, the following methodology has been 
employed: 
Objective 1: In order to achieve objective 1: Background research is conducted in the 
form of critical literature review considering the security risks and challenges faced by cloud 
computing based Business Intelligence. This is intended to identify research gaps in this 
domain and provide a comparison between existing and proposed solutions. 
Objective 2: In order to achieve objective 2: Use UML modelling language to focus 
on the design of a multi-party authentication framework, the development of five protocols 
and provide a formal specification of the authentication approach. 
Objective 3: In order to achieve objective 3: Using well known BAN logic to formally 
analyse the correctness of the authentication security protocols, deriving the trust beliefs that 
form the principals of the protocol and to then verify authentication protocols. 
Objective 4: In order to achieve objective 4: A set of experiments are implemented 
using the full production version of OPNET  Modeller to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed framework. In addition, Eclipse is used as a contrasting method to develop the 
prototype authentication framework.  
Potential Contribution  1.4 
A multi-party authentication system is proposed. The proposed system addresses 
scenarios of Business Intelligence (BI) application access on cloud platforms. More 
11 
 
 
specifically, the proposal applies to the situation when members of different security realms 
need to access distributed BI services through a trusted principal. The authentication system 
is designed, implemented and tested using two high quality development tools, OPNET 
modeller and Eclipse. Using multi-party session management protocols, the authentication 
system allows two service instances to authenticate each other with their session 
memberships. 
As a component part of the system, a session authority cloud (SAC) is proposed. The 
SAC is designed to control sessions in the cloud and precludes the concept of a home or 
foreign cloud, every participatory cloud obeys the decisions made by the SAC. The SAC 
comprises of an array of servers serving as a security vault. The vault holds authentication 
credentials and digital signatures for all of the tenants of all participating clouds. The root 
keys of the clouds are stored in a folder structure within the vault to identify the individual 
clouds. An active tenant will “know” the root key of its own cloud. The security realms (sub-
domains) are distributed across all clouds and are identified through separate sub-domain 
keys. These keys are stored in subfolders within the corresponding cloud folders.  
In the multiparty session scenario, members of multiple sub-domains may interact 
within a session. All such sessions will be identified by the SAC. The session keys will 
comprise of root key of the cloud, sub-domain key, and a section identifying the session. This 
means that there are multiple session keys which are valid for a given session; each session 
key has a common field for the session but unique fields for cloud root key and sub-domain 
keys. There is no need for any negotiation between the individual clouds because the SAC is 
aware of all participating clouds and their sub-domains. 
The problems surrounding the implementation of multi-party session authentication to 
permit access to shared Business Intelligence data in a Cloud computing environment have 
been investigated. The issues include service instance identification as well as key generation 
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and distribution. Based on the investigation, a set of protocols for multi-party session 
management and cross-realm authentication have been proposed. Formal analysis of the 
protocols is carried out using the well-known BAN logic and a comprehensive empirical 
study is performed to assess the scalability and the runtime overhead of the authentication 
system.  
Organisation of the Thesis 1.5 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) presents the 
background and context, specific details about this research, aims, objectives, motivation, and 
significance of the study. Essentially, this chapter establishes the direction of this study.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review considering the security risks and challenges 
faced by cloud computing based Business Intelligence. This is intended to identify research 
gaps in this domain. 
Chapter 3 presents a review on how BI and OLAP framework can be implemented on 
the clouds and presents key benefits of cloud computing for BI. Furthermore, it shows an 
approach for taking BI to the cloud as well as key challenges in hosting BI on cloud. 
Chapter 4 describes details on simulation modelling tool and an introduction to the 
models studied in this research. Three simulation experiments using OPNET is described – 
cloud security, BI on the cloud, and BI security on the cloud. The chapter presents the results 
of simulations, comparisons and critical analysis of results. The chapter presents the results of 
simulations, comparisons and critical analysis of results. 
Chapter 5 describes the design of the multiparty authentication system for BI, the 
mechanisms for hosting it on cloud computing, and presents the five authentication protocols 
in our multiparty authentication system. The correctness of the protocol is formally analysed 
and proven.  The chapter presents the analytic assessment of the multi-party authentication 
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mechanism and illustrates the empirical evaluation of the multi-party authentication 
mechanism. A set of experiments are implemented on OPNET Modeller and Eclipse 
respectively, and the experimental results are used to evaluate the scalability, runtime 
overhead, and compatibility with the message level security protocols. Finally in this study, 
risks, ethics and legal implications are considered including mitigation factors and 
recommendations. 
Chapter 6 provides the conclusion of the thesis and outlines future work. In addition, 
the limitations of this work.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Multi party Authentication in Clouds 2.1 
Cloud computing offers shared applications/software, platforms, and infrastructure 
services on multitenant IT systems built on virtualisation. However, in the shared domains of 
Cloud computing, BI is exposed to security and privacy threats by virtue of exploits, 
eavesdropping, distributed attacks, malware attacks, and other known challenges to cloud 
computing (Al-Aqrabi et al. 2012). In a multi-tenancy environment, the authentication 
frameworks cannot be static. The business systems running on clouds are dynamic and hence 
the authentication interactions need to be dynamic, as well.  Chen & Tu (2013) proposed a 
global authentication register comprising a privacy framework for tenants. The register can 
hold a private key and personalised data of each tenant for certification of a registration 
request. The system issues the private key after the personalised data has been provided to the 
registrar and matched successfully. There is a simple two-way interaction between the user 
and the cloud:  
– Cloud asks for register key  
– User notifies register key  
– Cloud verifies register key  
– On successful verification, cloud issues private key. 
In cloud computing, the global authentication register may be viewed as the 
multitenant database holding primary records about the tenants registered and additional 
extended tables for recording unique detail about each tenant (Pippal et al. 2011). The 
primary table comprises details generated by the cloud service provider created for each 
tenant as per a standard format. The extended tables may record unique details provided by 
the tenants against a list of metadata classes (for example, names of spouse, dog, first school, 
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mother, favourite movie star, favourite colour, etc.). The extension tables help in validating 
private details about a tenant before issuing the private key for accessing his/her workspace. 
This concept is called “identity-based cryptography” (Li et al. 2009). The root key is the 
public key for unlocking a cloud or grid-based workspace. The root key is appended with the 
private key based on an identity-based signature generated by an interaction process 
comprising identity information entered by the client and the corresponding digital signature 
generated by the server. The signature is used by the authentication registry server to append 
private key fields in the root key and issue to the requesting client.  
In cloud computing, identity-based cryptography and identity-based signature 
generation may be carried out by a separate array of servers (cloud array) dedicated for 
privacy-as-a-service (Li et al. 2011). The clouds may comprise hierarchical key structure as 
shown in the Figure below: 
 
Figure 3: Hierarchical key structure in cloud computing 
The key has two parts as public key fields and one part as private key field (Li et al. 
2011). The first public key part is common for all valid cloud tenants, the second public key 
part is common for all tenants of a sub-domain within the main cloud, and the private key 
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part is for individual tenants that are determined as per individual digital signatures generated 
by a separate array of servers against private information provided by the tenants. 
A cloud sub-domain is a group of multiple private virtual workspaces owned by an 
organisation or a group of related tenants (for example, a community or society) (Qin et al. 
2013). A common public key for the sub-domain ensures that only the tenants owning its 
workspaces are allowed to access it (Qin et al. 2013).  For example, the employees of an 
organisation will get access to the sub-domain public key by virtue of their employment 
records in the organisation. On the top of the sub-domain public key, a tenant-specific private 
key will be assigned based on private information provided by individual tenants. The below 
figure shows how this hierarchical scheme can ensure authentication of employees for 
uploading or downloading business data to and from the cloud, respectively. The private keys 
for employees may be hosted locally by the company that appends the private key portion 
with the sub-domain key generated by the cloud for the company. These two keys are finally 
appended to the root key of the cloud. 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchical authentication structure in cloud computing 
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This framework may become complicated further when multiple parties coordinate 
within an authentication system for accessing resources stored on multiple clouds through the 
home cloud. In this scenario, a cross-cloud federation system may be established comprising 
discovery agents, match-making agents and authentication agents (Celesti et al. 2010). The 
discovery agent manages a process for discovering the resources requested by the parties by 
browsing the available foreign clouds. The match-making agent manages a process for short-
listing foreign clouds to gain access to the resources requested. The authentication agent 
creates a security context and trust relationship between the parties and the home cloud, and 
between the home cloud and the foreign clouds, as shown in Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5: Hierarchical multi-party structure in Multi-cloud computing 
There are multiple steps involved in this framework, stated as the following: 
 The parties make authentication requests. 
 The authentication agent sends queries for artefacts to all parties. 
 The artefacts are resolved and a group-level public key is generated for all the 
parties. 
19 
 
 
 The discovery agent discovers the resources in the available foreign clouds. 
 The match-making agent shortlists the preferred foreign clouds. 
 The home cloud requests for public keys from the foreign clouds. 
The foreign clouds make a request for artefacts before sending the keys, which the 
home cloud provides (establishing trust relationships between the home cloud and the foreign 
clouds). 
On getting the keys, multiple keys are generated integrating the home cloud public 
key and the corresponding foreign cloud keys for accessing the resources. 
The resources are collected by the home cloud and made accessible to the 
authentication server for the entire multi-party group. 
The individuals in the party gain access to the resources through the authentication 
server by providing individual secrets and gain private keys. The private keys are appended 
with the group key that in turn is appended with the home cloud key. 
As an alternative to the previous two steps, the home cloud can forward the groups 
artefacts to the foreign clouds such that they can provide individual public keys to the groups 
authentication server. 
These group public keys assigned by different foreign clouds can be appended with 
the individual private keys such that they and be given access to the resources on an 
individual basis being a member of this multi-party group. 
Such a group authentication protocol requires sharing of a number of security 
attributes, like secrets for group session key, secrets for private keys, secrets for key 
duplication (for resilience), secrets for session forwarding to other clouds, and secrets for 
control of keys (opening a vault of keys) (Dai et al. 2011). For facilitating automated inter-
organisational processes, trust and dependability, and security needs to be ascertained 
(Avizienis et al. 2004). Dependability and security are interrelated through a number of 
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attributes (confidentiality, integrity, availability, reliability, maintainability, and safety) 
(Avizienis et al. 2004). There can be faults and errors in inter-organisational authentication 
processes leading to failure of services (Avizienis et al. 2004). There are higher chances of 
faults and errors in modern distributed business environments in which, the business 
specifications are dynamic and the runtime executing them are sometimes unpredictable (Xu 
et al. 2012). It is very difficult to standardise the runtimes as there may be “one-of-a-kind” 
execution of processes (Xu et al. 2012).  
Xu et al. (2012) explained that participants in a service-oriented architecture (like 
Grid and cloud computing) may be parts of different security realms collaborating only at the 
runtimes. A Security realm may be viewed as a group of principals (like, people, services, 
and computers) engaged with an authentication system (a trusted principal) for accessing 
services and resources. It may not be possible that security realms participating in a 
collaborative transaction may have any authentication relationship directly. If authentication 
relationships are established among different security realms, the process may involve large 
numbers of extra and expensive steps for converting artefacts (like, validating multiple digital 
signatures). The federated authentication establishment may require time-consuming 
activities for negotiations and amendments. In many scenarios, this may be infeasible given 
that the participants in different security realms may be engaged in one-of-a-kind transactions 
only. A simpler mechanism may be to establish authentication paths through two distributed 
realms having pre-established trust relationships. The scenario shown in Figure 5 is an 
example of an authentication path. This process may overload the realms used for 
authentication path with conversion of artefacts. In addition, there are possibilities that the 
principals of two security realms trusting each other may not have authentication paths 
(enough trust relationships) for recommending certain principals. These possibilities may 
again require expensive negotiations and contractual amendments. In this context, Xu et al. 
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(2012) proposed an on-the-fly mechanism for establishing trust relationships for 
authenticating partners during runtimes. They employed the multiparty concept as described 
below: 
In a multiparty concept, multiple parties can join or leave a session dynamically. The 
parties are allowed or removed from the session by a session authority. A simplified drawing 
showing the concept is presented in the below figure. 
 
Figure 6: The multiparty session authentication concept 
In this concept, a session authority controls the authentication of all session 
participants. Existing session participants can introduce new participants to the session 
authority for limited transactions. The session authority issues a secret session key to all 
running session participants. In practice the session authority communicates with multiple 
session handlers. Whenever a new participant joins or existing one leaves, the key is 
refreshed and shared with the active session participants using forward security techniques. 
The session authority recognises the session participants with the help of participant Ids. A 
participant leaving the session cannot reuse its participant ID for re-entering. Similarly, a 
reused ID will not be assigned to a new participant. The participants join through introduction 
only and need not share any secret artefacts to gain the session key. However, two 
participants acting as partners can share private keys using Diffie-Hellman algorithm.  
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In the framework of Xu et al. (2012), a cloud service provider can host an array of 
servers acting as session authorities. There may be multiple session handlers managing 
sessions among different groups of participants. The session key of a session may be a 
combination of three fields – root key (ascertaining cloud membership), sub-domain key 
(ascertaining membership of a valid security realm on the cloud) and the session key. This 
means that the sub-domain key portion will differ for each participant depends upon which 
sub-domain (security realm) it belongs to on the cloud. However, the session authority will 
recognise it as long as it is registered in the global registry of the cloud. Whenever a 
participant leaves, only the session key portion will be refreshed. 
The process will become more complex when multiple clouds are involved. The 
process defined by Celesti et al. (2010) is quite complex given the number of exchanges of 
artefacts between the home cloud and foreign clouds and the home cloud and its tenants 
within the sub-domain. Their solution does not address the scenario when members of 
multiple sub-domains (principals of different security realms) want to interact (through a 
session) to access resources stored on multiple clouds. Hence, the framework proposed by Xu 
et al. (2012) needs to be applied to solve this problem. The roles of discovery agent and 
match-making agent are needed as-is. However the challenge is to ensure that the session 
authority is able to “convince” the foreign clouds without bulk exchange of artefacts. This 
can be fulfilled through a highest level of authentication relationship in which, the foreign 
clouds trust each and every tenant connected with the home cloud on the latter’s 
recommendation. However this system puts a lot of ownership on the home cloud. Given that 
the resources are requested by principals of multiple security realms, the introductions made 
by session members become the primary approval points. Drilling down further, the final 
onus lies on the first introduction made by the session initiator given that all subsequent 
introductions made by additional members are trusted based on this initial introduction.  
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Cloud Computing and its Security Challenges 2.2 
With the growing popularity of cloud computing, the concerns about security and 
compliance are also growing. Businesses do not want to be deprived of the already 
established and accepted benefits of cloud computing and hence they require continuous 
research towards the path to achieve standardised policies and controls on cloud computing 
that shall be acceptable to the regulatory bodies (Carroll, Merve and Kotze, 2011). It is 
important for the management of a business to understand what threats and risks exist on 
cloud computing infrastructures and what are the feasible mitigation strategies (Carroll, 
Merve and Kotze, 2011). In a survey conducted by Carroll, Merve and Kotze (2011), it was 
observed that the IT managers stated information security, business continuity and regulatory 
compliance as the top three concerns in moving their business workflows to the cloud. 
Ramgovind, Eloff and Smith (2010) argued that the full potential of cloud computing cannot 
be used for the benefit of businesses unless the security and compliance issues are sorted out. 
They further elaborated that secured connectivity to clouds over Internet, data segregation, 
data location and multi-tenancy are the key issues that are discussed by Gartner and IDC 
reports on cloud computing security that are coming in the way of achieving full compliance 
to the established regulations and acts. The main security issues to be solved in the context of 
connectivity, data segregation, data location and multi-tenancy are: identity management, 
authentication, authorisation, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and availability 
(Ramgovind et al. 2010). At the technical level, Mukhin and Volokyata (2011) described that 
cloud computing comprises new types of vulnerabilities, like – incorrect provisioning in 
virtualisation, riding and hijacking of virtual sessions, insecure or obsolete cryptography 
keys, evasion of billing/metering data, data recovery of one user when the resource gets 
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allocated to another user, insufficient virtual network controls, poor authentication and 
authorisation in the virtual machines, etc.  
Cloud Computing Domains 2.3 
The architecture, deployment, workflows and service procedures of cloud computing 
is yet to be standardised. The academic scholars and professional architects have presented 
their own architectures of cloud computing in numerous research papers. (Qian, Luo, Du and 
Guo, 2009). NIST has come forward with a draft paper to standardise cloud computing, albeit 
currently at high level only. In the NIST’s model, cloud has been presented as an integrated 
service oriented architecture comprising three forms of offerings – software-as-a-service 
(SaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS) and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS). NIST’s model 
proposes that clouds can take four types of forms – public clouds, private clouds, hybrid 
clouds and community clouds. (Badger et al., 2011) The NIST’s model is adapted and 
presented in the figure below: 
 
Figure 7: The NIST model of cloud computing( NIST 2011) 'content removed for 
copyright reasons' 
 
The key performance attributes of cloud computing comprises effective 
implementation of on demand self-services, broad network access, rapid elasticity, measured 
service and resource pooling (Badger et al. 2011). The key benefits from cloud computing 
hosting are: low-cost high-performance computing, usage based payments, improved 
performance of business processes, easier maintenance, world-class software tools at 
affordable costs, no hassles of upgrading, storage/computing on demand, better compatibility 
and portability of applications, better group collaboration and universal access (Miller, 2009). 
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Amburst et al. (2009) presented the following formula for calculating economic feasibility of 
moving business processes to the cloud: 
 
This formula shows that the expected profit from the cloud should be greater than the 
existing profit from the self-hosted data centre. The formula reveals that if the utilisation of 
self-hosted data centre is higher, the feasibility to move to the cloud is lower. However cloud 
computing has some disadvantages as well. For example, it is not meant for businesses in 
remote locations that do not have reliable Internet connectivity (Miller, 2009). In addition, 
businesses under high security and compliance pressures should avoid cloud computing for 
time being (although they may find it feasible in due course) (Miller, 2009). According to 
Amburst et al. (2010), data lock-in, data confidentiality and auditing ability and 
unpredictability of performance are among the top five issues to be considered in the process 
of deciding on moving a business process and its data to the cloud. In this study, the author 
has focussed on these three issues of cloud hosting of business processes. In this context, the 
author has presented a review of existing solutions and also has recommended solutions 
based on self-interpretation of the challenges evident from the simulation exercise. Before 
getting into the details of these three issues, the author has presented a quick review of 
service provisioning on cloud computing. 
2.3.1 Software as a Service 
The SaaS framework on the clouds have been built using service oriented software 
tools that can run on any underlying platform and is mostly model driven. XML has been 
preferred for traditional computing devices and WML has been preferred for mobile 
computing devices for hosting application services. This is because the XML and WML 
formats are self-describable, easily discoverable, are not dependent upon a particular 
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programming language or platform, and can work with any database that supports them 
(Microsoft SQL, IBM DB2, Oracle, My SQL, etc.) (Sharma and Sood, 2011). 
Bolze and Deelman (2011) presented the following characteristics of SaaS: 
(a) The applications should be designed in such a way that they can effectively 
utilise large scale computing devices and storage. 
(b) The applications should be highly sophisticated at the background but very 
simple at the user interfacing end. 
(c) The applications and the underlying databases should support multi-tenancy 
(users and groups of large number of companies can work on the same 
application). 
(d) The applications should release processing power and storage on demand 
rapidly in order to complete heavy duty tasks quickly. 
(e) The applications should have provision for universal, domain specific and user 
specific master data tables. 
(f) The applications and the underlying databases should support high levels of 
parallelism and parallel data access.  
Ruiter and Warnier (2011) stated that multi-tenancy is viewed as the key security and 
compliance challenge on the cloud. As per them, many regulations require physical 
identification of data and its location in the IT systems. Some regulations stated by them are – 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). 
The SaaS community needs to come forward with solutions to meet the compliance 
requirements directed by these acts. Aulbach et al. (2008) described that multi-tenancy can be 
implemented on the cloud by sharing the database schema among multiple tenants (user 
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companies), which is executed employing database object partitioning and employing a 
separate schema object to identify the objects owned by various tenants.  
In the author’s view, this is one of the effective ways of implementing data 
identification of multi-tenancy setups. The reports generated from the master schema objects 
can clearly identify which database objects belong to which tenants. In addition, to comply 
with the “location of data” requirements, the SaaS provider can ensure that the objects 
belonging to a company under compliance pressure can be distributed to only those servers 
that are physically located within the national boundaries. All databases have built in 
advanced features to control object distribution and their replications. A report of schema – 
tenant mapping combined with a report of physical location of objects and of the servers 
should satisfy the external auditors. Before we get into detailed discussion on such solutions, 
let us quickly review the application and infrastructure provisioning on the clouds. 
2.3.2 Application Service Provisioning 
Application service provisioning on a SaaS cloud is presented in the following figure, 
adapted based on an illustration by Mietzner and Leymann (2008): 
 
Figure 8: Application service provisioning on cloud computing  
(Mietzner and Leymann 2008) 'content removed for copyright reasons' 
 
La and Kim (2009) discussed that service provisioning on SaaS clouds differs by 
users based on their workflows, privileges, logic. They further discussed that the resources 
pooled for service provisioning on SaaS clouds are hardware and networking, databases, web 
servers, platform services, specialised software servers (like use case testing tools) and 
application servers. The cloud resources are pooled and presented to user workflows through 
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composite resource provisioning carried out with the help of service provisioning engines. 
Some of the provisioning engines used by SaaS providers are Open QRM, Sun N1 
provisioning manager and IBM Tivoli provisioning manager. The users connect to their 
business workflows through web services gateway, and the workflows in turn are served by 
the resource pool accessible through the service provisioning engine. (Mietzner and 
Leymann, 2008) The workflows are created employing standard tools like MPI, Apache 
Hadoop, Microsoft Dryad and Google Map-Reduce (Ekanayake et al. 2011).  
2.3.3 Infrastructure Resource Provisioning 
Infrastructure resources are provisioned in three ways – server virtualisation 
(Amazon), technique specific sandbox (Google) and a hybrid of both the techniques 
(Microsoft). Server virtualisation can be carried out using VMware, Xen virtualisation or 
Linux virtualisation solutions (Qian et al. 2009). However, many academic scholars view 
virtualisation as the key underlying technology for infrastructure resource provisioning on the 
cloud. Wan (2011) described that cloud based hypervisors should be deployed on multi-core 
CPUs on the bare-metal (the underlying real hardware) for optimisation of performance of 
parallel processing and queuing. In addition, Niyato (2011) presented that a virtual machine 
depository using multiple virtualisation solutions (OS layer virtualisation, Para-virtualisation, 
application virtualisation and bare metal virtualisation, as described by Wan (2011) can be 
the most effective solution to interface a private cloud with the public cloud (i.e., creating a 
hybrid cloud). In this context, Sotomayor, Montero, Llorente and Foster (2009) described that 
the host based virtualisation deployments need to be managed at the array level (an array 
comprises a large number of hardware devices) using software based virtual infrastructure 
management solutions. They demonstrated Open Nebula architecture that can be used for 
provisioning of hardware resources for the cloud users using sophisticated virtual machine 
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placement strategies with priority queuing based on immediate (prioritised) provisioning and 
best-effort (non-prioritised) provisioning (p. 19). 
In a virtualisation setup, a server can host multiple virtual machines running their own 
operating systems. The operating systems of the virtual machines do not communicate 
directly with the assembly language of the hardware, but communicate with a middleware 
called “hypervisor”. The hypervisor interprets the instructions from multiple operating 
systems and translates them into consolidated assembly language instructions which are 
passed on to the CPU. Intel and AMD have developed special CPUs for running hypervisors 
for virtualisation ready servers (Phelps and Dawson, 2007). 
2.3.4 Configurable Cloud Resource 
The cloud users do not get opportunities to know about the pooled resources made 
available to them through the provisioning manager. They only have access to the user and 
development interfaces provided to them by the cloud service provider. The developers can 
use standard APIs to add functionalities to the workflows. The APIs do not facilitate 
development of an entire software product, but do allow the in-house developers of the user 
organisation to focus on the business logic and its processes, and create/modify the 
workflows and the interfaces (forms, reports and documents) (Chorafas, 2011). Examples of 
workflows that can be configured on the cloud are – user and privilege management 
workflows, service creation workflows (e.g. adding mailboxes), software development life 
cycle (SDLC) workflows, domain specific workflows (HR, Finance, Marketing, etc.) (Litoiu 
and Litoiu 2010). Litoiu and Litoiu (2010) further emphasised that the resource creation, 
modification and deletion on clouds should be managed through an in-house change 
management system in the user company. All users connect to service oriented virtual 
machines, and the services provisioning done by the cloud service provider (using tools like 
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Open Nebula or IBM Tivoli) on such virtual machines are accessed by the end users (Younge 
et al. 2010). 
Threats and Security Risks in Cloud Computing 2.4 
Cloud computing platforms may be subject to the following threats as described by 
Bisong and Rahman (2011): 
(a) Unauthorised use of cloud computing components and resources 
(b) Threats and vulnerabilities in the APIs provided to the developers 
(c) Malicious insider trading 
(d) All possible threats and vulnerabilities associated with shared IT systems and 
resources. 
(e) Data manipulation, leakage and loss 
(f) Hijacking of accounts or user sessions 
(g) Other forms of unknown/emerging threats 
The users view their virtual machine systems as self-sufficient desktops that are 
isolated from others. However, the virtual machines are hosted on servers on hypervisors. 
Hence, hypervisors are the targets of the attackers (Sabahi, 2011). It may be noted that 
hypervisors should be viewed as special purpose operating systems that are vulnerable to the 
traditional exploits that have been troubling operations systems for a long time, like – buffer 
overflow, DDOS, zero day attacks, viruses, spyware, covert channels, Trojans, etc. It is 
possible that an attacker can take a valid subscription on the cloud, take ownership of one or 
more virtual machines, and begin attacking other virtual machines. It may be noted that there 
are many exploits that need not be installed on the operating system, albeit they can just be 
launched from a folder. Hence, traditional security controls are needed on the cloud as well 
(Wen and Xiang, 2011; Sabahi, 2011). 
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2.4.1 Privacy on the Cloud 
Following are the key privacy requirements on the cloud, as described by                   
Katzan (2010): 
(a) Identity: Identity on the cloud is an entity, which may be a virtual machine or a user 
or the objects that they are trying to access (an application, a data file, a folder, a 
document, or a record). For interaction of two entities, it is important that a trust is 
established between them. For example, a user is accessing a folder, a virtual machine 
connecting to a data file, a user trying to associate a record with a document, etc. In 
traditional self-hosted systems, there are multiple settings possible to establish trust 
between two identities such that they can interact or a session is denied (Katzan, 
2010). The cloud systems should comprise the proven mechanisms of trust 
establishment between any two identities, like – identity management tools (LDAP, 
RADIUS, TACACS, etc.), RSA based public key cryptography issued and managed 
by a certification authority, secured socket layer, etc. (Ranganathan, 2010). NIST 
recommends Extensible Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML) and Security 
Assertion Mark-up Language (SAML) as the mechanisms for authentication and 
authorisation decision making between any two cooperating entities (Jansen and 
Grace 2011). Both SAML and XACML are emerging as large scale role mining and 
policy engineering standards for service oriented architecture, and hence are suitable 
for cloud computing (Takabi et al. 2010).  
(b) Authentication: In every IT system, there are multiple levels of authentication 
depending upon the access rights of the user or the system. Clouds normally have 
distributed authentication mechanism to distribute load (Katzan, 2010). The SaaS 
provider will be accountable for all authentication levels till the users are allowed to 
the web apps servers hosting their workflows. The authentication and privileges 
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within the workflows and the backend database objects have to be managed by the 
user company. The SaaS provider will however be responsible to manage proven 
mechanisms of trust establishment between any two identities, whoever make the 
settings – users or cloud administrators. For example, if a workflow administrator 
makes privilege settings, the system supporting these settings is under SaaS provider’s 
ownership. Similarly, if the users make privilege settings for access to database 
objects, the SaaS provider is responsible to make sure that they work. Overall, the 
SaaS provider is responsible for effective isolation of two entities, whether users, 
companies, virtual machines, group of objects in the database, etc. irrespective of who 
manages the security administration tools – a user or an administrator on the cloud. 
The roles should be very clearly bifurcated between the two parties such that during 
an incident analysis, it is clear who is accountable (Pearson  2009). 
(c) Authorisation: Authorisation is the level of privileges assigned to a requesting entity, 
depending upon its role defined in the system. It is closely linked with authentication 
and the details are normally stored on the same systems used to manage 
authentication. Essentially, authentication and authorisation should be viewed as parts 
of the same security control because they cannot be delinked. On the cloud, the roles 
may be defined by the user company or the SaaS administrator depending upon the 
object. For example, the SaaS administrator will define roles in the web servers, 
whereas the user company should have an administrator defining roles in the 
workflows and backend database objects (Katzan 2010; Jansen and Grace 2011). 
NIST recommends that every user entity and virtual machine entity should have valid 
authentication and authorisation tagging. Guest accounts or stray accounts (not 
actively used by any entity) should be strictly prohibited (Jansen and Grace 2011). 
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(d) Accountability: This is the most complex challenge on cloud computing platforms. 
Given that the underlying systems are owned and managed by the cloud service 
providers, technically they are the ones responsible for any breach. However, there 
can be conflicts. For example, a user company may claim that the security settings in 
the workflow didn’t work, or the cloud providers may claim that the user company 
didn’t make the settings adequately in the workflow. Hence, essentially it is important 
that there is a high trust on the capabilities of the underlying platform. The security 
procedures of the hosting framework should be co-designed by the user company and 
the cloud provider (Pearson and Charlesworth 2009). NIST recognises this aspect and 
hence has tried to present a method. They have recommended that the cloud service 
provider should clearly mention the underlying platforms used for trust management, 
and the user company should clearly understand the capabilities of the platforms. 
They should accept the services only when they are satisfied with the platforms, or 
else use a third party for accessing the cloud (example, a unified threat management 
cloud provider). In general, each migration to the cloud should be treated as a change 
management project and an in-depth risk assessment should be carried out by the user 
companies. The cloud service providers should fully co-operate by sharing all the 
information about the platforms and technology (after filtering confidential 
information as applicable). The agreement between the cloud service provider and the 
user company should be based on the risk assessment and impact analysis. NIST 
recommends a number of best practices that the cloud provider should adopt (taken 
from traditional IT risk management practices) to make this process simpler. The 
accountabilities should be documented very clearly such that there are no conflicts 
during incident management (Jansen and Grace 2011). 
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2.4.2 Component Level Security on the Cloud 
There are two key issues in component level security on the cloud: 
(a) Trustworthy computing  
(b) Auditing and compliance  
Trustworthy computing should predictable, reliable and controllable and hence should 
be secured by design with high level of accuracy. At the component level, the trusted 
computing framework should have a trustworthy hardware, operating system, software tools, 
applications, maintainability and serviceability (Katzan 2010). As described by Shen and 
Tong (2010), the cloud computing components should benefit from the specifications 
developed by trusted computing group (TCG) in 2003, which comprises a number of 
hardware and software vendors. In this model, the hardware, operating system, software 
systems and applications are viewed as a stack of trustworthy systems certified by the TCG. 
For example, when Windows operating system is ported on IBM hardware, both vendors 
ensure complete compatibility and protection. Hence, it is essential that all the components 
deployed on the cloud should be the ones certified by TCG (Shen and Tong 2010). 
However, it is important that the user companies should be confident about the 
cloud’s trustworthiness. Hence, there should be established mechanisms for auditing the 
cloud’s trustworthiness. Gul et al. (2011) discussed that the concept of third party auditor and 
security administration services should be implemented on the cloud. In this mode, these 
scholars have recommended different designs and topologies for connecting third party 
auditors or security administrators with the SaaS or IaaS providers’ clouds. Carvalho (2011) 
recommended that identity management should be provided by separate cloud service 
providers called “security-as-a-service”, using the traditional concept of “unified threat 
management” in service oriented mode. As explained by Chao et al. (2010), unified threat 
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management is a system in which a packet passing through is inspected against all possible 
threats before allowing to the destination host. However, the Gartner report recommends that 
virtualised data centres should have embedded security within the server arrays, by 
implementing security services on some of the virtualised servers and allowing the incoming 
user sessions to pass through them to the virtual machines hosting applications. This is 
because the inter-VM traffic within the same server (virtual networking) cannot be inspected 
by external network security devices (MacDonald, 2010). 
In this study, the author has created an OPNET model comprising a separate security-
as-a-service cloud (designated as UTM cloud) and tested the simulation of all user traffic 
passing through the UTM cloud to the application clouds. The results of simulation are 
discussed for analysing the feasibility of this solution vis-à-vis the solution proposed by 
Gartner report. The concept of security-as-a-service is good for transferring the risks to a 
service provider specialised on security only, rather than transferring the risks to a SaaS 
provider taking security as an embedded responsibility. This may ensure better compliance 
and better governance of security controls as per the risk assessment models of user 
companies. However, the practical feasibility also needs to be ascertained, which is the 
deliverable of the experiment conducted in this research. 
2.4.3 Personnel Level Security on the Cloud 
As per the above analysis, it is revealed that the personnel level security depends upon 
the personalisation of each user as an entity on the cloud. As discussed above, this depends 
upon the capability of segregating entities on the cloud, and maintenance of reliable trust 
management platforms. Trustworthy computing is the answer to this requirement, provided 
the components used for personalisation and segregation can be identified. In author’s view, 
the cloud service providers should be able to produce tangible answers to a user’s questions,        
36 
 
 
like – how do you ensure my login is protected, how is my login segregated from others, how 
is my data protected, how is my data segregated from others’, etc. The third party auditor 
should be able to verify the personalisation and segregation effectiveness of the cloud service 
providers. Also, Unified threat management (security-as-a-service) may be an effective 
answer to personalisation and segregation.  
Security Solutions for Cloud Computing 2.5 
The steps recommended by NIST for security assessments before moving to the cloud 
are worth noting (Jansen and Grace, 2011):  
(a) The user company should clearly identify the security and privacy requirements and 
define the criteria for selecting a SaaS provider. 
(b) Based on the short listing of SaaS providers (and the related PaaS and IaaS providers), 
the user company should carry out detailed risk assessment using the information 
collected from the cloud providers and mapping with the internal control objectives. 
(c) The capabilities and commitments of the chosen cloud provider should be very clearly 
recorded. 
(d) All information assets being moved to the cloud should be listed. An 
acknowledgement against each asset should be taken from the cloud provider before 
moving them. The cloud provider should tangibly verify if the asset acknowledged by 
them has been moved to the cloud. 
(e) It is advised that a competent legal advisor is involved when the terms of SLA are 
being drafted. Every line item should have clear accountability description, and no 
vague areas should be allowed. The jurisdiction of the conflicts should be clearly 
agreed, because clouds are global. All confidentiality and accountability clauses 
should be in line with legal and regulatory requirements of the jurisdiction. 
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(f) The agreement should clearly mention what and how reports will be published by the 
cloud provider and what and how the user company will audit at the cloud premises 
periodically. 
(g) There should be detailed termination agreement. The roles of both the user company 
and the cloud provider should be clearly documented with the help of legal advisor. 
Issues like data lock-in and other possibilities of hindrances caused by the cloud 
provider in withdrawal by the user company should be clearly identified and 
addressed. 
(h) There should be special clauses about how the cloud provider will return the assets to 
the user company (and vice versa) should be documented. Methods of data 
destruction and validation should be clearly stated. When the clauses are invoked, it is 
essential that both parties should follow all separation steps necessary under the 
regulatory framework to avoid any claims thereafter. 
Based on these recommendations by NIST and the literature review in previous 
sections, let us analyse the three risk mitigation strategies, as recommended by a separate 
standard by NIST on risk management (Stoneburner et al.  2002). 
2.5.1 Transferring the Risks 
The process recommended by NIST is essentially a method of transferring risks to the 
cloud service provider. The user company may trust its due diligence done in selecting the 
cloud service provider and carrying out the risk assessment. In practice, the risk assessment 
will be based on information shared by the cloud service provider and its references (other 
customers). Hence, to a large extent the best that a user company can do is to ensure that the 
contract comprises all the terms from legal perspective, and the jurisdiction and contract 
enforcement aspects are carefully documented and agreed. There will be a significant element 
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of risk, which will be out of the control of the user company. Hence, the theories of 
trustworthy computing and effective trust management, personalisation and segregation 
practices will enable the user organisation to make a decision. The idea of security-as-a-
service appears to be more promising because the risks will be transferred to a service 
provider specialised in security only, and it can be expected that the service provider has 
invested in state-of-the-art security products and solutions. However, the idea of all the user 
traffic passing through the security-as-a-service (UTM) cloud may not be feasible in practice. 
The author has tried to present this argument with the help of simulations carried out in 
thisstudy. 
2.5.2 Absorbing the Risks 
As discussed in the literature review, the systems will be owned by the cloud service 
provider. However, the security management practices will be shared between the cloud and 
the user company. For example, the SaaS provider or UTM service provider will take 
accountability of the authentication and authorisation services at the virtual machine level, 
but the user companies will have to take accountability of the security settings of the 
workflows. Assuming that the SaaS or UTM service provider has taken care of trustworthy 
computing effectively, all other risks pertaining to workflow security will be the 
accountability of the user company. Hence, a significant element of risks will have to be 
absorbed by the user companies as well. There should be effective security administration 
practices in the user companies as well, which should effectively interface with the service 
provider’s security administration team (Al-Aqrabi et al. 2013). 
2.5.3 Avoiding the Risks 
As per NIST’s recommendations, risks can be avoided by implementing effective 
security controls. In the recommendations pertaining to cloud privacy controls, NIST has 
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mentioned about internal control objectives of a user organisation. As recommended, these 
objectives should be effectively mapped with the capabilities of the cloud service providers 
before selecting the preferred one. If the cloud service provider is able to publish internal 
audit reports periodically that tangibly demonstrate the effectiveness of the controls, the user 
companies can treat the risks as avoided rather than transferred. This is because in a 
partnership mode, the internal auditors of the cloud service provider can be treated as internal 
auditors of the user organisations as well. Both the parties will be under compliance pressure 
within a jurisdiction and hence mutual partnership to avoid risks is a better arrangement than 
considering the risks to be transferred from one party to another. This arrangement will 
reduce the chances of conflicts and will increase the longevity of the service-oriented IT 
deployment for the businesses. 
Compliance and its Measurement 2.6 
Ruiter and Warnier (2011) stated that the only way to measure compliance is to allow 
third party auditing of cloud services by certified bodies or regulatory authorities. The cloud 
service providers will be under compliance pressure as much as the user organisations. 
Hence, they will definitely support third party auditing. However, as argued by Ruan et al. 
(2011), the third party auditors are currently not ready with tools, techniques and procedures 
to audit virtualised computing environments. In the current scenario, compliance can only be 
measured at the level of a user organisation, whereby the cloud provider will be required to 
demonstrate their capabilities related to trust management, authentication and authorisation, 
segregation, and personalisation. However, a complete auditing of the cloud providers will 
not be possible using traditional auditing tools used by third party auditors. Ruan et al. (2011) 
further stated that the auditors are not ready with tools for carrying out forensic analysis on 
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the cloud. Hence, the compliance measurement aspect of cloud computing is still inadequate 
and requires significant amount of development and testing. 
 
Summary 2.7 
The Cloud-based business processes contain collaborating BI services from multiple 
heterogeneous security realms which need to be engaged dynamically at runtime. If 
authentication relationships are established among different security realms, the process may 
involve large numbers of extra and expensive steps for converting artefacts. The federated 
authentication establishment may require time-consuming activities for negotiations and 
amendments. This framework may become complicated further when multiple parties 
coordinate within an authentication system for accessing resources stored on multiple clouds. 
The existing frameworks do not address the scenario when members of multiple sub-domains 
want to interact to access resources stored on multiple clouds. To address this research gap, 
this PhD project proposes a multi-party authentication framework for securing Business 
Intelligence on cloud computing. Specifically, the proposal applies to the situation when 
members of different security realms need to access distributed BI services through a trusted 
principal. Our proposed framework can authenticate dynamically and not requiring a lot of 
other processes for credential conversion that will need extensive invocations to intermediate 
services. 
In this chapter, the security risks on cloud computing have been reviewed, and the 
unified threat management (UTM) and distributed models for securing cloud infrastructure 
are reviewed. In addition, the NIST recommendations on managing risks on cloud computing 
are reviewed and analysed in detail. The reviews in this chapter have resulted in a theoretical 
foundation about security risks and solutions in cloud computing. This foundation has been 
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useful in preparing the primarily OPNET models presented in chapter 4. The next chapter 
presents a detailed review of literatures on planning and hosting business intelligence on 
cloud computing. 
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Chapter 3: Business Intelligence on the Clouds 
Background 3.1 
Cloud computing is conceptualized in three forms – software-as-a-service (SaaS), 
platform-as-a-service (PaaS) and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) (Convery 2010). The SaaS 
providers interface with the end users by virtue of provisioning of business application 
services similar to the ones that have been traditionally self-hosted by the corporate houses 
(Convery 2010). Cloud computing is getting popular because it offers many benefits over 
self-hosted IT infrastructures. The cloud computing users can discard the hassles of large 
scale investments in hardware and software platforms, in upgrading them regularly and in 
expensive licenses of application software used to run business processes, related transactions 
and decision-support systems (Brieter, 2010).  
The end customers are required to pay for the services as per their usage of the 
underlying resources hosting the application and data services. This model has ensured better 
affordability of the best possible application systems thus supporting an increase in efficiency 
of businesses. The resources are allocated to end users against service requests made by their 
end terminals. The resources are allocated by a service provisioning engine that verifies the 
eligibility of the users from a separate schema object holding multi-tenancy data about all 
cloud users and groups. Once the eligibility is verified, the resources are reserved for the user 
through session bindings till the computing processes are in progress by the user terminal. 
The terminal is normally a virtualized client presented through a virtual server farm. 
However, there can be direct loading of resources as well (example, for data backup) (Bento 
and Bento 2011).  
A separate layer monitors the session usage and utilization of resources such that the 
billing related information can be generated (Demchenko and Laat 2011). NIST is in the 
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process of developing standard protocols for user connectivity to the cloud through 
virtualization interface, terminal emulation interface, thin client interface and Internet 
browser interface. As of now, there is no standard protocol for users’ connectivity to cloud 
hosted resources (NIST, 2011). 
Business intelligence (BI) has been one of the most resource intensive applications 
historically. It comprises a number of data warehouses created by fetching decision-support 
data from organization wide databases. The data warehouses are updated at frequent intervals 
through appropriate queries executed on the business processing and transactional databases. 
An online analytical processing (OLAP) application fetches data from the data warehouses, 
organizes them in highly complex multidimensional data cubes, and presents to the users 
through user defined and configured GUI dashboards (Glaser and Stone, 2008). 
BI and OLAP framework has a high business utility, because it helps in locating and 
eliminating/solving business process deficiencies, inefficient process steps and waste process 
steps. A BI and OLAP framework is expected to provide timely, accurate, organized and 
integrated information to business decision makers (Glaser and Stone 2008).  
In spite of excellent business utility of BI and OLAP framework, many business 
owners were compelled to look for its alternative because of uncontrolled increase in 
computing and storage resource requirements in self-hosted environments. At some stage, the 
cost of maintaining and upgrading the BI and OLAP framework becomes unjustified for a 
business (Preston 2007). However, the unique selling points of cloud computing offers 
exactly what businesses need to successfully run BI and OLAP frameworks – unlimited 
resources, resource elasticity (resources on demand), moderate usage costs, high uptime and 
availability, high security, no hassles of upgrading and maintaining loads of servers and 
databases, etc. (Bento and Bento 2011). 
44 
 
 
Hence, it is hereby argued that cloud computing has the potential to offer a new lease 
of life to BI and OLAP framework. Moreover, it is also argued that cloud computing will also 
extend the power of BI and OLAP to small and medium scale businesses, which could not 
have afforded the framework in self-hosted IT infrastructures. However, it is important to 
establish a framework for implementing BI and OLAP on cloud computing platform. This 
research presents a literature review on how BI and OLAP framework can be implemented on 
the clouds and also presents its modelling and behaviour by virtue of an OPNET based 
simulation experiment. We have described how BI and OLAP framework can be modelled on 
a cloud and how it should behave in order to extend maximum utility to the businesses. 
A review of BI with OLAP on Cloud Computing 3.2 
3.2.1 BI and OLAP Framework 
BI and OLAP framework comprises a highly complex multi-layer structure. 
Following are the key components of BI and OLAP framework (Glaser and Stone 2008): 
a) A user interface layer comprising a large library of dashboards for graphical reporting. 
b) A layer of data analytics comprising what-if scenarios, reports, stored queries and data 
models. 
c) A layer storing the OLAP cubes formed by multi-dimensional data extraction from the 
data layer (the data warehouses). 
d) A data integration layer for identification, cleaning, organizing and grouping of data 
extracted from the data warehouses before the cubes are formed. 
e) A data layer comprising of the data warehouses. 
f) A layer acquiring data from the business processing, decision support and transactional 
databases used by various functions of the organization. 
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g) The layer comprising the IT infrastructure components and related resources (data 
processing, storage and networking). 
 
The key feature of a BI and OLAP framework is the OLAP cube, which is a 
multidimensional view formed in the structure of a matrix. The OLAP cube is a complex data 
view formed by running simultaneous queries on the tables of the underlying data 
warehouses that fetch at least three times more data compared with an ordinary database 
query. Each cube comprises a stack of multiple two dimensional reports (an ordinary planar 
graph showing a relationship between two variables). In typical OLAP applications, the 
queries fetch typically 10 to 12 times more data than an ordinary database query (Ross 2005). 
An OLAP application may comprise multiple OLAP cubes stored in the form of a 
complex hierarchy of matrices having data organized in the form of cross-tabulations. The 
cubes are normally stored in separate data marts or within predefined tables in the data 
warehouses (Boutsinas 2005). 
The common OLAP functions employed for formation of such cubes with a hierarchy 
of cross-tabulated data are drill-down, merge/split, roll-up, slice-and-dice and pivoting. Each 
matrix plane is identified by its own classification comprising different data mappings, like 
product codes mapped with product managers, product codes mapped with sales locations, 
locations mapped with revenues, revenues mapped with sales person, etc. The planes form a 
nest-like structure due to interrelationships. The resulting relationship looks like a tree with 
the roots comprising the primary variables and the branches comprising the secondary 
variables. For example, a product code is a primary variable and revenues generated in a sales 
location is a secondary variable. The dashboard operator can modify or change the primary 
and secondary variables, which direct the query to fetch different set of data to form different 
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cross-tabulations in the next querying cycle on the underlying data warehouses. Hence, the 
OLAP cubes are flexible and can be changed dynamically as per the business needs.  
The following figure shows the BI and OLAP framework: 
 
 
Figure 9: The BI and OLAP framework 
Figure 9 illustrates two forms of cubes – the OLAP multidimensional data cubes and 
the OLAP master data cubes. The master data cubes control the relationship formation 
between the two-dimensional data planes within the multi-dimensional data cubes. A 
business user is offered a large range of variables that he/she can combine to form different 
views of two-dimensional reports needed in the dashboards. The data is pulled from OLTP 
(online transaction processing) and DSS (decision-support systems) databases into the data 
warehouse tables periodically, which in turn helps in periodic automatic updating of the data 
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in the data cubes and finally in the dashboards. Hence, the business users can closely monitor 
business performance by virtue of continuously updating dashboards. Appropriate colour 
coding of reference points/thresholds helps in generating alerts and alarms that helps the 
business strategic decision-makers to take appropriate steps (Cuzzocrea et al. 2007). 
3.2.2 BI and OLAP on Cloud Computing 
On the cloud, the matrices in the OLAP cubes can be formed using the web data 
warehousing concept making use of XML data files using DTD (document type definition) 
described XML programming language (Vrdoljak et al. 2003). The data structures in the 
cubes are formed using the DTD parsed XML files. The DTD format helps an XML file to 
exhibit relational properties of a conventional database. This is what enables the OLAP cubes 
stored on the cloud making use of XML data files following DTD structures (known as web 
cubes). This also helps the BI system to make use of web services components thus ensuring 
better performance on the cloud (Chadha and Iyer, 2010). 
The entire OLAP framework comprising the dashboards and the data analytics layer 
can be hosted as SaaS. The BI and OLAP framework software platforms available for cloud 
hosting are SAP, IBM Cognos and Web-Sphere dashboards, Oracle business objects and 
Salesforce.com. The integration of data warehouses (XML based) and OLTP/DSS databases 
can be hosted on PaaS. The underlying servers, databases, storage and networking 
infrastructure components can be hosted on IaaS (Chadha and Iyer 2010). 
The databases on the cloud need to be implemented in the form of a massively 
parallel system to support high demand elasticity of BI and OLAP framework. A centralized 
schema object may be designed to hold the details and privileges of all tenants on the cloud. 
The actual data files may be distributed among different schema objects. Each schema object 
holding the data files may be massively partitioned such that each partition can be held by a 
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separate server on a large scale server array. The IaaS provider should be capable of rapid 
expansion of the server array making use of virtualized array expansion. In this way, it may 
be possible to serve one partition through more than one server that can enhance the 
performance of BI. The IaaS provider should keep a close watch on the load distribution and 
response time patterns and make effective network changes to ensure that the network load is 
also distributed evenly (Curino et al. 2011). 
The OLAP application hosted on the cloud may not be web services compatible. To 
make an OLAP application compatible to web services architecture, the SaaS provider may 
allow creating an intermediate layer to host a dependency graph that helps in dropping the 
attributes not needed in the finalized XML data cube (Aboulnaga et al., 2009). 
Based on the reviews it is concluded that the key challenges in hosting BI on cloud 
are the following: 
(a) Compliance of the BI application with web services architectural standards (and the 
standards defined by the SaaS or PaaS provider, like Google Apps standards) 
(b) Deployment of massively parallel data-warehousing system with evenly distributed 
query load and even patterns of response times from all database servers. The IaaS 
provider should effectively use the virtualized server array management and 
expansion to meet the resources on demand. 
(c) The network architecture should be designed in such a way that the query load can be 
evenly distributed among the servers in an array. This will ensure even query 
processing response times by the servers in an array. If the server array employs 
storage area networking for storing the XML data files and the OLAP cubes, the data 
fetching from various storage devices should again be evenly distributed by virtue of 
appropriate network connections. 
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BI hosting on cloud can ensure a distinct advantage pertaining to multidimensional 
faceted search on the underlying data warehouses. Every OLAP application supports 
multidimensional faceted search because of its ability to organize multidimensional 
information in the form of cubes. A faceted search helps in reducing information overload 
because it gives the user an opportunity to choose multiple category filters for searching a 
particular information using drill down feature of OLAP search function. For example, if a 
user wants to buy a new car, he/she can define multiple facets (like, make, model, year, city, 
and colour) to fetch multidimensional information from the data warehouses through 
organized filtering. This method helps the user to make use of wide scale of information from 
the data warehouses through a structured query (Kashyap et al. 2010). 
Faceted search is highly resource intensive, especially when a large number of facets 
are defined in a structured query. In the past, researchers have been struggling to optimize the 
performance of faceted search tools sitting on the top of OLAP cubes in self hosted data 
warehouses. However, the service oriented architecture on cloud computing is an ideal 
platform to accelerate the performance of faceted search on OLAP cubes by virtue of 
massively parallel computing resources. The cubes in services oriented architecture is formed 
in the form of multidimensional XML data files, as discussed in the beginning of this section. 
The faceted search can be created in the form of a hierarchy of facets. The search results may 
be in the form of a set of multidimensional results with zoom-in and zoom-out options. These 
results may be stored in temporary view tables. On the cloud, the OLAP cubing operations 
can be carried out on the search results to extend the visibility of faceted search to the 
dashboards. These cubes may be temporary and serve the purpose of temporary drill-down or 
slicing/dicing until the user is successful in deriving the desired results. The mechanism is 
highly resource intensive and hence the massively parallel processing ability of cloud 
computing can make its usage feasible (Lempel and Sheinwald 2010). 
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3.2.3 Benefits of Cloud BI 
Nowadays, Cloud BI solutions are gradually gaining popularity among businesses, as 
many businesses are realising the benefits of data analytics. Businesses need quality insights 
driven by accurate data more than ever. The SaaS providers are serving as the primary 
interfacing to the business user’s community. Cloud BI is the concept of delivering BI 
capabilities as a service (Al-Aqrabi et al. 2014). The following are key benefits of Cloud 
computing for business intelligence. 
	
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In the Cloud, companies do not need to budget for large, up-front purchases of 
software packages or carry out time-consuming updates on local servers to put the BI 
infrastructure up and running. They will treat it as a service, paying only for the computing 
resources they need and avoid costly asset acquisition and maintenance thereby reducing the 
entry threshold barrier. 

		
Cloud BI solutions allow for greater flexibility to be altered quickly giving technical 
user access to new data sources, experimenting with analytical models. With the Cloud BI 
solutions, business users will be able to keep a better fiscal control over IT projects and have 
the flexibility to scale up or down usage as needs change. Moreover, in the Cloud, resources 
can automatically and rapidly scale in and scale out, and it can support large numbers of 
simultaneous users. This means that customers can easily increase their software usage 
without delay or the cost of having to deploy and install additional hardware and software. 

	
Reliability improves through the use of multiple redundant sites, which can provide 
reliability and secure locations for data storage and the resources can be spread across a large 
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number of users, which makes Cloud computing suitable for disaster recovery and business 
continuity. 

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
Cloud applications allow data access to be shared remotely and enable easy cross-
location data sharing capabilities as they are deployed via the Internet and outside a 
company’s firewall. 
	
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
Low TCO (total cost of ownership) is a key benefit of the Cloud model. With the 
Cloud, companies pay for a service they actually use. With this policy, Cloud computing 
allows companies better control the CAPEX (capital expenditure) and the OPEX (operations 
expenditure) associated with non-core activities. Hence, the benefits of BI can be rolled out 
faster to more users within the organisation. 
Business Intelligence Security on the Cloud 3.3 
Business intelligence (BI) is a complex framework in which, relevant data units are 
captured from all the transactional and decision-support databases in separate data-marts and 
data warehouses. The key components in a large-scale enterprise-class BI framework are the 
following (Lehner 2007): 
 
(a) Intelligent data extraction agents are installed in all the transaction processing 
databases and decision support systems of the organization. These data extraction 
agents follow certain rules defined by the BI strategist in a centralized data 
extraction engine controlling the agents. The process of data extraction may 
comprise of a selective export of database objects, or an SQL program with 
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appropriately defined select statements. Schiefer, List, and Bruckner (2002) 
emphasized that even external data sources may be needed by the business 
owners. The data from external sources may be collected in manual formats (like 
Excel) or sent by consultants in pre-defined formats. 
(b) The extracted data is loaded into temporary data marts. These data marts are 
accessed by expert data modellers to ensure that the data is transformed as per the 
standards set for the data warehouse. Golfarelli (1998) explained that a number of 
design components are needed in a data warehouse design, like – facts, 
dimensions, hierarchies, attribute tree, pruning rules, grafting rules, temporal and 
spatial designs, and OLAP cube structures. 
(c) The data needs cleaning and transformation into the desired formats before it is 
loaded into the data warehouse. Schiefer et al.  (2002) emphasized that there 
should be a change control process to ensure that the transformed data is approved 
before loading into the data warehouse.  
(d) After appropriate cleaning and transforming, the data is finally loaded into the 
data warehouses. SQL loader and object import are used at the core level. 
However, they are ably controlled by advanced data loading tools eliminating 
chances of errors. 
(e) The data units are accessed from the data warehouses through multi-dimensional 
OLAP queries. A number of interfaces are in action. Examples are software, 
hardware and database interfaces, front-end interfaces (dashboards and special 
purpose report customization and presentation screens, such as crystal reports), 
and data visualization (export to excel, adobe acrobat or other formats). 
From this analysis, it is clear that business intelligence is not just an IT enabled 
system but comprises a number of processes requiring human interventions and interfacing. 
53 
 
 
3.3.1 BI Security on the Cloud 
Malinowski and Zimanyi (2008) explained that the rules of intervention (for data 
extraction, transformation and modelling) change periodically as per the business rules and 
the expectations of the business users. Hence, a lot of activity is carried out in changing the 
rules of data acquisition, data transformation, formatting, and finally loading. Hence, security 
challenges in BI is not just limited to technical settings but also related to procedural and 
human security. In this study, the focus is on technical security challenges and solutions when 
BI is hosted on cloud computing. Hence, the review from this point onwards is focused on 
technical security of BI. In the end, two OPNET models have been presented. The first model 
demonstrates security controls for BI on the cloud employing a separate cloud delivering 
security-as-a-service using unified threat management. In the second model, a distributed 
security controls framework is presented in which, the technical security controls are closely 
integrated in the database server arrays and the application server arrays. A comparison has 
been presented using custom reports in OPNET to evaluate which option is suitable for BI 
security on the cloud. 
3.3.2 BI Security Challenges and Controls 
A security architect for BI may be challenged to implement all possible technical 
controls at various stages of the BI process. A BI framework will need access controls at the 
hardware systems, at network systems, at the instances and objects of data marts and data 
warehouses, at the metadata repositories, at OLAP servers, at the data view systems, at the 
data presentation layer, at the application services layer, and all layers of authentication 
(Kadan, 2012). 
Farhan et al. (2012) emphasized that security rules are needed within the objects and 
closely tied with the tables holding temporary as well as permanent data. These rule tables are 
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needed in data marts employed at the extract level, the data marts at the data transformation 
and cleaning level, and the data warehouses at the loading level. The rules comprise of 
permissions for the human agents involved in extraction, transformation and loading. The 
rules also comprise read and write permissions on the temporal and non-temporal data. As an 
example, Farhan, Marie et al.  (2012) demonstrated how security constraints could be applied 
at object level to control and log formation of dimensions. 
Fernandez-Medinaa et al. (2007) presented a similar scheme for securing data 
warehouse objects. For running multi-dimensional OLAP queries, the objects in the data 
warehouse may be implemented in a multi-dimensional model. Fernandez-Medinaa, et al. 
(2007) proposed that security controls need to be integrated with the conceptual multi-
dimensional modelling by including objects describing and enforcing security constraints on 
various operations requested on the objects. They proposed a system of secure UML with 
extended modelling using object security constraint language (OSCL). Given the multi-
dimensional proposition of implementing security constraints, it is possible that security 
objects will also attain a hierarchical shape for securing many-to-many relationships within 
the hierarchy of various dimensions. Hence, security constraints need to be extended to 
making and breaking relationships in addition to transformation requests and data access 
requests. They illustrated this concept through a hierarchical structure of a multidimensional 
model in which, field level restrictions have been implemented through the multi-dimensional 
access control rules. 
The tight object level security controls presented by references Farhan et al.  (2012) 
justified that given that the data has been extracted from the domain owners through the 
extraction agents and until the time it is loaded into the data warehouses, the temporary 
databases do not have owners of different data units (Brankovic et al. 2000). In practice, BI 
users are secondary users of the data units and hence may not be able to own their security 
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because the data units are flowing in continuously. Thus, there may be a threat of lack of 
information on handling a data unit (Brankovic et al. 2000). This mandates that the controls 
on the data units in temporal and non-temporal databases should be more stringent that the 
original data stores from where the data units have been extracted. However, such tightly 
coupled security in the multidimensional objects and the query, transformation, loading, and 
views processes makes the overall BI very heavily loaded with security-linked objects. There 
may be further rules engine for securing OLAP cubes positioned above the data warehouses 
(Blanco et al. 2009). Ahmad (2010) recommended that data might be encrypted during the 
transformation process before loading into the data warehouse.  
The above analysis presents a challenge in implementing reliable and effective 
security controls in BI. It may appear that a combined security framework comprising 
multidimensional security architecture within the database objects, hierarchical controls on 
all relationships and data encryption at the object level may produce a significant volume of 
security related objects in the BI framework. This may make the BI framework heavier on 
computing resources and capacity hungry. Moreover, the BI framework may significantly 
overload the network as well due to added security validation overloads. It should be kept in 
mind that even the network will comprise of its own security-linked overheads (for example 
encryption on the LAN, MAN and WAN links).  
Stobla et al. (2005) has presented a solution to this problem in the form of a cluster of 
federated data warehouses connecting to separate network switches and storage hardware. 
Such a system may comprise multiple data warehouse implementations in multiple servers 
through a process of depersonalization. The framework proposed by Stobla et al. (2005) is 
redrawn and presented in Figure 10 below: 
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Figure 10: A federated data-warehouse system to facilitate distributed security  
(Stobla et al 2005) 'content removed for copyright reasons' 
 
The framework proposes creating a distributed data warehouse system comprising 
federated database servers owned by different administrative groups. The federated systems 
ensure that critical data is striped into multiple data elements whereby, an individual data 
element does not make sense to any user unless all corresponding data elements are 
combined. This concept of striping critical data is termed depersonalization. The sensitive 
data units or their groups are first identified and then striped smartly to ensure that one or 
more elements do not reveal the information hidden in the data units after they are assembled. 
In the second phase, called pseudonymization, all re-identification requirements of a data unit 
are eliminated. For example, if the data unit comprises a social security number matched with 
the age, first name and last name of an individual, then after splitting this information, the 
programmer need to ensure that they need not be integrated at an intermediate stage before 
reaching the authorized user. The third step is federation, in this phase the OLAP queries are 
federated in such a way that it fetches data stripes from the databases and assembles them 
only at an authorized user’s workstation. This system gives an impression that the authorized 
users are accessing a virtual data warehouse which is invisible to unauthorized personnel 
(Stobla et al. 2005). 
A closer analysis of this model reveals that federating the data warehouses and 
stripping the critical data into multiple data elements fetched and assembled through a 
federated OLAP query may return similar results compared with a virtualization system. 
Hence, keeping in view the recommendations by scholars about security solutions it appears 
that BI on cloud can address the security needs. This is because BI itself is very resource 
hungry and its security overheads are much heavier than other relational database 
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applications. Abadi (2009) argued that relational databases could be made highly elastic on 
the clouds, and hence all these additional security related schema objects can be easily 
implemented and expanded on the cloud. In self-hosted mode, such schemas may simply add 
to the overheads, increase cost, and cause reduction in efficiency and effectiveness of the 
entire system.  
Before undertaking a review of BI on the cloud, a review of OLAP security is 
presented herewith. OLAP is a dynamic multidimensional reporting application. The data is 
first consolidated in the form of views comprising data cubes, and then presented to a 
dashboard application that can facilitate multiple presentations of data for the end users. A 
basic OLAP view comprises of a services cube and a user cube. The security settings in an 
OLAP system may be based on access restrictions to whole cubes or parts of a cube (Priebe 
and Pernul, 2000).  
OLAP security controls may also comprise permissions to carry out OLAP 
operations, like – roll-up, drill-down, drill across, set operations, selection, change base, 
projection, and slice-and-dice. This can be achieved by using multidimensional security 
constraint language (MDSCL) incorporating creating cube, hiding cube, hiding measure, 
hiding slice, hiding level, and hiding measure where an attribute is present syntaxes  
(Priebe and Pernul, 2001). The distributed security controls model is redrawn and presented 
in Figure 11 below:               
 
Figure 11: Distributed security controls in an OLAP cube comprising viewing 
(Priebe and Pernul 2001) 'content removed for copyright reasons' 
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Figure 11 presents basic and advanced controls those can be applied to an OLAP 
cube. These controls can be pulled from a centralized logical controls engine and applied to 
various cubes created by the users. A data security administrator or even the users can pull 
and apply access controls. The controls engine needs to be designed at the logical layer of the 
OLAP and relational database systems, and the pull-down menus needs to be designed at the 
conceptual level where the multidimensional data modelling has been carried out (Priebe and 
Pernul 2001).  
Based on these fundamentals, the OLAP system can be made to preserve privacy of 
users based on a new protocol called Secure Distributed-OLAP aggregation protocol (SDO). 
Such an OLAP system can generate privacy-preserving views in addition to local data views. 
Such views present the identity of the owners those have established or manipulated 
multidimensional relations (a form of object and view-level activity logging for manipulation 
of multidimensional relationships) (Cuzzocrea et al. 2012). 
The advantage of having such a view is that any unauthorized manipulation of 
structures and dimensions (apart from the team engaged in transformation tasks) can be 
detected. The privacy view will present details about the “privacy metrics” captured from the 
user attributes against each committed operation on the database objects. It will be in the 
form of a tree that follows the hierarchy structure and related dimensions built by a 
transformer (Agrawal et al., 2005).  
Wang et al. (2004) explained that the privacy metrics could be termed as inferences 
that analyses the source of sensitive information and the target where it is requested based on 
a sensitivity criterion and logs the personal details in the transaction log. This phenomenon 
will be based on the original privacy settings of the source transactional database (Wang  
2004).  
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Fienberg (2006) proposed more controls built over privacy-preserving features built in 
the data marts, data warehouses and OLAP cubes. The recommendations include deployment 
of intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) deployed close to the databases, 
authentication and authorization repositories (like LDAP), and the temporary stores for 
OLAP cubes. In addition, Fienberg (2006) recommended deploying secured socket layers 
(SSL) based user access systems, and encryption of critical data elements including objects 
holding privacy preserving information. The idea is to implement selective revelation through 
security barriers based on a calculation of risk-utility trade-off and need-to-know-basis 
strategy.   
The above reviews indicate that scholars have preferred distributed and embedded 
security components in BI components rather than centralized security controls (like the 
unified threat management framework). However, the studies have not presented evidences 
on how the distributed and embedded security components are expected to perform in 
comparison with a unified threat management approach, given that the computing and 
networking resources are always limited. In this study, the two approaches have been tested 
by modelling them separately in OPNET and comparing the simulation results. Given that 
this is a study about BI security on the cloud, the modelling is done to reflect the cloud based 
database and OLAP server arrays. In the UTM approach, a centralized database monitoring 
system has been implemented in a security-as-a-service model. This system owns a system-
level root login into the database instances holding the objects and logs all DDL and DML 
commits along with the identity of users finalizing the modifications. Such a database 
security monitor is very common in legacy systems (like Oracle Enterprise manager). A 
separate database of activity logs is maintained by the security administrators. Exception 
reports are generated periodically by the security administrator to locate the transactions 
committed by individuals not supposed to have access to the objects. In the second model, 
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there is no UTM cloud, and all security components are embedded within the database and 
OLAP application servers. 
To build the models, a theoretical fundamental understanding about BI on the cloud 
and security issues in cloud computing is needed. Hence, the next two chapters are dedicated 
to establish the theoretical foundation needed on a cloud. 
3.3.3 Securing BI on the Cloud 
Any BI expert will visualize that moving BI to the cloud will involve a massive 
implementation of relational databases on the cloud hosted servers. Aboulnaga et al. (2009) 
presented a number of design considerations in deploying database appliances on the cloud. 
First, it needs to be considered how databases are deployed in a self-hosted or ISP hosted 
environments. A number of servers are normally deployed to facilitate load sharing and fail-
over. However, the database instances are tied to single servers, or at the most clusters of 
servers. The following figure demonstrates how databases are implemented in self-hosted IT 
infrastructures (Aboulnaga et al. 2009):  
 
Figure 12: Database appliances in self-hosted environment  
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In a self-hosted setting, each server holds a separate instance and copies of all 
databases is replicated within them. The advanced features of the database tool are used to 
create a clustering among all instances, each holding the same set of objects. The databases 
are kept synchronized with the help of advanced replication features. Given that, all the 
databases have a common set of transaction logs (due to advanced replication), the failover is 
implemented by applying the latest transaction logs on the remaining servers when one or 
more servers fail (Aboulnaga et al. 2009).  
This scenario is completely changed when the database appliances are hosted on a 
cloud. A presentation of relational databases on cloud is shown in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 13: Database appliances in cloud environment 
On a cloud, the database servers are connected in a large and flexible array. A single 
instance, and all the databases and their objects held by the instance, is partitioned to ensure 
that each server services one or more partition (Abadi 2009). The server arrays (both 
application and database) are implemented in the form of a massively parallel processing 
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system with no physical object tied to any specific hardware. This means that in a database 
array, each server will hold a partition of all data files in the instance (Al-Aqrabi et al. 2012). 
The data warehouses or temporary data marts on the clouds need not serve the 
applications through data files in their legacy formats. The applications are hosted in a web 
enabled services oriented architecture. Hence, the data files presented to the applications may 
be in XML format. Hence, all data warehouses on the cloud may employ XML files 
comprising the intended hierarchies and dimensions (Vrdoljak et al. 2003). 
It is possible to use XML files as data cubes because of their hierarchical structure 
and ability to hold multidimensional views (Hummer et al. 2003).  The database resources are 
assigned to the application servers through a provisioning engine facing the array of 
application servers, and the application services are provided to cloud tenants through another 
web-services provisioning engine facing the tenant machines. This model is called database-
as-a-service on the cloud (Curino et al. 2011).  
The temporal and non-temporal data files in data mines as well as data warehouses are 
stored in the form of relational XML files. The OLAP views are generated by creating XML 
hierarchies as per the object requests chosen in the application. The requests are embedded 
into a XML query and the corresponding XML file is generated by the data mart or 
warehouse (Wang et al. 2010). 
Summary 3.4 
In this chapter, a review of BI architecture and mechanisms for hosting it on cloud 
computing is discussed. The knowledge gained from this review helps in understanding how 
BI can be hosted on cloud computing and how its architecture is different from traditional 
LAN hosted BI architectures. In the next chapter, a review of BI security risks and solutions 
is presented. 
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The reviews in this chapter have created a good insight about security threats in BI 
and the strategies for addressing them. In addition, the reviews have given a good overview 
about BI security controls in a cloud computing environment. These reviews have been used 
as inputs for creating the third  and fourth models in OPNET. In the next chapter, a review 
about OPNET modelling and details of the models pertaining to this research are presented. 
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Chapter 4: Primarily: Modelling and Scenarios 
Introduction 4.1 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, an overview of OPNET tool 
and review of simulation project using this tool is presented. In the second part, four 
simulation experiments using OPNET is described – cloud security, BI on the cloud, BI 
security on the cloud and multiparty authentication system for securing BI on the cloud. 
These experiments present a simulation based perspective of applying theoretical knowledge 
gained from literature review in practical scenarios such that the factor contributing to an 
optimum design for securing BI on the clouds can be derived. The results of these 
experiments have been discussed in this chapter. 
Research Methods 4.2 
Research methods are vital for the success of a project. This section describes the 
study modelling tools and Integrated Development Environment (IDE) that used within the 
project. The authentication system is designed, implemented and tested using high quality 
development tools, OPNET academic version, OPNET Modeller 14.5 and Eclipse. In this 
study, a set of experiments are implemented respectively to test and assess different scenarios 
of BI on the cloud that addresses the objectives.  
Research methods are vital for the success of a project. The possible research methods 
include empirical work, case studies analysis, questionnaire, and simulation 
Empirical methods are mainly based on empirical evidence. It is about 
gaining knowledge by means of direct and indirect experience or observation. Empirical 
studies; quantitative and qualitative approaches are part of the critical paradigms in empirical 
research. First, in qualitative research, the researcher is mainly concerned with studying 
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natural settings of objects. It is vital to note that in a qualitative method, the researcher 
indulges in interpreting phenomena using descriptions derived from other persons. Among 
the internal traits of qualitative research is the fact that there are diverse ways of 
interpretation of the occurrences under investigation. Thence, qualitative methods associated 
with determining causes identified by participants the research while aligning with their ideas 
regarding the underlying problem matter (Wohlin, 2012). 
On the other hand, quantitative research deals with quantifying associations or 
determining uniformity among groups with the purpose of obtaining an action and reaction 
trend among the groups of participants. As a means to effect quantitative research, controlled 
experiments are set up for the collection of the required data for the research study. Notably, 
therefore, the use of quantitative methods hence relies on measurement as an underlying 
constant in research (Conradi, Wang & Esernet, 2003). Therefore, quantitative inquiries serve 
as the vital tool in determining the effect of alterations on the variables under study. As a 
research tool, quantitative data is advantageous as compared to other methods given 
capability to permit the researchers to examine and analyse the data using statistical tools.  
Case studies analysis is critical in the collection of previously unobtainable data by 
use of typical methods in research. Through case studies, data collected is of upscale quality 
and more reliable. Due to the in depth and reliability of the data, the method is thus more 
preferred in comparison with other investigational designs especially when researching on 
large samples lacking similar participants. However, although the method has the merits, the 
fact that data collected generalisation for a wider population under study is impossible makes 
the procedure of case studies unattractive to some researchers. The disadvantage thus makes 
data e collected over longitudinal case studies irrelevant this not viable in the study. Despite 
the generalisation loophole, other limits of cases studies are the fact that they only describe 
behaviours detected without an explanation of how the acts occur and manifest themselves. 
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Also, drawing definite cause/effect seems impossible in the event of using case studies as a 
method (Conradi, Wang & Esernet, 2003). 
Another useful investigative method involves questionnaires. For researchers 
interested in vast amounts of information, questionnaires are a critical resource especially 
when there are time restrictions thence vital in collecting data over a short span of time 
during a survey at a manageable expense. Likewise, the outcomes of questionnaires are 
usually fast and easy to quantify by use of the various statistical packages and analytics tools 
by the researcher. However, given the open-ended structure of the questions contained, the 
participants are thus bound to read and interpret the various included inquiries in a different 
way thence leading to different responses.  
There exists other concerns during research such as the potential of the members to 
forget some of the vital parts to be included in the replies and hence not fully answer the 
questions satisfactorily. From the responses, researchers need to determine the vitality and 
relevancy of the answers which at mostly becomes time-consuming and causing a delay to 
primary study (Wohlin, 2012). Similarly, the determination of the genuineness and 
truthfulness of the responses by participants is difficult as the opinions are subjective across 
the different interviewees. 
Simulation has been selected in this PhD project because all above methods cannot be 
used to evaluate the performance and overhead of the proposed systems. 
Simulation is used almost exclusively in this type of research as the data and 
processes under consideration are volatile, high value, commercially sensitive and therefore 
datasets are not readily available for public use. To implement and test a security framework 
in real commercial cloud systems is prohibitively expensive which cannot be affordable by 
this Ph.D. project. Therefore, simulation is a suitable research method for this PhD project. 
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Eclipse is an integrated development environment (IDE) for Java and other 
programming languages like C, C++, Python, and PHP etc. Then the Java source code will be 
imported to Eclipse for editing and debugging. Eclipse is produced by Sun Foundation as a 
free, open source tool which is readily available for Eclipse users (Draxler et al. 2015). It has 
been used to develop authentication model in chapter 5.  
OPNET academic version was used as part of the initial research for the primarily 
modelling scenarios in this chapter. This version is free but has scale limitations that 
prevented its use in the larger scale multiparty authentication sections.   
OPNET Modeller version 14.5 was used in the later research models to develop the 
multiparty authentication model in chapter 5. 
OPNET Modeller is one of the most powerful simulation tools to represent distributed 
system architecture supporting a variety of application services, communication devices and 
protocols (Sahlin et al. 2015). It accelerates the R&D (research and development) process for 
analysing and designing protocols, and applications. It has the capability for application 
testing for Cloud systems.  
It is a very effective, wide and accurate network modelling and simulation tool, and is 
the only tool having model libraries of real world network components and links (Guo et al. 
2007). Given these advantages, a network architect can create architectures and topologies 
similar to real world networking environments, and use the results for defining strategies for 
real world network deployment projects (Guo et al. 2007). Given the significant costs 
involved in implementing such strategies, OPNET Inc. has made the tool very accurate and 
capable of modelling all the seven layers of OSI such that no aspect of designing is left out. 
These key advantages have been considered for choosing OPNET for this research.  
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4.2.1 OPNET Architecture 
OPNET is a discrete event simulation tool that simulates a number of events 
occurring on the network at the repetition of a clock cycle. The object library is a collection 
of configurable network devices and links (both wired and wireless), preconfigured network 
devices based on products of leading manufacturers, network connectivity and routing 
protocols, configurable applications, and voice and video configurations employing 
commonly used CODECS and formats. The profile configuration for applications helps in 
generating traffic. All the configurations are carried out on an object palette after importing 
objects from the object library. Each object needs to be configured separately using attributes 
configuration screen. Normally, all configurations are GUI based, but advanced commercial 
versions support programming interfaces, as well. The simulator is built over the objects 
taken from the object library, object attributes configured in the model, and statistics chosen 
in reports. The simulations run in a separate discrete event simulation module showing the 
number of events in progress and the simulation speed in number of events per second. It also 
reflects the simulation errors, if any. The OPNET academic version simulates up to 50 
million events, which is sufficient for this research. The reports are displayed in a separate 
reports module in as-is format as well as transformed formats into various statistical 
distributions. The plots can be viewed in continuous curve form, scatter plot form, bar chart 
form, and histogram form (Guo et al. 2007; Aboelela, 2003). 
4.2.2 Simulation Projects in OPNET 
The following process flow for managing a simulation project in OPNET. 
 
Figure 14: Simulation project management process flow 
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The network modelling is done based on inputs about user and network data sets 
captured as a part of requirement specifications. In a research project, the requirement 
specifications evolve from the objectives and are configured with the help of known statistics 
from literatures and professional reports. These inputs are helpful in defining the attributes at 
each network object (nodes and links), protocols, traffic profiles, application configurations, 
and application profiles. If an object of desired type and nature is not present in the object 
library, the designer may have to create it first and then apply the attributes. These attributes 
need to be configured very accurately for ensuring that the network model works and traffic 
is generated. For example, configuring IP addresses with different network addresses on 
either sides of a link will not establish a PPP (point-to-point protocol) connection. Similar 
problem may arise if the bit rates at either side of a link are different or speeds less than 10 
Mbps are configured on Ethernet links. After completing the applications and application 
profiles, they need to be applied on each node of the network for ensuring that the node 
understands what traffic it needs to generate or support.  
After completing the model, the next step is to choose statistics from OPNET 
reporting engine. Statistics may be chosen as per the research objectives and the research 
questions/hypotheses. OPNET allows creating custom reports by grouping the statistics 
together. The discrete event simulator follows the attributes configured for each object and 
the statistics chosen by the modeller. Hence, OPNET does a focussed job as per the 
researcher’s objectives and goals (Aboelela, 2003). 
There are four models created in this study for fulfilling different goals. The scenarios 
created in the first three models are discussed in the next section. The fourth model is the 
outcome of this research. 
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Description of Scenarios Created in OPNET 4.3 
In this section, the cloud models on cloud security, BI on the cloud, and BI security 
on the cloud are presented. The results of simulation are presented in the next section. 
4.3.1 Cloud Security 
The key security challenges and solutions on the cloud have been investigated in this 
section with the help of literature reviews and an experimental model created on OPNET that 
is simulated to produce useful statistics to establish the approach that the cloud computing 
service providers should take to provide optimal security and compliance. In this sub-section, 
a brief description of the multi-cloud model created on OPNET academic edition is 
presented. The following Figure shows the main interface to the model. The clouds shown in 
this interface are created using the IP network cloud objects in OPNET. An IP network cloud 
object can be expanded to enter another palette for carrying out detailed model comprising 
nodes and links. In the main screen, there are the following components: 
 
 
Figure 15: The main screen of the first model 
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a) The Internet domain: This is an IP network in which the backbone switches of an ISP 
(Internet Service Provider) have been modelled. The switches have been used to 
connect 1500 concurrent users of cloud hosted applications.  
b) The UTM cloud: This is another IP network cloud object used to model a cloud 
infrastructure with security components only. In this model, the UTM (Unified Threat 
Management) cloud service provider is the primary interface between the cloud users 
(corporations) and the application clouds. The UTM cloud comprises all the security 
components required to protect the user networks and the application clouds from 
Internet based threats. The UTM cloud is explained in more detail later in this section, 
immediately after introducing its screenshot. 
c) The Application clouds (1 and 2): The application clouds are IP network cloud objects 
comprising application server arrays and database server arrays connected to a cloud 
network. The Application clouds are explained in more detail later in this section, 
immediately after introducing their screenshots. 
d) All the clouds are inter-networked using high end enterprise class switches with ATM 
OC-48 links. The servers are connected to the switches through 1000BaseX links. 
Hence, all switches possess ATM LAN Emulation enabled. 
e) Application object: There are seven applications configured with built in load 
parameters as per default values in OPNET: 
 Cloud application – a HTTP browser based application with light browsing load 
 RDBMS Services – a high load database service 
 Antivirus and Antispyware application – a medium load database service 
 Anti-spam application – a medium load database service 
 Web services firewall application – a high load database service 
72 
 
 
 LDAP services – a low load database service 
 Overheads – Encryption overheads configured as a custom application 
f) Task object: The custom application for the encryption overheads has been created 
with the help of the task object. The encryption overheads have been configured as 
mild background traffic (1 KB to 4 KB per second) with fifteen to twenty packets 
delivered in one second between the source and destination using DDP (direct data 
placement – RFC 4296) protocol. The sources are the three corporate LANs and the 
destination is the UTM firewall object. This is an arbitrary choice made to generate a 
finite encryption overhead traffic on the network. The author has configured six 
phases in the task object to create application instances. The phases have been 
triggered at regular intervals of every five seconds after the start of the first phase. 
The protocol selected is DDP, and hence the overhead will not generate any TCP 
traffic or sessions, but will throw packets to and fro between the sources and the 
destinations defined in the phases of the task. In real network as well, the encryption 
overheads are additional streams of packets that do not contribute to any useful TCP 
or UDP session. This is the reason for the choice of DDP in the tasks object. 
g) Profile object: The profile object has been included to configure the behaviour of 
applications configured on the network. The applications have been configured to run 
concurrently with uniform distribution of packets. An exponential, normal or log-
normal distribution has been avoided to keep the model behaviour simple. The start 
times of the applications are within 5 to 10 seconds from the start time of the profile. 
The start time of the profile is within 50 to 55 seconds from the start time of 
simulation. A sufficient time gap is needed to allow the network build completely by 
building of the routing tables at all network devices. 
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Figure 16 presents the application cloud object. The servers configured in this object 
are the LAN objects with multiple server nodes attached to a central backplane chassis. This 
type of server configuration is similar to a blade server having a centralised chassis and 
multiple processor cards serving as individual servers. Normally, the processor cards share 
the storage attached to the entire chassis (not modelled in this project because OPNET 
academic edition doesn’t support advanced server modelling). 
 
 
Figure 16: The application cloud object 
The modelling of the LAN Object as a server array is presented in the following table. 
The number of processors is 32, shared among 25 workstations added in the LAN object. 
Given the huge backplane processing power configured in this object (attributes under red 
coloured rectangle), the LAN object serves as a LAN of servers and not workstations. Clouds 
comprise server arrays, and the chassis based servers (commercially known as blade servers) 
are best components to implement such arrays. The blades also comply with green computing 
requirement of clouds as they occupy very small rack space, consume significantly less 
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power, and dissipate much less heat, when compared with a similar array of standalone 
servers. 
Table 1: The Modelling of the LAN object as the server object 
                   
 
Figure 17 illustrates the Unified Threat Management (UTM) cloud. This is the 
interfacing cloud between the application clouds and the cloud users, with the UTM zone 
based firewall being the primary interface. The UTM firewall is an advanced stateful 
inspection firewall with multiple interfaces. In this model, three interfaces have been 
configured – users’ interface, application clouds’ interface and the De-Militarised Zone 
(DMZ) connected to multiple security servers, viz., UTM LDAP server for authentication and 
authorisation, UTM spam filter, UTM antivirus cum antispyware server, and UTM web 
services firewall comprising built in intrusion prevention capabilities (like Checkpoint). 
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Ideally, the author wanted to create server arrays for all these services, but the model was 
getting too heavy to generate useful results within the maximum cap of 50 million events.  
 
Figure 17: UTM cloud components 
Hence, their poor response times in the results will have to be ignored. Each server 
has been tied with its own application by configuring its “application supported profiles” and 
“application supported services”. The UTM firewall is configured to support “overheads” to 
simulate the encryption overhead traffic. It forwards all the traffic to the security servers and 
the security servers in turn forwards the traffic to the application cloud servers. This has been 
configured by defining the “application source and destination preferences” in the attributes 
of the servers. As reviewed in the literatures, each security services server works like a 
database server. For example, the UTM web services firewall comprises a database of exploit 
signatures and blacklisted/malicious URLs, whereas the anti-virus/anti-spyware server 
comprises a database of virus and spyware signatures. 
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The cloud users are configured as LAN objects comprising 500 workstations each. 
Overall, 1500 workstations have been configured in the LAN objects. To generate the 
encryption overhead as the task phases based on direct delivery protocol, the user LANs and 
the firewalls have been configured as sources and destinations, respectively. 
4.3.2 BI on the Cloud 
The Cloud hosting of BI has been demonstrated with the help of a simulation on 
OPNET comprising a Cloud model with multiple OLAP application servers applying parallel 
query loads on an array of servers hosting relational databases. However, how do current BI 
software and online analytical processing (OLAP) frameworks perform in business 
environments, and how can BI be implemented on Cloud and how can its performance be 
measured. Figure 18 illustrates the main screen of the second OPNET model. The model 
comprises two large domains – the BI on the cloud domain and the Extranet domain 
comprising six corporates having 500 OLAP users in each corporate. 
 
             Figure 18: The main screen of the second model 
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The BI on the cloud domain is expanded in the figure below. The cloud has been 
formed using four nos. of Cisco 7609 high end routing switches connected in such a way that 
they can distribute the load evenly. The cloud switch 4 is dedicated to route all inbound 
traffic to the servers and send their responses back to the clients. The cloud switches 1 and 3 
are serving four RDBMS servers each and the cloud switch 2 is serving 4 nos. of OLAP 
application servers. 
 
 
Figure 19: The BI on the cloud architecture 
The blue dotted lines indicate the traffic flow distribution from the OLAP application 
servers to the RDBMS servers. As shown in the figure, the load from the OLAP application 
servers are evenly distributed among all RDBMS servers. The client load is routed to the 
OLAP application servers using destination preference settings on the client objects 
configured in the extranet domain, as shown in the below Figure. 
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The extranet comprises of three ISP gateway switches serving six corporate LAN 
segments having 500 users each. Each LAN objects have the four OLAP servers configured 
as destination preferences for the OLAP application profile. In this way, the OLAP requests 
from the clients are routed to the four OLAP servers and the RDBMS requests are routed 
from the four OLAP servers to the eight RDBMS servers (serving as a small scale server 
array in this model). 
 
Figure 20: The Extranet domain comprising six corporates having 500 OLAP 
users in each corporate 
The RDBMS queries are configured using the attributes shown in the following table. 
The default configurations of heavy database load of OPNET has been chosen and then 
increased by 10 times in shown in the Table below. This is based on the learning from the 
literature review that OLAP query load on databases is at least 10 times heavier than the 
normal query load. Moreover, the inter-arrival time of query has been set at 1 seconds and the 
type of service has been set at “excellent service”. Finally, the transaction mix of queries 
versus total transactions has been set at 100%. This is because the BI and OLAP framework 
does not have any data entry load because the framework is used for strategic decision 
support.      
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    Table 2: The Database query settings to emulate OLAP query load on the databases 
 
Table 3 illustrates the OLAP application has been configured as a heavy browsing 
HTTP application having varying 5120 bytes to 10240 bytes of object downloads per second 
(continuously updating dashboards), 7 to 10 objects per screen (dashboards, its description 
screens, legends, text boxes etc.), 1 second object refresh time (because the transaction inter-
arrival time on the databases is 1 second) and 10 second page refresh time (ensuring that the 
OLAP screen refreshes after every 10 cube refreshes such that the user gets noticeable data 
changes at every screen refresh). 
                  Table 3: The OLAP application profiling 
 
The application profiling of OLAP application (OLAP requests) and the RDBMS 
services is shown in Figure 18. Both of the profiles trigger concurrently with an offset of 5 to 
10 seconds after the start time. The start time has been configured at 50 to 55 seconds to 
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ensure that all routing updates are successfully completed on the network before the 
application services are triggered. 
4.3.3 BI Security on the Cloud 
It is recommended that BI security model on a Cloud should comprises of network, 
transport, session and presentation layers of security controls through UTM, and application 
layer security through the distributed security components. In this section, two models for 
securing BI on a cloud have been simulated. The first model is based on securing BI using a 
Unified Threat Management (UTM) cloud and the second model is based on distributed 
security controls embedded within the BI server arrays deployed throughout the Cloud.  
This scenario is divided into two models – Model A and Model B. Figure 21 presents 
the Model A of BI security on the cloud. The model comprises three large networks – an 
extranet domain of BI users, the UTM cloud, and the cloud hosting BI services. 
 
Figure 21: The Model A of BI security on the cloud comprising access of BI users through    
a UTM cloud offering security-as-a-service 
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The BI cloud comprises two server arrays as shown in the below Figure. The 
DW_DM servers are the data warehouse/data mart servers hosting the temporal and non-
temporal databases. The OLAP apps servers are OLAP application server arrays hosting the 
OLAP dashboards application, and the temporary views to create and transform the OLAP 
cubes. The servers are connected through an array of cloud switches formed by Cisco 7000 
series switches. The hardware chosen in the model are also changed and all application 
demands have been eliminated. The DW_DM servers chosen are high-end Dell servers and 
the OLAP servers chosen are standard HP servers from the OPNET objects database.  
 
Figure 22: The BI server arrays forming a cloud infrastructure 
Table 8 (Appendix B) illustrates the OLAP application and data mart/data warehouse 
services modelled in OPNET, along with the security services. The OLAP and database 
modelling has been done as per two earlier models (Cloud security and BI on the cloud). 
However, the security services modelled in the table 7 are based on reviews conducted in this 
study.  The services modelled are the following: 
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a) OLAP_DASHBOARDS: A heavy-load HTML application with large size objects 
(200KB; 15 nos. per page) and an interval of 3 seconds between two transactions 
b) DW_DM: A heavy database application 
c) UTM_DB-ACT_MON: A heavy load database application representing an 
activity logger and monitor for all database commits in the data marts and 
warehouses; this is similar to the system that creates embedded security related 
database objects (separate tables) comprising information as per the privacy 
metrics 
d) OLAP_VIEWS: A medium load temporal database application representing 
OLAP views 
e) ANTIMALWARE: A medium load database application representing anti-virus 
and anti-spyware software (checking all files against a database of malware 
signatures) 
f) WEB_SECURITY: A low load database application verifying all web service 
calls and requests against a database of users and privileges 
g) ANTISPAM: A medium load database application verifying all SMTP 
transactions against a database of spam signatures 
h) IDPS: A high load database application tasked to verify all incoming packets 
against a database of exploit signatures such that intruder sessions can be detected 
and blocked 
i) LDAP: A low load database application that takes authentication and 
authorization requests and compares against a database of user identity details 
and privileges; it also maintains an account of all successful and failed requests 
All of these applications have been grouped under three types of application profile, 
each having a different role in the system. The profiles are required in an OPNET model to 
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apply on server systems, selectively, such that the role, traffic load, traffic patterns, 
initialization and termination, and inter-session delays can be clearly defined. The profiles 
also help in defining a traffic pattern initiated by a server or a client-end device, like – 
constant, linear, logarithmic, serial-random, serial-ordered, parallel (with overlapping times), 
concurrent, or exponential. If Quality of Service is implemented, the profiles also help in 
defining traffic prioritization. For most of the commonly used applications, OPNET provides 
configuration windows. However, custom traffic profiles can also be created based on 
observations made in a real world application environment. 
The profiles configured in the two models are shown in Table 9 (Appendix B) as 
following: 
Three profiles have been created in the models – BI_Security_UTM, BI_Application, 
and BI_DW_DM. The BI_Security_UTM has the security and privacy related services 
grouped under it, the BI_DW_DM comprises the DW_DM application, and the 
BI_Application comprises the OLAP_DASHBAORDS and OLAP_VIEWS positioned under 
it. The purpose of creating three separate profiles is to assign them independently to the 
hardware marked for the three roles in the first model. Hence, all hardware under the UTM 
cloud was assigned to the profile “BI_Security_UTM” with application services enabled as 
per the role. The connectivity of all users to the BI cloud is routed through the UTM cloud. 
The destination preferences of the user machines are the UTM servers, and those of the UTM 
servers are the cloud servers. In this way, a user machine cannot contact the cloud server 
without its traffic being routed through all security servers in the UTM cloud. The user cloud 
comprises six corporate LANs with 500 workstations in each LAN. The workstations are 
connected to ISP core formed by Cisco 7000 switches those are uplinked to the UTM cloud 
using 10G Base-T links. The BI and the UTM clouds comprise switch arrays interlinked with 
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ATM OC-12 links. Hence, bandwidth is not a constraint given that the clouds need to serve 
only 3000 concurrent users. 
The Model B of BI security on the cloud is presented in the figure below. In this 
model, the UTM cloud is eliminated and all user workstations are directly interfaced with the 
BI cloud switches. Given that the UTM servers have been deleted, the profiles and their 
application services need to be redistributed among the remaining servers – the OLAP apps 
servers and the data marts and data warehouse servers. The following distribution has been 
implemented: 
a) BI_DW_DM: the data warehouse and data marts servers 
b) BI_Application: OLAP apps servers 
c) BI_Security_UTM: all the security services are enabled on all the servers (with an 
assumption that each server will need the services of these security components). 
 
Figure 23: The Model B of BI security on cloud computing with the UTM cloud eliminated 
and all users directly connected to the BI application servers on the cloud 
Hence, this setup represents the distributed embedded security concept for BI 
advocated by a number of scholars, as reviewed in Chapter 4. The application destination 
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preferences have been changed to point towards the OLAP apps servers, which in turn has 
their destination preferences set as the data warehouse and data mart servers. After running 
the simulation, the following result is obtained. It may be observed that the simulation time 
has reduced to one minute from two minutes because the number of events has increased on 
the network (OPNET academic edition supports a simulation up to 50 million events only). 
The increase in number of events per second is because the security-related services are no 
longer confined to their respective servers albeit are distributed across all the servers in the 
two arrays. 
Simulation results and Discussion 4.4 
In this section, the simulation results of the three cloud models on cloud security, BI 
on the cloud, and BI security on the cloud are presented. The discussions are referred to the 
screenshots presented below. 
4.4.1 Cloud Security 
Figure 24 illustrates the application response times. The database traffic comprises of 
the security server services as well as the database services for the cloud based applications.  
 
Figure 24: Application response times 
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Figure 24 indicate that there are negligible queuing delays on the ATM links (given 
that they are OC-48 connections), but the application performance is very poor. No user will 
accept 20 seconds of response time of a DB query and 10 seconds response time of an HTML 
object download, although the application traffic has been configured at light browsing load 
and the database traffic has been configured mostly at medium load. This is because the UTM 
cloud is the bottleneck. The response times are low in this model because all the traffic is first 
forwarded to the security services servers (for necessary inspection and clearances) and then 
delivered to the application servers. The author has configured standalone servers for security 
services in the UTM cloud and hence there are congestions.  
 
 
Figure 25: A sample of overhead requests count from one of the user LANs indicating the 
encryption overhead using direct data placement (DDP) protocol. 
 
The http traffic is the browser based traffic of the cloud applications. In addition to 
these traffic statistics, the simulation has also captured the overhead traffic shown in Figure 
25, comprising encryption overhead modelled as direct delivery protocol requests/responses. 
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Figure 26: A sample of queuing delays between two inter-cloud links 
However, will the situation be different in real world clouds when the security servers 
are implemented as large scale arrays? How many firewalls (serving as VPN concentrators) 
will be required? Will the UTM providers implement large scale firewall arrays as well? A 
user company will hire the services of only one UTM provider to connect to the application 
clouds. This means that there will be fewer UTM cloud service providers than application 
cloud service providers. The cost of implementing large arrays of security servers and 
firewalls will be very high. Hence, at some stage, the resources on demand (elasticity) of the 
application clouds will suffer due to bottlenecks at the UTM clouds. The users may have to 
maintain two SLAs – one with the UTM provider and other with the application services 
provider. Hence, when the response times degrade, the user organisations will have to 
negotiate with two different parties, and it will be very difficult to ascertain where the 
problem is. But in such a scenario, it may be very difficult for the user company to maintain 
appropriate security and governance of the resources maintained by them on the cloud. The 
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UTM provider may take accountability of external security threats, but once the traffic has 
reached the application cloud, they will be out of this obligation. In such an arrangement, if 
there is a security incident at the application cloud, the user company will find it difficult to 
identify who is accountable – the UTM provider or the cloud application service provider. 
Hence, based on the results of the simulation and the problems evident thereof, the dual party 
model comprising unified threat management clouds separated from application clouds may 
not be effective in cloud computing threat management, and resulting risk mitigation 
although inter-cloud performance is not an issue. The application cloud providers will have to 
launch their own UTM services, or else change the architecture to distributed threat 
management, like – security services embedded within the application and database servers 
deployed in the arrays, and the cloud switches acting as firewalls and intrusion prevention 
devices. For example, it is possible to configure a Cisco router as a firewall and intrusion 
prevention device. The mechanism of distributed network admission controls, and 
authentication/authorisation will have to be implemented. The author would like to present 
another example. There should be some mechanism to build the LDAP services within the 
core database server array in some kind of multi-tenancy configuration. In this configuration, 
the database objects (tables) defining the multi-tenancy attributes should also comprise the 
parameters configured in an LDAP server. In this way, the LDAP services will be built 
within the database servers meant for cloud applications, and separate LDAP arrays will not 
be required. Similar mechanisms need to be invented for anti-spam, anti-virus/antispyware, 
web-services firewalls, etc.  
The security architects should come out of the “in-the-box” mindset and spread 
security solutions across the components of an application cloud. The author will prefer to 
call it “embedded UTM” within application and database servers of the application cloud. In 
this model, there will be single point of accountability from the users’ perspective, because 
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the cloud application provider will also be accountable for data protection and security of the 
client resources, and the user organisations will find it easier to carry out risk management 
and mitigation practices. This will also result in optimum performance of the cloud 
applications, and added revenues for the cloud based application service providers. 
4.4.2 BI on the Cloud 
The results of simulation are presented in the below figure. The query load is not 
exactly the same on the RDBMS servers but the pattern indicates almost even distribution of 
query load. This is evident from the “database query requests per second” statistics collected 
from the eight RDBMS servers are stacked one above another as shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27: Query load on the RDBMS servers 
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The query load is slightly above or below 40 requests per second on all the RDBMS 
servers. This reveals that the load distribution through appropriate network configuration and 
application demand. 
These configurations have caused near even distribution of query load from the four 
OLAP servers on the RDBMS servers. Moreover, the query task processing time on the 
database servers are also nearly even as shown in Figure 28. This has been possible because 
the author has deliberately chosen the same hardware make, model and configurations for all 
the eight RDBMS servers.  
 
Figure 28: Query task processing time by the RDBMS servers 
These results are a good demonstration of how a massively parallel RDBMS system 
can be deployed to form a BI and OLAP framework and how the framework should perform 
in the cloud environment. This is in line with the requirements stated by scholars as reviewed 
in the literature study. However, there are a few key points that should be kept in mind about 
this model as listed below: 
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a) First of all, the model has only eight servers in the RDBMS array serving only four 
nos. of OLAP application servers. 
b) Secondly, the load distribution has been managed evenly through application 
demand flow modelling which is an excellent feature of OPNET and works very 
well.  
c) Thirdly, the servers chosen in this model are of the same make and model having 
identical hardware configuration.  
d) Fourth, the load has been modelled as constant after an exponential increase at the 
start. The simulation of the load carried out in this model has lasted only for fifty 
million events and with no load variations. 
e) Finally, this model comprises only 3000 OLAP users connecting concurrently. A 
real BI environment on cloud computing will have tens of thousands of end users 
applying concurrent BI load on the servers. 
These are ideal scenarios that would not be possible on the cloud. But these settings in 
OPNET have evolved the challenges that will be faced in moving BI to the cloud as per the 
requirements stated by the scholars. A cloud will have hundreds of servers in the arrays and 
hence even distribution of network load will be a very challenging task. The architects will 
have to watch for the bottlenecks on the inter-switch connections, even if they are deployed 
using the fastest possible ATM connections or the 10G gigabit Ethernet. The load distribution 
will have to be managed by advanced provisioning engines and routers, which will not be as 
easy as configuring application demand flow patterns in OPNET as indicated by blue dotted 
lines. These provisioning engines and routers need to be optimized to ensure that the user 
load is evenly distributed among the servers in the array and spilled over to additional arrays 
if there is an overloading scenario. Also, it may not be possible for the IaaS provider to 
implement a cloud with identical hardware make, model and configurations. Hence, the query 
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processing response time of each server will be different due to differences in hardware 
configurations. Hence, a mere even distribution of load to the servers by the service 
provisioning engine and the router will not serve the purpose. There should be some 
intelligence to route the load based on the knowledge of query processing response times of 
the servers. The servers with slower response times should get lesser load compared with the 
servers with faster response times to eliminate wait states at the receiving end. The 
capabilities of RDBMS partitioning, RDBMS load balancing, web provisioning application 
services, services routing engines and query performance optimizing should be exploited 
effectively by the BI architects to ensure that the massively parallel processing system of 
database server arrays works perfectly to effectively utilize the processing power of the 
servers and synchronize the query processing times to reduce/eliminate wait states at the 
application servers’ end.  
The above discussion presents one more challenge in taking BI to the clouds. The 
SaaS, PaaS and IaaS providers may be different companies. Hence, to ensure the above 
requirements of BI hosting on clouds, these providers need to carry out excellent coordination 
of architectural detailing for designing and deploying the services to enable the various layers 
of BI and OLAP framework. BI cannot be implemented in an ad-hoc way by the providers 
otherwise it will suffer from the same level of bottlenecks and resource crunch as it has been 
suffering in the self-hosted environments. The providers need to carry out effective planning 
of every detail and implement the infrastructure components, platform components and 
application components to achieve a true massively parallel processing system with highly 
elastic capacity enhancement framework using all available technologies efficiently. 
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4.4.3 BI security on the Cloud 
The performance of Model A is presented in the figure below. The average response 
to database queries on the entire network is between 20 to 40 seconds and the average http 
object response time varies between 1 to 3 seconds. The TCP delays have exceeded 20 
seconds, TCP segment delays are between 2 to 4 seconds and the TCP retransmission count 
has exceeded 1000 twice during the simulation. The performance degradation is clearly due 
to capacity crunch. There are three factors affecting the performance of this network. 
 
Figure 29: Performance of Model A of BI security on the cloud 
All the user traffic is being routed through the security services servers in the UTM 
cloud. The users are connected to a zone-based firewall, which routes their traffic to the 
security servers. In this way, there are two hops from the user workstations to the BI 
application servers on the cloud. In this arrangement, the capacity may not be an issue but the 
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routing of traffic through the servers placed in the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) may be 
adding a delay component on all the servers.  
The security servers are adding significant overheads over the user traffic in the 
process of carrying all the checks and verifications configured in the model. One may view 
the security server arrays as one large server object inspecting two other major server objects 
(OLAP and BI) over a high-speed network interface. These servers are facing each other as 
single entities with large number of TCP sessions consolidated into the four network uplinks. 
Hence, TCP delays and retransmissions are occurring on the network. 
With a large number of TCP session requests processed by the security servers on the 
UTM cloud, congestion at the network and transport layers is evident. The congestions are 
not due to data-link layer problems (because all links are either 10G Base-T or ATM OC-12 
high capacity and high bandwidth optical fiber channels). The congestions are clearly due to 
limited TCP session handling capability of the security servers in the UTM cloud. There are 
two roles of each security server – (a) to inspect all session initiation requests emanating from 
the end users and forward the authenticated ones, and (b) to establish separate TCP sessions 
with the OLAP and data warehouse/data mart servers on the cloud for monitoring and 
logging their transactions. 
The performance may degrade further if the number of user workstations is increased, 
resulting in a rise of TCP sessions through the uplinks to the UTM cloud, and increasing the 
number of transactions per server (thus increasing the monitoring and logging overheads). 
The embedded security-related database objects comprising details of transactions may add to 
a huge archives requiring separate management. Hence, there should be a way to purge older 
activity logs in the system, automatically. 
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The performance report of Model B is presented in the below Figure. In this model, 
the performance is within the expected limits and there are no TCP delays, TCP segment 
delays and TCP retransmissions. It is observed that the performance of database query 
response and html page and object responses is much better than the first model and is very 
satisfactory from a user’s perspective.  
The response times returned in this model are the ones expected from a cloud hosting 
of BI. Elimination of the UTM cloud layer has ensured that all the session bottlenecks in the 
network are gone.  
 
Figure 30: Performance of Model B of BI security on the cloud 
The user sessions are served by the BI cloud based server arrays for application 
requests and for the security sessions, as well. The load of the security sessions are 
distributed among all servers in the OLAP and data warehouse arrays given that the databases 
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serving the security applications will also be partitioned and spread across the servers. Hence, 
the massively parallel processing model proposed by Al-Aqrabi et al. (2012) holds good for 
security services as well. This is essentially a practical form of implementing the distributed 
embedded security components recommended by the scholars as evident from literature 
review findings. 
What will be result if the UTM cloud owner provides significantly large sized arrays 
with servers plugged to them, and partition all security related databases to produce a 
massively parallel system? The performance at the UTM cloud will definitely improve, but 
the network and session layer congestions cannot be reduced. This is because the system will 
be a cascade of two large clouds, and the cascade itself will be a bottleneck. The effects of a 
massively parallel database query-distribution system will not work when two large arrays 
are cascaded by joining two clouds. This limitation will be there when two clouds are 
interconnected and the user sessions will be allowed to pass through one cloud to the server 
arrays of another. The performance will definitely improve when the users are allowed to 
connect to two clouds independently for different purposes, and there is no inter-cloud 
cascade. However, such a system will not be effective from security point of view, because 
the user sessions need to pass through a common checkpoint before allowed accessing the 
application resources. 
Discussion 4.5 
In chapter 2, the author reviewed cloud computing security with special emphasis on 
governance of the security and compliance from the perspective of user companies as well as 
cloud service providers. A number of literatures have been reviewed to present what can be 
done to make the cloud hosted businesses secure, reliable, compliant and long lasting. The 
NIST recommendations and the supporting literatures have been taken into account. Some 
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literature highly recommended that the cloud security should be hosted as a service oriented 
framework and the accountability should with a separate security-as-a-service provider. The 
NIST recommendation on risk assessment and compliance also becomes quite effective in 
this model because the risk transfer and risk avoidance can be carried out effectively by 
handshaking with a specialist cloud service company rather than application cloud providers 
that may undertake security as an additional responsibility. However, a report by Gartner 
recommends that virtualisation security cannot be implemented in centralised manner 
following the UTM approach. The simulation results of first scenario presented in this 
chapter tend to support Gartner recommendations. However, the Gartner report doesn’t talk 
about cloud security and hence this report may be one of the very few that views UTM from 
the other side of the table. 
Cloud computing comprises three ways of provisioning services – software-as-a-
service (SaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS) and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS). These 
services may be provided by same or different providers depending upon the business 
arrangements. However, the SaaS provider needs the settings on the PaaS and IaaS clouds to 
be defined as per the application services provisioned through the web services architecture 
components. Clouds comprise the service provisioning and routing engines that can effectively 
sense the loading pattern on the underlying resources. 
BI and OLAP framework is highly resource intensive. It has a multilayer architecture 
comprising multidimensional OLAP cubes with multiplexed matrices representing 
relationships between various business variables. The cubes are formed by sending OLAP 
queries to the data warehouses stored in the RDBMS servers. The size of an OLAP query is 
typically 10 to 12 times larger than an ordinary database query. Hence, if BI and OLAP 
framework is taken to the cloud for serving hundreds and thousands of end users, it is essential 
that the cloud providers implement massively parallel processing RDBMS systems with even 
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distribution of query load and query response times for the OLAP application servers. In this 
study, a BI and OLAP framework has been modelled using OPNET and the requirements of a 
massively parallel RDBMS server array has been modelled using the OPNET features. The 
results have reflected the ideal scenario for taking BI to the cloud. However, the real clouds 
will not have ideal configurations as made in this OPNET model. Hence, the real challenges 
on the cloud needs to be identified and addressed to ensure that the results can be brought 
closer to ideal scenario as far as possible (Al-Aqrabi et al. 2012).  
The details of challenges in implementing a massively parallel processing RDBMS 
server system to take BI to the cloud have been discussed. In addition, the deviations from the 
ideal configurations in the OPNET model presented in the research have been discussed. The 
author has tried to discuss the solutions to address the challenges and the deviations from the 
ideal scenario of the OPNET model. In future, researchers may like to study modern 
technologies pertaining to service provisioning, service routing, schema partitioning, load 
balancing, etc. to implement an enterprise level RDBMS system to achieve a massively 
parallel processing RDBMS server system for taking BI to the clouds. In this context, there is 
a significant opportunity to carry out multiple experimental studies to evolve the practical 
configuration solutions useful for the cloud service providers targeting to host BI and OLAP 
framework on the cloud. 
Before the security controls in a BI environment is discussed, a brief analysis of its 
security requirements is presented below (based on the findings of the literature review):  
a) The security controls in BI is different from traditional database applications. The 
data units are extracted from various transactional and decision-support databases, 
which belong to a number of information owners. Although, the data units are 
extracted for BI reporting purposes only, their original ratings, as an information asset 
(confidentiality, integrity, availability, and sensitivity) cannot be discarded. Hence, it 
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is important that the details of information ownership and security related attributes of 
the original information units is captured in the temporary data marts, preferably with 
details of legal and regulatory compliance obligations.  
b) The data transformation and modelling agents should be tasked to take care of the 
security details tagged with each information unit, and include appropriate summaries 
in separate tables along with the rest of the metadata entries. In addition, the identity 
of the transformation agents should be tagged along with the metadata of the data 
units after building the hierarchies, dimensions and multi-dimensional relationships. 
c) After loading the transformed data into the data warehouses, the system should have 
features to capture monitoring and activity logs for all data units tagged with high 
security attributes. Separate objects should be defined to capture such details. For 
example, the Oracle enterprise security monitor constructs separate database objects 
to capture activity and monitoring logs, and generates automatic alerts and alarms as 
per the specified rules. 
d) The data related to security attributes tagged with the data units and the 
activity/monitoring logs should be encrypted within the database objects. 
e) The security controls pertaining to network security, session security, and transport 
security should be implemented to protect the BI framework. Some examples of such 
security controls are:  
a. Antimalware: comprises antivirus and antispyware tools 
b. Anti-spam: for SMTP protection of inbound and outbound automatic mails in 
the BI framework 
c. Intrusion detection and prevention systems: for detecting and blocking exploit 
attempts  
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d. Web services security: to protect all components of web services in the BI 
framework 
e. LDAP server (alternatively, RADIUS and TACACS servers): for providing 
authentication and authorization services for end users, database 
administrators, OLAP administrators, and the transformation agents 
When BI is taken to the cloud, it takes the form of service-oriented architecture. The 
XML data files find a significant role as the data files of web based data warehouses or data 
marts, and as OLAP multidimensional cubes. Hence, the embedded distributed security needs 
to be implemented within the XML data structures, as a part of the document object models. 
The security related attributes, tagged with the data units can be embedded within the XML 
hierarchies, or can be part of separate relational tables marked as metadata tables, which can 
also be exported in the form of XML files. Any changes in the metadata information can be 
imported back into the database tables using DOM parsing. The transformation agents can 
use this feature to maintain metadata XML files, including the security attributes embedded 
in it. 
The LDAP server on the cloud may also be a separate relational database server 
holding details of all authorized users, their authorization levels on the database objects and 
their access to OLAP views. Hence, LDAP should be viewed as a set of separate objects 
ensuring appropriate segregation between the user sessions. Privacy and trust are two 
significant issues on the cloud after a critical business application (like BI) is migrated to it. 
The user sessions should be segregated using trustworthy technologies, where LDAP, 
RADIUS and TACACS can play a significant role. The security policies may follow the 
cloud cube model. Cloud cube is an innovative representation of directing the security 
policies based on business needs of an organization (Chea et al. 2011). The cube presents 
four forms of security policies: 
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a) Internal and external model: In the internal model, a company may demand a physical 
boundary of data ownership, and in the external model, the company may be flexible 
to keep the data units outside the physical control of the data owners. The former can 
be implemented on a private cloud and the latter can be hosted on a public cloud. In a 
private cloud, a company may be the sole owner of the LDAP, RADIUS or TACACS 
engines, and all other security components mentioned in this document. In a public 
cloud, all the security components and the LDAP functionality will be shared among 
multiple companies implementing an appropriate, reliable and technically sound 
segregation mechanism. 
b) Proprietary and open model: In the proprietary model, a company may demand 
hosting of proprietary software platforms and interfaces. In this mode, the distributed 
and embedded security components will also have proprietary features (examples are 
special-purpose hardware security appliances and firewalls, and Oracle and IBM 
relational databases and tools). In the open model, the software platforms and 
interfaces can be open (example, Google Apps) and the embedded security 
components may also be open (examples are Linux based firewalls and IDPS systems 
hosted on standard servers). In open model, a platform-as-a-service provider may be 
involved for offering platforms as a service (including the platforms for distributed 
embedded security). 
c) Perimeterised and deperimeterised model:  In the perimeterised model, the mission 
critical database and application services may be deployed within secure perimeter 
(like a De-Militarized Zone, DMZ) defined and controlled by a zone based firewall. 
The UTM cloud presented in this research is an example of a perimeterised security 
setup. In such a setup, the security components may be separately positioned in a 
DMZ like environment, or the critical application and database servers comprising 
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distributed security components may be separated from the rest of the components 
and placed within the DMZ. In deperimeterised setup, the controls may be placed just 
like the perimeterised system but no perimeters or boundaries are formed to identify 
and separate critical components from non-critical components. 
d) Insourced or outsourced model: In the insourcing model, the security controls may be 
deployed within the cloud periphery owned by a company, and managed by internal 
employees. In an outsourced model, the security components may be outsourced to 
the provider offering security-as-a-service (example, a UTM cloud). In the outsourced 
model, distributed and embedded security components will not be possible to 
implement. 
 
Based on the findings of the modelling and simulation experimentation in this project, 
and their mapping with the cloud cube model proposed by Chea et al. (2011), the following 
scenarios are possible: 
a) Internal model: In this model, the OLAP servers and the relational database servers 
for data marts or data warehouses are hosted on arrays owned by a company as a part 
of their private cloud. The security components may be distributed, and embedded, 
and managed by in-house employees. The performance will be highly effective as 
revealed by the simulation results for distributed embedded security components. 
However, to sustain the performance, businesses will need to observe the increase in 
number of TCP sessions, continuously, and upgrade the server arrays. This model 
may comprise limited number of servers per array and may be very expensive given 
the high capital and operating costs of owning a private cloud and all the security 
components on it. Typically, banks or financial institutions may like to own a private 
cloud with internal model of security. 
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b) External model: This model may be applicable for any company that is flexible to use 
a shared cloud to host BI framework. Such a model may be highly useful to promote 
BI as a SaaS offering. The security components can be distributed and embedded and 
all security services may be shared among multiple tenants on the cloud. This setup 
will be very cost effective given that the cost of BI framework and the embedded 
security services may be available on pay-per-use basis. As per the simulation results, 
this model returns excellent performance results. 
c) Proprietary and open model: This model will be based on the choice of BI and 
security platforms made by the companies. The proprietary platforms (especially the 
security appliances bundled in specially packaged hardware) may be more expensive 
and hence lesser number of devices will be deployed per array. Hence, cloud arrays 
with proprietary platforms may perform poorer than open platforms given that the 
company owning them may be under compulsion to make maximum use of the 
available capacity before investing in additional appliances per array. Open platforms 
comprises a number of open source appliances (like the Linux based zone based 
firewalls and IDPS devices). Such appliances are supported by most of the cloud 
providers and hence the companies may simply have to invest in the BI framework, or 
buy SaaS subscriptions. The performance of both arrangements is expected to be the 
same. 
d) Perimeterised and deperimeterised model: In perimeterised, a company may like to 
isolate the server arrays holding business critical servers (like BI framework) and 
employ embedded distributed security components. This may be more expensive than 
deperimeterised setting in which no such boundaries are created. The performance of 
perimeterised arrays may degrade because the array sizing and provisioning of 
computing, networking and storage capacity may depend upon the paying power of 
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the company requesting for it. Deperimeterised model will be highly effective and 
will provide excellent returns. 
e) Insourced or outsourced model: In the insourced model, a company may like to 
implement a self-hosted private cloud. Such a cloud may defeat the business 
advantages of having BI on the cloud and distributed security components embedded 
in the cloud. For example, such a cloud will have lesser elasticity and will be very 
expensive. Outsourced model will have excellent performance returns and will be cost 
effective because the cost of elasticity will be shared among multiple clients. 
 
Finally, it is believed that embedding BI specific security controls (security attributes 
in the metadata repositories, separate database objects holding monitoring and activity logs, 
and table level encryption of data and security metrics details) and the rest of the security 
controls (antimalware, anti-spam, IDPS, etc.) may overload an array significantly. The rate of 
increase of elasticity will need to be significantly higher. The conventional security 
components (like IDPS, antimalware, anti-spam, web services security, etc.) require separate 
administration procedures, and have their own databases, which are continuously updated 
over the Internet (Al-Aqrabi et al. 2012). Hence, administration of conventional security 
components and BI specific distributed and embedded security components in the same array 
may be very challenging. In addition, it may not be feasible to combine the accesses provided 
to administrators of conventional security components and BI security and data components. 
Hence, it is recommended that the conventional security components should be kept in a 
separate server array on the same cloud in the UTM approach. This approach will ensure that 
both areas of securing BI on the cloud will be managed by different agents and there will be 
lesser chances of breaches in the data mart and warehouse data-files, and the OLAP cubes. 
The embedded security role is more of a DBA activity and hence this segregation is expected 
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to work. This will not affect performance provided both arrays are hosted on the same cloud 
served by a common cluster of network switches. 
BI on the cloud is a large-scale array of database and OLAP application servers. The 
administration of such large-scale arrays will be carried out making use of XML document 
object models as data-files. The extraction, transformation and loading of data files will be 
carried using XML data-files and the DOM parsing feature of databases. The security controls 
of BI on cloud can be implemented by capturing source security attributes (called security 
metrics) defined in the source transactional databases and maintained in the metadata 
repositories. The metadata information will be exportable to XML format. The data 
transformation agents should record security related summaries and attach them with the 
multidimensional data hierarchies created and stored in data warehouses. In addition, an 
automatic relational database security tool should continuously monitor and log all changes to 
the data-files in separate relational database objects. This arrangement is called distributed and 
embedded security by the scholars those proposed them. In this research, two scenarios have 
been modelled in OPNET – (a) BI security using a UTM cloud (security-as-a-service), and (b) 
BI security using distributed and embedded components. The second scenario performed 
much better than the first scenario. With 3000 concurrent users, the first scenario returned 
unacceptable performance of DB queries and html page and object response times. There were 
significant number of TCP delays, TCP segment delays and retransmission counts. However, 
the first model performed very well and returned excellent performance on the cloud with 
3000 concurrent users on the OLAP and database servers. Hence, it is evident that UTM cloud 
model may not work for BI security on the cloud. The BI security on cloud is further analysed 
based on the cloud-cube security model proposed by reference (Chea et al. 2011). Based on 
the simulation results, it is concluded that the external, open, deperimeterised and outsourced 
models are expected to return best results when employing distributed and embedded security 
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components to secure BI on the cloud. Finally, it is concluded that mixing BI specific security 
controls and general security controls on the same array may not be feasible administratively. 
Hence, it is recommended that both forms of security implementation may be split into two 
different server arrays on the same cloud. Such a model will keep the security administrators 
with the two roles separate, and will not mix the role of conventional security with security 
administration during data extraction, transformation and loading in a BI framework. In 
addition, it is expected that performance of BI transactions will not be affected if both server 
arrays are served by a common cluster of network switches and high-speed links.  
Summary 4.6 
In this chapter, a review of network modelling and simulation, introduction to OPNET 
toolkit, a review of network modelling in OPNET, and a description of the first, second, and 
third modelling scenario is presented. The three models described are related to cloud 
security, BI on the cloud, and BI security on the cloud scenarios. The BI security on the cloud 
is divided into two models – Model A and Model B. The modelling part helped in preparing 
the fundamentals for the three models to be created as the final outcome of this research. In 
this chapter, the simulation results of these models are presented. The simulation results of 
the four modelling scenarios have been presented and critically analysed. All the discussions 
presented in this chapter will be used as inputs to the finalised model, which is presented in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Multiparty Authentication System (MAS)  
Introduction 5.1 
In this chapter, we present a multiparty authentication framework and the proposed 
model for securing BI on the cloud and we define five core protocols in our multiparty 
authentication system. The formal analysis enables us to re-examine assumptions used to 
develop our authentication protocols, to verify whether the objectives of our protocols are 
achieved through the intended actions. A comprehensive empirical study is performed to 
evaluate the scalability and the runtime overhead of the authentication system.  Finally in this 
chapter, risks, ethics and legal implications are considered including mitigation factors and 
recommendations. 
Multiparty Authentication Framework in the Cloud 5.2 
In this section, the proposed framework for dynamic authentication interactions in a 
distributed environment is shown in Figure 31. The author propose adding a session authority 
cloud controlling sessions of multiple clouds. There shall be no concept of home or foreign 
clouds. Every cloud obeys the decisions made by the session authority cloud. The session 
authority cloud shall hold a large array of servers serving as a security vault. This vault holds 
authentication credentials and digital signatures of tenants of all clouds. The root keys of all 
the clouds are stored in the vault having folders identifying the clouds. An active tenant will 
“know” the root key of its own cloud. The security realms (sub-domains) are distributed 
among all the clouds and are identified through separate sub-domain keys. These keys will be 
stored in subfolders within the corresponding cloud folders. The concept of private key 
assignment against a digital signature will be adopted but only for entry into the relevant sub-
domain of the cloud. In the multiparty session scenario, members of multiple sub-domains 
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may interact within a session. All such sessions will be identified by the session authority 
cloud. The session keys will comprise of root key of the cloud, sub-domain key, and the 
portion identifying the session. This means that there will be multiple session keys valid for a 
session, each having a common field for the session but varying fields for cloud root keys and 
sub-domain keys. There is no need for any negotiation among the clouds because the session 
authority cloud “knows” all the clouds and their sub-domains. The schematic of the proposed 
framework is shown in the below figure: 
 
 
Figure 31: Proposed multiparty session authentication framework in cloud environment 
The ground rules of the proposal are: 
 Each session participant should be a tenant of at least one cloud in the multi-
cloud framework controlled by the session authority cloud. 
 If a potential participant is not a cloud member, the introducing participant 
will have to share credentials with it for joining its own cloud. 
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 Each session will have multiple keys valid. While the session key field will be 
common (refreshed on change of no of participants), the cloud root keys and 
sub-domain (security realm) keys will vary depending upon the membership 
profiles of the participants.  
Multiparty Authentication System for Securing BI on the Cloud 5.3 
The proposed system is shown in Figure 32, specifically addressed to scenarios of BI 
applications access on the clouds for dynamic secure interactions when members of different 
security realms want to access distributed BI services through a trusted principal. These 
scenarios are applicable when there are no direct authentication relationships between users 
and BI services in multiple Cloud systems located in different security realms. 
 
Figure 32: Multi-party authentication system for securing BI on the cloud 
A – This is the principal that forwards the session request for a user (whom he/she 
trusts) of any security realm willing to access BI databases hosted on remote clouds (clouds 
A and B). The principal is the only one trusted by the session authority Cloud. 
F – This actor is playing the role of multiparty session handler that collects the keys 
from the session requester and forwards to the Session Authority Cloud (SAC). 
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SAC – This actor is playing the role of a session authority cloud that authorizes the 
sessions based on matching of keys forwarded by F. It serves as the cloud certification 
authority (CCA). 
SAC-DB – This actor is a supporting database that advises the SAC about 
matches/mismatches of keys sent by F. 
Clouds A and B – These are clouds having membership with the session authority 
cloud for allowing access to their hosted resources from users authorized by the SAC. 
The operation of the algorithm is described as the following: 
The session begins with a user having membership in any security realm (Cloud C) 
that the trusted principal recognizes. We assumed to provide access to the BI database objects 
in clouds A and B if the SAC approves the request forwarded by the principal. It is also 
assumed that SAC will not entertain any request not forwarded by the principal. The user 
requesting access is neither a member of Cloud A nor a member of Cloud B. In essence, the 
user is a member of a security realm that is a different cloud (Cloud C), which is trusted by 
the SAC (which means that the third cloud is a member of the SAC-DB). Most importantly, 
the principal should recognize who is the user because the SAC trusts the principal for 
accepting the session request. Hence, the only way the user can gain access to BI database 
files on clouds A and B is to send a request to the session authority cloud through the session 
handler F. The session handler will only forward requests of the trusted principal and hence 
the requests need to be forwarded through the login of the trusted principal. The only 
resources the requesting user has are a root key of cloud C (by default available to all the 
users of Cloud C) and a sub-domain (security realm) key. The principal “A” places a request 
to the session handler to gain access to resources A and B for the user (the user knows their 
URLs but do not have any access to them). 
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On the request of the session handler (F), the principal A shares the root and sub 
domain keys of the user. These keys may be viewed as two packets of a finite size (example, 
1024 Bytes each). F is just an intermediate system having no decision-making powers. Its 
role is to package the keys and forward to the SAC. The SAC checks the keys with the help 
of a database SAC-DB assisting it (may be viewed as a huge security vault having all root 
and sub-domain keys of the clouds registered with it). In essence, SAC-DB is a centralized 
registrar in the proposed algorithm. 
On confirmation from SAC-DB, the SAC is approves access to BI database files A 
and B stored on clouds A and B respectively. It forwards its approval to the SAC’s session 
handler (SAC-SH). The SAC-SH may be viewed as a separate dynamic database that caches 
all approvals from the SAC and forwards them to respective clouds for opening the accesses.  
In this way, the SAC can be freed from this responsibility and allowed to focus on 
approving/rejecting sessions after verifying the keys records in the SAC-DB. It also is 
responsible for creating a key called the session key and sends to the SAC-SH along with the 
requested URLs (cloud BI database files A and B) and the ID of the requesting session 
handler. It may be noted that SAC-SH needs to know the identification of the requesting 
session handler because there may be a number of them interacting with the SAC. The 
session key may be viewed as an approval signature by the SAC. 
The SAC-SH interacts with the clouds A and B, shares the SAC’s approval (the 
session key), and requests for opening access to the resources. After verifying the approval of 
the SAC, the clouds A and B open the access to the BI database files for the session identified 
by the session key issued by the SAC. Thereafter, the SAC-SH sends confirmation to the 
requesting session handler (F). The authorized session key now becomes a combination of the 
cloud root key, the sub-domain (security realm) key, and the session key issued by the SAC. 
The session key will remain valid till the session is kept active by the trusted principal. Given 
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that multiple users may join the session through the trusted principal, same session can have 
more than one valid key (root key, security realm sub-domain key and the session key issued 
by the SAC). This key combination is unique for each user joining the session. If a user exits 
the session, the validity of the key combination is dropped such that he/she cannot re-enter 
the session using the same key combination. The user will need to request the trusted 
principal for re-entry and the whole process will begin again. For re-entry, the requesting user 
will get a new key combination again valid until his/her next exit from the session. 
Experiments 5.4 
In this section, a set of experiments are implemented on OPNET Modeller and Eclipse 
respectively to develop our multiparty authentication model and to test our multiparty 
authentication protocols efficiently and increase the reliability as well as performance.  
5.4.1 Experiment on OPNET Modeller 
In this section, we present a multiparty authentication system model for securing BI 
on on the cloud. The proposed system is specifically addressed to scenarios of BI applications 
access on the clouds when members of different security realms want to access distributed BI 
services through a trusted principal. These scenarios are applicable when there are no direct 
authentication relationships between the people of different security realms and the 
distributed BI services in multiple cloud system.  
The entire multi-cloud model is created on OPNET modeller using HP9000 
Superdome 64 CPU mega modular servers. These servers are the most powerful systems 
available in OPNET’s model library in the academic edition. Each server can host hundreds 
of virtual machines. The model is shown in Figure 33. The object “A” in this model 
comprises an Internet cloud 1000 users, each representing a trusted principal by the SAC 
requesting a session each for a foreign user (member of a different security realm) on his/her 
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behalf. The objects F, SAC, SAC-DB, and SAC-SH are independent HP9000 Superdome 
servers whereas clouds A and B are collections of four HP9000 Superdome servers each.  
 
Figure 33: Multi-party authentication model  
SW1 is an Internet switch connecting the trusted principals to the entire inter-cloud 
framework. SW2 is an internal switch of the inter-cloud framework interconnecting the 
clouds A and B with the core cloud certification authority (SAC in this model) and all its 
supporting services (F, SAC-DB, and SAC-SH). SW1 and SW2 are advanced Cisco chassis-
based switches. The red lines represent 1000BaseX links and the numbers at the centre of 
each line represent the number of links per connection. For example, the red line connecting 
A with F has eight 1000BaseX links. Overall, this is quite a powerful network possible in 
academic edition of OPNET modeller with little scope of link and node level congestions for 
1000 users connecting the network. Hence, whatever delays are found in the simulation 
results are because of the execution times of the phases of the authentication algorithm. 
The OPNET tasks object has been used to define the phases of the authentication 
algorithm. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate how they have been modelled in OPNET modeller. Table 
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4 illustrates the phases configured without any phase-wise timeouts and Table 5 illustrates a 
timeout of 60 seconds per phase. Both the configurations are simulated separately in OPNET 
modeler. The phases are sequential, each considered as a request or a response between the 
stated nodes. In each phase, an appropriate amount of data is transferred as may be needed 
during practical operation of the phase. For example, the first phase A > F and the second 
phase F > A are requesting phases in which, the data transmission size is configured as 1024 
bytes. However, the third phase A > F is a responding phase (A submits IDr and IDs to F) 
and hence the data transmission size is 4096 bytes.  
 
Table 4: The algorithm steps are configured as individual protocol tasks in OPNET 
tasks creator object with no timeout 
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Table 5: Timeout introduced in each phase of the authentication protocol 
 
 
The data sizes have been configured accordingly in all the phases of the algorithm. A 
subsequent phase does not begin unless the previous phase has ended. Thus, if a phase fails to 
complete, the subsequent phase will not begin at all. A phase will be deemed as ended only 
when a final response has arrived from the requested node to the requesting node. Thus, if 
there is congestion on the network and a timeout has been configured for each phase, the 
session will be dropped if any of the subsequent phases fails to execute successfully. 
 
(a) The phases have been packaged in an application called as “Protocol_Tasks” in the 
model. As shown in Table 10 (Appendix B), Protocol_Tasks is a custom application, 
which in turn is designed using the tasks object in OPNET modeller. One needs to 
enter the attributes in this field and select the task object packaged with all the phases 
configured. 
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(b) The database application has been configured for running on SAC-DB only. It is a 
OPNET’s default high load task format. There was no need to configure it manually 
because it is not the focus of this research. 
(c) The applications are executed using the profiles object, as shown in the following 
table. Protocol_tasks and SAC-DB have been configured to execute independent of 
each other such that they do not cause a conflict during simulation. Both applications 
have been assigned a start offset of 5 to 10 seconds. However, the start offset of the 
network itself has been configured at 100 to 110 seconds. This is because the network 
is large and should be given enough time for completing the tasks of the routing 
protocol. In this model, the routing protocol selected is RIPv2 (which is OPNET’s 
default). 
Table 6: Configuring the profiles object for executing the applications 
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Before explaining the simulations, it is essential to clarify how the nodes recognize 
whom to contact for executing a phase. This clarification is needed to map the symbols (A, F, 
SAC, SAC-DB, Cloud A, and Cloud B) with actual servers (names of servers in the network) 
on the network. For simplicity, the symbols and server names have been kept the same in the 
model. However, in actual clouds they will be completely different. The configuration needed 
for this mapping in OPNET modeller  is called destination preferences as shown in Table 11, 
and 12 (Appendix B). This is a complex configuration in OPNET that needs to be configured 
carefully by matching the source-destination relationships with the phases of the customer 
application (Protocol_Tasks authentication algorithm). In destination preferences, a node is 
allowed to communicate with only those nodes that it is supposed to interact for executing the 
algorithm. Hence, A is allowed to communicate only with F and F is allowed to communicate 
only with A and SAC. 
It may also be noted that a self-relationship (A communicating with A and F 
communicating with F) is established in destination preferences, as well. This is done to 
ensure that the node is able to communicate with itself whenever required by OPNET. 
Finally, the attachment of a profile with a node is important to instruct it about what it 
needs to execute. This is done by identifying the profile within the node configuration. In this 
model, all nodes are configured to execute the “Protocol_Tasks” whereas SAC-DB is 
configured to execute “Protocol_Tasks” as well as the database application. 
5.4.2 Experiment on Eclipse  
With the help of Eclipse, we created our five multiparty authentication protocols in 
our multiparty authentication system. It is used to develop the prototype authentication 
system based on the proposed framework. The experimental configuration is shown in 
(Appendix A). 
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Figure 34 illustrates the main screen of the session authority cloud program. The 
program set consists of 3 parts: 
 SAC: Session Authority Cloud program 
 Cloud: User program 
 Service: service program 
 
Figure 34: SAC program main screen 
 
 
Figure 35: Cloud user connecting to service 
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Figure 35 presents the cloud user connecting to service.  Figure 36 illustrates use case 
a multiparty authentication system on the cloud. This Multiparty authentication system can he
lp session users authenticate their session memberships to simplify the authentication process
es within multiparty sessions. 
 
Figure 36: Use case Multiparty authentication system diagram 
The following UML class diagrams of the proposed system:  
• SAC 
This program represents SAC program. 
 Session Handler 
This class is one for session management. This class is responsible for session 
approval (creating a session and permitting to access resources) and deleting sessions. 
 Node 
This class is one for communicating with session users. Whenever a user creates or 
joins a session, an instance of this class is created and registered in node list and associated 
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with the corresponding session. This class is responsible for processing requests of its 
corresponding user.  
 Session 
This class represents a multipart session. This class is responsible for management of 
users that belong to it and management session key. Whenever a session is created,   Session 
Hander creates an instance of this class.  
 Service 
This class is one for communicating with services. This is responsible for forwarding 
requests of users to service and forwarding responses of services to users through Node. 
When a session is created, an instance of this class is created and registered in the session and 
associated with the corresponding service against each service that the creator of the session. 
 
Figure 37: Classes of session authority cloud 
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• Cloud 
This program represents a Cloud program. 
 UserInterface 
This class plays the role of user interface and a store of information about SAC. A 
user can view session list and service list and send requests of creating or joining a session. 
 Agent 
This class is responsible for communicating with SAC.  
 
Figure 38: Cloud class diagram 
• Service 
This program represents a service. This only has very simple function. 
 Service  
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This class is to let a person observe status of service (user call or login to 
session).    
 Service Thread 
This class is for processing requests of users. This class is for storing session 
information (session key, session identifier). Each instance of service Thread has one 
instance of this class. 
 
 
Figure 39: Service class diagram 
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Figure 40: A Business Scenario 
 
As illustrated in Figure 40, In this scenario, first user A contacts SAC to start a new 
session for his/her work, and forwards session name(ID) and desired resources list in step(1). 
SAC then verifies A’ identity and creates a new session instance to control the new business 
session. SAC also generates the key of the new session and then registers the session its 
session list. Also SAC registers A in the session. Next, SAC invokes the resources A wants, 
so checks if available (step (2)(3)). After receiving a reply from resources, SAC then sends a 
response of session approval with session key and available resources list (step (4)). Before 
calling Resource1, A sends a request for the Resource1 to SAC. SAC then contacts the 
Resource1. Resource1 invokes a new instance R1 and send back its identifier to SAC. SAC 
records R1 in the session and sends it to A (step (5)). Next, after receiving a response from 
SAC, A sends a request to R1 (step (6)). Then R1 first contacts SAC to check whether A is a 
valid session user in step (7). Once it is validated, R1 sends a response of results that A 
requires (step (8)). 
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Multi-Party Authentication Protocols 5.5 
In this section, we present five core protocols in our multiparty authentication system 
using the well-known Logic of Authentication or (BAN logic). Protocol 1 performs 
authentication for session approval, Protocol 2 for adding a new user to an existing session, 
Protocol 3 for accepting a new session User, Protocol 4 for leaving a session, and Protocol 5 
for ending a session.  
5.5.1 Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 
The Diffie-Hellman (D-H) algorithm is a public key algorithm. D-H introduced by 
Diffie and Hellman in 1976, was the one of the earliest practical examples of public key 
exchange implemented within the field of cryptography. This algorithm allows two users that 
have no prior knowledge of each other to establish a shared secret key over an insecure 
channel. In the Multiparty authentication protocols, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm is 
employed to help session user secure their communication. Hada and Maruyama (2002) 
demonstrate the need for multi-party session authentication protocol, if a multi-party session 
is constructed out of multiple two-party sessions, it is very hard in some cases for a session 
user to determine and verify whether the service instance it contacts is a member of the same 
multi-party session. In a cross-realm authentication, the techniques used in two-party session 
does not address such Heterogeneous Cross-Realm Authentication issues, which requires 
credential conversion and the establishment of authentication paths.  
5.5.2 BAN Notations 
BAN is a logic of belief (Abadi and Needham 2003). BAN logic was introduced by 
Burrows, Abadi and Needham. BAN logic is used to analyse authentication protocols by 
deriving the beliefs that honest principals in protocol. BAN consists of three stages to analyse 
any protocol. The first stage is to express the initial assumptions, and goals as statement to 
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translate them to symbolic notations. The second stage is to verify the goal whether the goals 
are in fact reached. Lastly, a group of rules are performed to acquire the authentication goal.  
Assume there are three principals, Alice (A) and Bob (B), Server (S) for example, A  
might come to believe that a key (KAS) she has received from a (S) is a good key (KAB) for a 
communication session with (B). To idealise the protocol by replacing concrete messages by 
idealised messages in the protocol into logical formulae. For example, if a (S) sends (A) a 
session key (KAS) inside an encrypted message, the key (K) might be replaced with logical 
formula that means that the key (K) is good. We could then apply the inferences rules based 
on (A)’s ability to decrypt the Key (K) and other assumptions that would also lead to the 
conclusion that (A) believes that the received key (KAB) is good for talking with (B). 
Before the proofs of correctness of our authentication protocol algorithms, let us state 
the following notation for formal definitions and proofs. 
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5.5.3 Rules of Inference 
We use the extended BAN logic to analyse formally the correctness for the Protocols. 
We first introduce some deduction rules to be used by our correctness proofs. These rules are 
specified in (Abadi and Needham 2003). 
  
BAN Rules: 
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Correctness Proofs for the Protocols 5.6 
To prove the protocols using BAN Logic, it has to be more briefly, but its idea and 
functions MUST NOT be modified. To do so, Multiparty Session Handler, SAC, Vault and 
SAC Handler can be considered making into one entity (SAC), because most authentication 
functions are concentrated upon SAC and the messages can be merged suitably without 
modified their meanings. Therefore, we can simplify the system as shown in Figure 39.  
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
Figure 41: Simplified system for BAN Logic 
To prove the correctness of the security protocol. It is important to show whether a 
protocol indeed achieves its security goals after running the protocol under the stated 
assumptions. Therefore the following theorems were proposed. 
5.6.1 Protocol 1: Session Approval 
 

Figure 42: Session approval protocol 
Figure 42 illustrates the session approval protocol. User A sends a request to create a 
new session in order to access the BI application on Cloud A or B. F sends a request for User 
A’s keys (certificate). N1 is a nonce for preventing the replay attack and for matching the 
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request and reply. User A sends his/her certificate, which contains a root key and subdomain 
key, and the certificate is encrypted with User A’s private key. Here, C(A) consists of IDr 
and IDs. Pri(A) is User A's private key. For the Digital Signature, C(A) is encrypted by 
Pri(A). F generates a new session ID and sends it, along with User A’s request, to SAC in 
order to verify User A’s identity and to approve a new session. SAC-DB uses User A's public 
key, which is stored in the vault, to decrypt the encrypted C(A). Then it can verify User A’s 
identity by checking IDr and IDs. If User A’s identity is valid, then SAC generates a session 
key and sends a request to Cloud A to access the BI application. SAC then requests access 
and notifies IDsess and its key. N2 is a nonce. Cloud A stores the session ID and key in its 
registry or cache and then sends a response to SAC. SAC sends a reply for session approval 
to F. Then, F sends a response for session approval to access the BI application on Cloud A 
or B. 
The details of the messages transported in this protocol are presented as follows, 
where “A->B” means that A sends a message to B.  
 
 . + , -+./ 0 1  2)*&3456 
 . -+. , 7+/  1	&8569 
 . 7+ , -+./ 1 &8  569 
 . -+. , +/  	
  56 
 
When the user A tries to create a new session including Resource A (RA), A first 
sends a request to SAC (message (1)). This request consists of the credential of A, the name 
of Resource A and the session name to create. (Indeed, in implementation the message (1) is 
sent by dividing to 2 messages. The first message includes the credential of A. after 
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authenticating against the credential is success, the second which includes the names of 
session and service (resource) is sent. But these messages are merged to one by formalising 
and simplification for BAN Logic.) SAC then creates a new session and informs RA that RA 
has become a member of a new session (message (2)). After receiving a confirmation from 
RA (message (3)), the SAC sends back a response of session approval with session key 
(message (4)). All the messages are protected by the secret keys generated with D-H 
algorithm.  
The Security goals of the protocol for session approval include the following: 
1) verifying the identity A who are going to create a new session 
2) building a session key to be shared among session members(RA, RB)and SAC 
So,the security goals can be formally described as follows: 
,that is, SAC must verify that A possess keys and verify signature.  
	
	
	
this means session members must share the session key.


The assumptions of this protocol are formally described as follows: 
:;<| =>?:;< ;|  =>?:;< @;|  =>?@;: users believe that their 
private keys are secure.  
 
;| =>?:;< :;<|  =>?; :;<| =>?@; @;|  =>?:;<: they 
believe other’s keys are secure. 
 
;| $AB CDE|  $AB CDE|  $AF GD|  $AF: Users believe the nonce 
3
8 
are fresh, that is, those have not been sent.   
 
D|  :;< |H IJ: A believes SAC can control session key Ks 
GD|  :;< |HKs:  RA believes SAC can control session key Ks 

Theorem1.The goals of the protocol for session approval are satisfied under the 
assumptions of the protocol. 
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Proof. It is needed to deduce SAC sees C(A),  A|  Ks , RA |Ks  and  RA|Ks 
from the assumptions of the protocol. 
Firstly,  let’s achieve the first goal, SAC sees C(A). 
From SAC | KLM-+ and SAC| KLM+, it follows that SAC | -+. 56

 + 
by Rule 4.NNNNN O 
Formula (i) means SAC believe that the key shared with A , 	 is secure, but 
SAC has not yet get the confirmation from A.  
Then from the messageand SAC |P 
, it yields that 
SAC |P QRST RSUTV RSWT RSWX .+YZ[\  
3] by Rule 2.NNNNN OO 
Furthermore, from ^^^ and message  we can deduce that 
 SAC | -+. 56

 +by Rule 5.·· · · · ·  (iii) 
That is, SAC believes the key _DCDE is secure and SAC has get confirmation         
from A.
`abcdeMfc^d-+.gaagRSX RSUTV RSU .+)* 
3 cdh
-+.gaag.+YZ[\NNNN OiMjfkalaggcma^^^7Lnaocdh7Lnap
Consequently, we can obtain :;<JqqJ<;by SAC| !" + , (iv) and Rule7. 
This means that SAC can see C(A) by decrypting it with A’ public key and so can 
verify the identity of A.  
Secondly, for second goal. 
From  A | + 56

 -+.  A |P 
^r and Rule 6, we can deduce A 
| -+.|  sU. NNNN i 
Then, from A | -+ |H sU , (v) and Rule 3, we can obtain A | I:. 
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That is, A can know the session key - Ks. 
The remnants can also be deduced through a similar procedure. 
Thus we can verify the session key is to be shared among the session members. 
Hence the theorem. 
So far we have proved the following. 
 SAC can verify the identity of A exactly. 
 All users of a session can share the secret key. 

5.6.2 Protocol 2: Adding a User to an Existing Session 

Figure 43: Adding a new user to an existing session 
Figure 43 illustrates the protocol for adding a new user to an existing session. User B 
wants to join the session created by User A, IDsess. Steps 1–5 are identical to protocol 1. 
Thus, so far, SAC and F have verified User B’s identity. F then asks if User A wants to allow 
User B to join. User A sends a response that either accepts or rejects the request. If User A 
accepts User B, then F sends a request to add User B to the session with IDsess and 
regenerates a new session key. SAC appends User B to the session, regenerates the session 
key, Ksess2, and then notifies all session members that the session key has been changed. 
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Cloud A stores the session ID and key in its registry or cache and then sends a response to 
SAC to access the BI application. SAC sends a reply for session to F, notifies User A of a 
new key and sends a response to User B to join the session. 
The details of the messages transported in this protocol are presented as follows: 
 , :;<tuvtuCDEtuwEvxyzvAB_vCDE
 , ;tuvtuCtuD AF_C 
 , :;<tuD tuCDE tuv:={ :tuwAF  B_C 
 , ;_C|  AF  F_C 
 , {_C| AB  B_vCDE 
 , @;tuCDE tuGD tuC_C| A}_C
 , :;<A}  B_C 
When the user B join the session S (created by the user A), B first sends a request to 
SAC (message (1)). The SAC asks A (session creator) whether A wants to accept or not 
(message (2)). After receiving a confirmation from A (message (3)), SAC regenerates the 
session key and notifies creator A that the session key is updated(message(4)). Then SAC 
send a response of joining the session to B with the session key (message (5)). And then SAC 
informs all other session members of updating the session key (message (6)). The members 
send back confirmations. 
The integrity of the message (1) (5) are protected by the secret key generated by D-H 
algorithm and the ones of messages (2), (3), (4), (6), (7) are protected by the secret key 
shared within  the session S. 
Security goals of the protocol for adding a user to an existing session include the 
following: 
1) verifying the identity B who are going to join  a session 
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2) accepting B as a new user 
regenerating and distributing the session secret key to be shared among session members(RA, 
RB, B) and SAC 
The security goals are formally described as follows: 
SAC sees C(B) ,that is, SAC must verify that B possess keys and verify signature.  
then,  -+.'  -K~ -  means accepting B as a new user. 
CDE'  _w
| D' _w
| v'  _w
| GD' _w
| Gv'  _w
|   means session members must 
share the session key again.  

The assumptions of this protocol are formally described as follows: 
;'  ; _C

 :;<:  A believes that SAC and A has the same session key and can 
use it to exchange of messages with SAC. 
{'  =>?{ CDE' =>?:;< v'  =>?:;< :;<'  =>?:;<4
		# (
:;<'  ;' H :={ :/ SAC believes A can control the B’ joining to the session 
S. 
D'  :;<'  _C
| :  A believes SAC can control session key Ks’. 
CDE'  $AB CDE'  $AFSAC believes the nonces 
3 
8 are fresh. 
D' $AFv'  $AB v'  :;< |HKs’: B believes SAC can control session key 
Ks’. 
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Finally, for the third goal. That is, we should prove that a new session key is to be 
generated and shared among all the session members. 
From the message 4 and +'  $
8, it follows that+'  $s|  
3   by Rule 2.. 
(iv) 
Then from the message 5 and (iv),it yields that +'  + 

 -+. by Rule 5. ……….(v) 
So A believes that Ks is secure. 
From (iv), (v) and the message 5, we have +'  -+.'  s|  by Rule 6.  ……..(vi) 
Consequently, from the assumption  +' -+.'  s|  , (vi) and Rule 3, it follows that  
;'  IJ
|
. 
That is, the new key Ks’ has been shared with A.  
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@;'  IJ
| cdh@{'  IJ
|
  can also be deduced  similarly. 
	
 -+.' KLM-+.~+'  KLM~
	~'  ~
5


8(?(!"
/ 
  ~'  ~
5

 -+. ~'  $&3  	   9 	  		
~'  ~
5

 -+.(?(!"
Consequently, from (viii) and ~'  $&3 and the message 5, we can deduce ~'
-+.'  sU
|
.  ……(ix) 
Then from (ix),~' -+.'  sU|  and Rule 4, it yields that v'  _C| . 
Hence the theorem. 
So we have proved the following. 
 SAC can verify the identity of user B.
 User A (the session manager) can add new user B to his/her own session S.
 When adding a new user, the session key is regenerated and distributed among all 
session users. 
5.6.3 Protocol 3: Accepting a New Session User  

	
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	
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	
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
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
Figure 44: Protocol for accepting a new session user 
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Figure 44 illustrates the protocol for accepting a new session user. User A wants to 
call a new desired service, BI Resource1, in Cloud A (available in the session). First, User A 
sends an accepting request with IDsess and Resource1 to SAC. Then SAC invokes Resource1 
with IDsess and Ksess. Resource1 spawns a new instance, R1, and delivers IDsess and Ksess 
to it. After this, Resource1 sends a reply with the identifier R1. SAC then registers it in the 
session and sends a response with R1 to User A. Then User A can call R1. The messages 
between SAC and User A are secured by session key Ksess, which has been previously 
shared among them. In addition, the messages between SAC and Resource1 are secured by 
the key shared using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm.   
The following are shown messages transported in this protocol. 
@ (, :;<tuDtuCDE :=@B :AB_w
@ (, @BtuCDEtuGBtuCIJAF_CDEGB
@ (, :;<tuGB tuCDE tuyBAF  B_CDEGB 
@ (, ;tuCDE tuD tuyB AB  B_C 
 
 When the user A in the session tried to contact Resource1 (R1), A first sends a 
request to SAC (message (1)). Then SAC sends a request to R1 (message (2)). R1 then 
generates a new instance (r1) of service and sends back the information about R1 to SAC. 
After receiving the response from R1 (message (3)), the SAC adds R1 to S and sends back a 
response to A (message (4)). The integrity of the messages (1) and (4) are protected by the 
secret key generated with DH algorithm and the integrity of the messages (2) and (3) are 
protected by the secret key shared within S. 
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The security goals in this protocol include the followings. 
1) Accepting R1 as a member of session S. 
2) Sharing the session key of session S, Ks, with R1 

The goals are formally described as follows: 
:;<'  :=@B : : SAC believed that R1 is accepted as a member of session S  
@B'  IJ  This means that session key must be shared with R1. 
Assumptions: 
;'  ;
_C

 :;<:  A believes that SAC and A have the same session key and can 
use it to exchange of messages with SAC. 
:;<'  ;
_C

 :;<:  SAC believes that SAC and A has the same session key and can 
use it to exchange of messages with A. 
@B'  =>?@B CDE' =>?:;< GB'  =>?:;< :;<'  =>?@B4
A		# (
:;<'  ;' H :=@B :/ SAC believes A can control accepting R1 as session 
member of the session S. 
GB'  :;<'  _C :  R1 believe SAC can control session key Ks. 
CDE'  $AB CDE'  $AFSAC believes the nonces 
3 
8 are fresh.
D| $ABGB|  $AF

Proof. It is needed to deduce CDE'  CxGB C and GB'  _w from the 
assumputions of the protocol. 
We obtain  tuDtuCDE :=@B :ABby the assumption:;<'  ;
_C

 :;<
the and(?!5"
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From the assumption CDE'  $AB and  it follows that
CDE'  $tuDtuCDE :=@B :AB'(      
      ?!6"
And from (1), (2), the message1 and Rule 6, it 
yieldsCDE'  ;'  tuDtuCDE :=@B :AB].     
        …(3) 
From (3) and Rule 1, it follows thatCDE'  ;'  :=@B :. …(4) 
So we can deduce that :;<'  :=@B :  by (4), the assumption :;<'  ;' H
:=@B : and Rule 3. 
Then from the assumption  @B'  =>?:;< @B'  =>?@B , we can obtain  
@B'  @B
_GBCDE

 :;<by( ?!9"
From (5), the message2 and Rule 7, it yields R1 sees [tuCDEtuGBtuCIJAF].
 …(6) 
=
  	  	
GB'  $AF 	 

 		
GB'  $tuCDEtuGBtuCIJAF6(?!;"
=
  !9" !:" !;"   : 	  		
GB'  :;<'  tuCDEtuGBtuCIJAF(?!B"

	GB'  :;<'  IJ!B"5(?!C"
/
    		 GB'  IJ   !C" 	  	
 GB'  :;<' 
_C 7(
<		
 (
So we have proved the following: 
 SAC can believe that user A wants to a new member R1 to the session. 
 When adding a new member, the session key is to be shared with the new member 
securely. 
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5.6.4 Protocol 4: Leaving a Session 
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Figure 45: Protocol for leaving a session 
Figure 45 illustrates the protocol for leaving a session.  User B, who is a session user 
but not the creator, wants to leave a session. First, User B sends a request to SAC to leave the 
session. After User B receives a response of “permit” from SAC, User B leaves the session. 
Next, after SAC removes User B from the session user list, revokes the old session key and 
invokes a new session key. Then SAC broadcasts it to all the other session users and to all the 
resources that belong to the session. 
 
The messages in this protocol are shown below. 
 , :;<tuvtuCDE { :AB_w
 , {tuCDEtuvAB  B_C 
 , @BtuCDE tuGB tuC IJ AF_CDEGB
 , :;<tuGB tuCDE AF  B_CDEGB 
 , ;tuCDE tuD tuC IJ A}_CDED 
 , :;<tuD tuCDE A}  B_CDED 
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When B (not session creator) tries to leave a session, B first sends a request to SAC 
(message(1)). Then SAC removes B from the session S and sends back a response of permit 
to B (message (2)). And then SAC regenerates the session key and informs all session 
members except B of updating the session key (message (3), (5)). The members send back 
responses to SAC (message (4), (6)). The integrity of message (1) and (2) are protected by the 
shared secret key within S and the integrity of messages (3), (4), (5) and (6) are protected by 
the secret keys generated with D-H algorithm. 
The security goals in this protocol include the following: 
1) Removing B from the session S 
2) Regenerating session key and sharing it among the members of session S except 
B.  
The goals are formally described as follows.   
 SA<'  { : : SAC believed that B left the session S. 
 @B'  IJ’  ;'  IJ’ this means that a new session key Ks’ must be 
shared among the session members. 

Assumptions: 
-;<'  { _C

 :;<:  SAC believe that SAC and B have the same session key and 
can use it to exchange of messages with B. 
@B'  =>?@B GB' =>?:;< D'  =>?; ;'  =>?:;<4 Users 
believe their private keys remain secure. 
:;<'  {' H { :/ SAC believes B can control the leaving the session S. 
GB'  :;<'  _C
| :  R1 believes SAC can control session key Ks’. 
CDE'  $AB CDE'  $AF	

3 
8(
D| $A}GB|  $AF
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Proof. It is needed to deduce CDE'  zGB C D'  _w and GB'  _wfrom 
the assumputions of the protocol. 
We obtain SAC sees tuvtuCDE { :AB]  by  the assumption :;<'  {
_C

 :;<, the message1 and Rule 7. …(1) 
=
 	 	
CDE'  $AB6	

		CDE'  $tuvtuCDE
{ :AB'( …(2) 
From (1), (2), the message1 and Rule 6, it yields thatCDE'  {'  tuvtuCDE
{ :AB] …(3) 
From (3) and Rule 1, it follows thatCDE'  {'  { :. …(4) 
So we can deduce that :;<'  { :  by (4), the assumption :;<'  {' H
{ : and Rule 3. 
*1	
 	 	
@B'  =>?:;< @B'  =>?@Bwe can obtain
@B'  @B
_GBCDE

 :;<( ?!9"
From (5), the message3 and Rule 7, it yields R1 sees [tuCDE tuGB tuC IJ AF].
 …(6) 
Then from the assumptionGB'  $AF it follows that GB'  $tuCDE tuGB tuC
IJ AF6(  …(7) 
From (5), (6), (7) and Rule 6, it follows thatGB'  :;<'  tuCDE tuGB tuC IJ
AF(?!B"
And then we obtain GB'  :;<'  IJ by (8) and Rule 1. …(9) 
Therefore, we can deduce thatGB'  IJ’ by (9),  the assumption GB'  :;<'  _C|  
and Rule 3. 
AndD'  IJ’ can be deduced by the same way as above. 
Hence the theorem. 
So we have proved the following: 
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 SAC can believe that user B wants to leave the session S. 
 Whenever a session user leaves the session, the session key is regenerated and 
distributed among all other session users. 
5.6.5 Protocol 5: Ending a session 
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Figure 46: Protocol for ending a session 
Figure 46 illustrates the protocol for ending a session. User A (session creator) wants 
to end his/her session. First User A sends a request to SAC to end the session. Then SAC 
removes the session from the session list and broadcasts, to all users (session users and other 
users) and resources that belong to the session, that the session has been removed. Next, SAC 
sends a response to User A, and then User A ends his/her session. After receiving “end 
session” messages, session users revoke the session key, exit from that session and remove 
the session ID from their session ID lists. The other users also remove the session ID. The 
resources terminate the corresponding service instances. 
The messages in this protocol are shown as followings. 
 , :;<tuDtuCDE ; :AB_w
@ (, @BtuCDEtuGB @: AF_C 
@ (, {tuCDE tuv @: A}_C 
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@ (, <tuCDE tuE @: A_CDEE
@ (, ;tuCDE tuD AB  B_C 
When A (session creator) tries to end a session, A first sends a request to SAC 
(message (1)). 
Then SAC removes all the resources in S from S and informs them of ending a 
session (message (2)). 
In turn, SAC removes all the users in S from S and informs them of ending a session 
(message (3)). Then SAC informs other users, connecting to itself, of ending a session 
(message (4)). 
Finally, the SAC expires the session key, removes the session S and sends back a 
response to A.  
The integrity of messages (1), (2), (3) and (5) are protected by the shared secret key 
with S and the integrity of message (4) is protected by the secret key generated with D-H 
algorithm. 
The security goals in this protocol include the following: 
1) Removing session S from the session list 
2) Informing all user of Removing the session 

The goals are formally described as following:  
 SA<'  { : : SAC believed that the session creator A left the session 
S. 
 @B'  @:  ;'  @: <'  @: this means that a new 
session key Ks’ must be shared among the session members. Here A and R1 are the members 
of the session S, C is other user that connected to SAC.  

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Assumptions: 
-;<'  ;
_C

 :;<:  SAC believes that SAC and A has the same session key and can 
use it to exchange of messages with A. 
7'  @B
_C

 :;<:  R1 believes that SAC and R1 has the same session key and can 
use it to exchange of messages with SAC. 
~'  {
_C

 :;<:  B believes that SAC and B has the same session key and can 
use it to exchange of messages with SAC. 

<'  =>?<<'  =>?:;<: User C believes the private keys remain secure. 
:;<'  ;' H ; :/ SAC believes A can control the leaving the session S 
(leaving of creator means ending a session) 
GB'  :;<'  @::  R1 believes SAC can control removing the session S. 
v'  :;<'  @: E'  :;<'  @:
CDE'  $ABSAC believes the nonces B F are fresh. 
GB| $AFv|  $A} E|  $A

Proof. It is needed to deduceCDE'  zD C GB'  GC, v'  GC and 
E'  GC  from the assumputions of the protocol. 
Firstly, we obtain SAC seestuDtuCDE ; :AB] by the 
assumption:;<'  ;
_C

 :;<, the message  and Rule 7. …(1) 
From the assumptionCDE'  $ABand6it follows thatCDE'  $tuDtuCDE
; :AB'( …(2)
From (1), (2), the message1 and Rule 6, it followsCDE'  ;'  tuDtuCDE
; :AB]   …(3) 
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Then from (3) and Rule 1, it follows thatCDE'  ;'  ; :. …(4) 
Consequently, we can deduce that :;<'  ; :  by (4), the assumption 
:;<'  {' H { : and Rule 3. 
Next, we obtain R1 seestuCDEtuGB @: AF' by the assumption@B'  @B
_C

 :;<the message2 and Rule 7.    …(5)
From the assumption GB'  $AF and Rule2, it yields thatGB'  $tuCDEtuGB
@: AF'(     …(6)
Then from (5), (6), the message2 and Rule 6, it followsGB'  :;<'  tuCDEtuGB
@: AF     …(7) 
From (7) and Rule 1, it follows thatGB'  :;<'  @: …(8) 
Consequently, we can deduce that@B'  @:by (8), the assumption@B'  :;<' H
@:and Rule 3.
{'  @: can be deduced as the same way as above. 
And then, from the assumption<'  =>?:;< <'  =>?<we can obtain
<'  <
_ECDE

 :;<by Rule 4. …(9) 
From (9) and the message4, it follows    tuCDE tuE @: A by Rule 7.
 …(10)
Then from the assumptionE'  $A it follows that E'  $tuCDE tuE @: A
by Rule 2.     …(11) 
Consequently (9), (10), (11) and Rule6, it follows thatE'  :;<'  tuCDE tuE
@: A(    …(12) 
And then we obtainE'  :;<'  @:by (12) and Rule 1. …(13)
Therefore, we can deduce that E'  @:  by (13), the assumption E'  :;<' 
@:and Rule 3. 
Hence the theorem. 
So we have proved the following. 
 SAC can believe that user A who is a session creator wants to end the session S. 
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 When a session is ended, all users can be notified of the fact. 
Analytic Assessment 5.7 
In this section, we focus on the analytic assessment of the MPA protocols and the key 
management mechanisms for business sessions.  
5.7.1 Analysis of the Protocols 
The Multiparty Authentication System can help session users authenticate their 
session memberships to simplify the authentication processes within multiparty sessions. 
If a user intends to create a new session, it has to invoke the Session Authority Cloud 
(SAC), when an authentication process between SAC and the user needs to be performed and 
authentication processes between SAC and the services that the user (session creator) wants 
to include in its session need to be performed.  
Also if a new user intends to join a session, it has to invoke the SAC and may join the 
session under the approval of the session creator. At this time, an authentication process 
between the user and SAC is to be performed. 
In order to facilitate the analysis benefits that the proposed system may introduce to 
multiparty sessions, assume that there is a multiparty session on cloud S which consists of n 
session users U3, U8, …U and m services  V3, V8, … , V. The multiparty session S is under the 
management of the SAC. 
The number of services that U[ intends to invoke to is denoted as c[. 
Without this system, there are N 	∑ c[[  authentication processes to be performed 
in S.  
And there are N3  n m authentication processes between SAC and session 
members (users and services). 
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Therefore, there are totally N  	N  N3 authentication processes performed in 
S. Among these authentication processes, there are N authentication processes (between 
users and services) and N3 authentication processes (between SAC and session users). 
The number of authentication processes between users and services simplified by our 
system is denoted as N¡. 
#$	


With our system, the authentication processes between SAC and session members 
(users and services). Figure 47, illustrates a worst case scenario (1) where there is only one 
user and m services in session (S). 
 Here,  N  m, N3  1 m, N   2m  1 and N¡  0.  
 
Figure 47: A worst case scenario-1 (session approval) 
Figure 48, illustrates a worst case scenario (2). Other worst case scenarios exist when 
there are either n users and one service or where there are 2 users and 2 services. In these 
cases, the authentication process cannot be simplified and the SAC process offers no 
significant advantage over direct authentication. In addition, the two-party session technique 
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does not address the issue of different Cross-Realm Authentication, which requires credential 
conversion and the establishment of authentication paths. 
 
Figure 48: A worst case scenario-2 
#"
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Figure 49 illustrates a best case scenario. In this case where there are n session users 
and m services, where both n and m are much greater than 2. The benefit is obtained since 
each user will be able to access all of the m services.  
Here, c3 	 c8  ⋯ 	c  m, N  nm and N3  n m. Thus, N   nm 
n m. 
With our system, whenever a new user joins a session, an authentication process only 
is performed. 
So, N = m, N3  n m, and N  = 2m + n.  
Thus, N¡  n ¤ 1m. 
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Figure 49: The best case scenario 
Without our system, the authentication processes to be performed in session because 
each user has to be authorised by all the services that he/she wants to access. Therefore, the 
multiparty authentication system on cloud can introduce more benefits to a session when the 
number of users and services is increased.  
5.7.2 Analysis of the Key Management 
How to negotiate and distribute secret keys is always a critical concern during the 
design of authentication protocols. In practice, authentication can be performed in different 
ways, and different key management mechanisms can be employed. A secret key can be used 
to encrypt the messages transported within the session so that prevent the messages from 
being known or modified by the others from the outside of the session.  With our system, 
whenever a new user join a session, a new session key is generated and shared with session 
members and the old key is expired before the user is added to a session. So the new user 
cannot know about the old key and the messages previously encrypted by it.  
Whenever a session user leaves a session, a new session key is generated and shared 
with session members and the old key is expired as soon as the user has left the session. So 
the user cannot know the new session key and messages subsequently encrypted. 
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In our system, each user has an authentication channel linked with SAC, each channel 
has its one secret key. This channel can be used to verify whether the other side is a session 
member. 
To facilitate the discussion, assume there are n session users U3, U8, … , U and m 
services,  V3, V8, … , V. 
Without our system, each user needs to be maintain m secret key shared with services 
and one secret key shared with SAC. So there are (m+1)n secret keys in a session. These 
secret keys are managed by SAC. 
The greater the number of session members is, the greater the number of keys exist 
and the more complex the management of keys becomes. 
With our system, there are (m+n+1) keys in a session.  
The figures below illustrate relationship of the numbers of users, services and secret 
keys.  
 
 
Figure 50: The case without employing multiparty authentication system on cloud 
152 
 
 
 
Figure 51: The case with employing multiparty authentication system on cloud 
We can realise that the rate of increasing the number of keys is very fast without 
employing our system. Before an authentication protocol is applied in practice, it needs to be 
carefully examined in both correctness and performance. So this section introduces the work 
of analysing the multiparty authentication system on cloud. 
Using BAN logic we have proved the perfection of our protocol. We can confirm 
follows with the method. The assumptions used to design Multi-party authentication system 
on cloud are re-examined. The objectives of our protocol are achievable. The crypto methods 
used in our protocol can prevent impersonation attacks and with the analytic assessment 
results, our protocol simplifies the authentication processes. In direct proportion to the 
increasing number of session memberships, if our solution is not used, the number of 
authentication processes increases and the authentication procedure becomes more complex. 
However, with our solution it can be simplified. Also with our solution the management of 
session key can be more readily facilitated. 
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Evaluating and Presenting Analysis Results 5.8 
5.8.1 Analysis of results 
The process of simulation execution is shown in the figure below. It may be observed 
that the simulation executed 178 million events in the operation of mere seven minutes and 
nine seconds on the network. This is because it is a reasonably large network with 1000 
trusted principals accessing it. This is a near real-world scenario and hence the results have 
practical significance to a large extent. 
 
Figure 52: Executing the simulation 
Figure 53 illustrates the TCP sessions initiated by the node “A”.  The active TCP 
sessions count exceeded 2000 during the simulation period indicating that each trusted 
principal has made two session requests on an average. Hence, the authentication protocol 
has been triggered more than 2000 times on the network. 
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Figure 53: TCP sessions initiated by the node “A” 
 
The overall performance and behaviour of authentication protocol tasks on the 
network are shown in Figure 54. The first statistic shows that the overall (end-to-end) 
response time of the authentication protocol on the network is about 60 seconds. This is 
genuine given the time taken in establishing the TCP connection and transferring the data. 
Hence, 60 seconds is a committed performance for executing all the 13 phases. However it is 
not infeasible knowing that it is only a one-time activity for each user being added by the 
trusted principal.  
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Figure 54: Overall performance metrics and behaviours of the authentication 
protocol tasks on the network 
It is important to note that the delays because of network or host-based congestions 
are more serious than protocol execution delays. This has been verified by looking into the 
second statistic packet network delay. It is observed that the maximum delay occurred on the 
network is slightly less than 0.06 seconds. It was further confirmed by getting into device 
specific reports that none of the servers, switches, and links had registered any packet queues 
or packet forwarding delays on the network. Hence, 60 seconds is a committed performance 
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for executing all the 13 phases. This delay has occurred because of the amount of data 
exchanged per phase. The statistic “application task response time” is the same as 
“application phase response time” in this model because each phase has only one task in the 
algorithm. The last two statistics reflect the overall authentication traffic sent and received on 
the network.  
 
Figure 55: Delays investigated at the transport layer 
For 1000 trusted principals interacting simultaneously, the traffic of up to 1.5 Mbps is 
quite moderate. This shows that the protocol is loading the network moderately. The delays 
have been further investigated at the transport layer, as well, as shown in Figure 55. There is 
hardly any TCP delay on the network. However, there have been up to 500 TCP 
retransmissions at one point when the traffic is at its peak. Five hundred TCP retransmissions 
out of 2000 TCP sessions is a considerable number necessitating network tuning.  
Before making the final recommendations, the response times of individual phases of 
the authentication protocol are also investigated. Figure 54 illustrates this statistic for six out 
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of the eleven phases of the protocol. The overall response time is about 5 seconds per phase. 
This is genuine given the time taken in establishing the TCP connection and transferring the 
data.  
  
Figure 56: Response times of the individual phases of the authentication protocol 
The above results are pertaining to the phases executed without a timeout. A second 
simulation was carried out by including a timeout of 60 seconds per phase. As per the 
previous results, the phases should not time out given that each phase was taking about 5 
seconds to execute. However, as shown in Figure 57, the number of application instances 
reduced significantly as the phases of the protocol progressed. This indicates massive session 
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drops because of timeout configuration. This should not have happened because the timeout 
configured per phase was larger than the average phase duration observed. Multiple settings 
were tested but the results were similar. This is a problem needing further investigation. 
Perhaps, a version of OPNET modeller may be needed to investigate more deeply on what is 
happening when timeouts are configured. In this research, it is recommended that the 13-step 
authentication protocol should not have any timeout configured. However, a localised 
timeout can be configured at F. 
 
 
Figure 57: Indicating progressive reduction of instances count when introducing a timeout 
In our approach, Cloud security service has a built-in relational database for 
examining the tenant sessions. The databases at the firewall (DBFW) cloud help in 
authenticating, authorisation and providing access permission to the session initiated by the 
tenant. Tenant metadata (DBMETA) comprises tenants’ information for enabling authorisation 
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to designated application instances and database objects that the tenant has subscribed. 
Tenants’ vault comprises keys and digital signatures stored in database objects (DBVAULT) 
that can be retrieved based on tenant authorisation enabled by the metadata layer.  
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is one of the challenges that may arise in any 
network based systems. The DDoS attacks generally exist in two forms, a network-based 
attack that loads the service using a bandwidth, and an application-layer attack which 
overloads the service and a database with many application calls (Modi et al, 2013). The high 
volume of packets moving to the target creates a denial of service as the media focuses on the 
target of a DDoS attack. Denial of Service attacks can result in significant loss of service of 
any system.  The attack master then identifies other vulnerable devices or processes in the 
network for potential attack. After infection, the attacker instructs the compromised devices 
to attack a single target on the network. In the network attack, the DDOS loads the network 
such that all available bandwidth is consumed and further communication is reduced to an 
impractically slow speed. The attack may take place as the attackers tries to break into the 
security control of the databases DBfw, DBmeta, and DBvault and gain access to the client 
data. A general sequence of events in an attack begins with the attacker targeting a cloud 
database. In such scenario, the attacker may gain access to a VM in the capacity of a verified 
tenant. The Cloud service providers offer a number of subscriptions and the tenant is given 
access to their virtualized environments after some preliminary verification (like ID and 
address proof, bank account details, credit card details, etc.). However, the tenant may be a 
hacker attacking neighbouring VMs through virtual links. The table below presents the 
sessions encountered by the tenant LAN. It may be observed that all the sessions initiated 
from the tenant LAN are with tenant Metadata only through all the virtual machines. 
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Similarly, the sessions are between tenant Metadata and tenant Vault only for the same 
virtual machines.  
Table 7: The Client DB sessions on Tenants’ LAN 
 
The results indicate that the virtual machines cannot jump a layer given their pre-
defined destination preferences. In this way, the session inspections and forwarding/dropping 
are mandatorily implied on each VM. The VMs assigned to the hackers are kept out of the 
tenant Metadata and the tenant Vault application profiles. In practice, this scenario may be 
viewed as the unauthorized users not having any records in the metadata or the vault when 
trying to access a different domain than allowed to them. It may be observed in Figure 58 that 
the IP packets from the hackers’ LAN dropped after an initial attempt. However, these 
exploits will be detected by the IPS and Anti-malware controls. Hence, the attacker may fail 
to steal any data from DBMETA and DBVAULT in spite of gaining access to Cloud VMs by 
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buying subscriptions. If this is the case, the IPS will check for traces of exploit signatures in 
the ongoing sessions, and it also will detect the traces of exploit codes and block the session. 
In addition, anti-malware will check for viruses and spyware signatures in the ongoing 
sessions. The sessions passing through the IPS may have spyware, adware, or worms 
embedded in the packets for executing at the BI application layer. Anti-malware will be able 
to detect and block the session if such malware traces are detected. Hence, traditional security 
controls are needed on the cloud as well. To get through all the layers and establish 
unauthorized sessions with the Cloud apps, the hackers will need to break the metadata layer, 
the vaults layer, the IPS layer, and the antimalware layer. It is unlikely that the hackers will 
be able to break so many security/privacy layers to reach the Cloud BI applications.  
 
Figure 58: After initial attempts, IP packets from the hackers’ machines are dropped 
On the other hand, the authorized tenants’ LANs could run DB sessions throughout 
the simulation period as shown in Figure 59. This is because their VMs are added to the 
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application profiles of all the layers. OPNET modeller does not have the feature to create 
database tables and enter content in databases. Hence, the simulations are limited to studying 
their operating behaviour, performance levels, and blocking of attacks.  
 
 
Figure 59: Authorized tenant LANs established and ran DB sessions  
                  
The author have used signature based because it is easy to implement, fast, effective 
and can be applied to protect the whole network without being installed on every 
participating machine, if one device finds a signature in a process, it can block the process 
from being passed on to other devices regardless of whether they could protect themselves. 
This was implemented as a proof of concept and to offer some protection, this is an item that 
is open for further development for a production system. 
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One of the issues with cloud computing service access is latency. According to Modi 
et al (2013), a cloud service provider experiences this delay in response to a client request for 
a service from the cloud. The “latency” issue could be more significant for Cloud-based 
business processes which contain collaborating services and users from multiple Cloud 
systems in different security realms. A typical solution will be locating some intermediate 
realms that will connect a pair of separate realms, hence serving as an authentication path for 
collaborating the pair of BI services. Nevertheless the “latency” resulted from creating the 
authentication path for the two BI services located in disjoint realms is significant as it may 
involve a lot of other processes for credential conversion that will need extensive invocations 
to intermediate services. In contrast, in our proposed system, we can authenticate 
dynamically and enable secure collaboration of different security realms. Hence, the proposed 
system reduces the latency times that occur due to initiating communication required among 
a multiple security realms. 
For security reasons, if an organization decides moving only part of the BI layers to a 
Public Cloud. For example, the organization may decide to keep the data in its private cloud 
datacenter on its premises while using BI tools in Public Cloud environments because they 
does not trust its sensitive data to a cloud computing provider. Our proposed framework 
provides a solution to address this issue, as our approach is designed for multiparty 
authentication for heterogeneous Cloud systems which include both public and private 
Clouds.  For future work, we are planning to carry out experiments in the real system to 
evaluate the performance and overhead of our framework in this specific scenario. 
BI on the Cloud requires multi-layered security for ensuring appropriate protection of 
each BI layer. The key security layers for BI on the Cloud are lightweight directory access 
protocol (LDAP), intrusion detection and prevention (IDPS), Antispam, web services 
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security, antimalware, and database activity monitoring. The key security services for BI on 
Cloud are identification, authentication, authorization, auditing, data confidentiality, data 
integrity, data availability, and prevention from unauthorized DB querying and transactions. 
Hence, traditional security controls are needed on the cloud as well. 
Clouds are like galaxies of servers. Multiparty authentication protocol is a proposed 
mechanism for creating a framework of BI applications used by users having memberships of 
different security realms but collaborating for running a common project. For example, users 
from multiple companies sitting on multiple clouds may collaborate for running a common 
research project with the project manager acting as the trusted principal. The SAC can 
guarantee secured access to resources on different clouds. However, it cannot guarantee 
performance and committed response times given that each member cloud may have its own 
network configurations. Hence, while such an authentication protocol is essential for 
multiparty collaborations on multiple clouds, timeout settings may not be feasible for all the 
phases of the authentication protocol. To ensure that the requesting user does not wait for 
long periods, a localised timeout can be set at the requesting cloud (in this case, it is F). The 
response time of 60 seconds is a committed performance for executing all the phases, 
however given that the authentication protocol invokes a complex sequence of interactions 
throughout the multi-cloud framework and it needs to execute only once for establishing the 
session, it may be feasible. 
5.8.2 Empirical Evaluation 
Besides analytic assessments, the feasibility of the proposed authentication system in 
real-world applications also needs to be examined. Consequently, a series of experiments has 
been conducted using two types of experimental systems. The first type of experimental 
system (ES1) consists of a SAC and three experimental services. In ES1 a user creates a 
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session including three services and then the instances of the three services are included in 
the session. 
 
Figure 60: Multi-party authentication system on cloud 
The second type of system (ES2) only consists of three experimental services. The 
experimental services of ES2 will be connected with session users respectively.  
ES1 is used to simulate distributed applications with our proposed system while ES2 
simulates distributed applications without our proposed system. The overheads of our 
proposed system can be assessed by comparing the experimental results from these two types 
of experimental system. We have performed all the experiments evaluated in this section in 
OPNET modeller. 
Figure 61 illustrates the results from the ES1. The number of the session users in 
different sessions range from 200 to 2000. As illustrated in Figure below, the time 
consumption of accepting new session users into a session is proportional to the number of 
the session members. 
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Figure 61: Scalability of the Multi-party Authentication System 
 In order to extensively evaluate the performances of the proposed system, several 
other experiments have been implemented. Figures below present the time consumption of 
invoking database and web services in ES1 and ES2. In these experiments there are no TCP 
delays, TCP segment delays and TCP retransmission.  
 
Figure 62: Database query response time 
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Figure 63: HTTP object response time 
 
 
Figure 64: Performance comparison of ES1 and ES2 
As illustrated in Figure 64, in the same environments, in ES1 the time consumption of 
invoking services is less than ES2. It observed that performance of database query and 
HTML page and object responses in ES1 are much better than ES2. 
Now, apart from ES1 and ES2, we also implemented a system to evaluate the 
performances of Hada and Maruyama’s authentication system and Zhang and J. Xu’ 
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authentication system. The time consumption of our proposed solution is better than other 
solutions. Figure 65 shows the performance comparison of three solutions: Hada and 
Maruyama’s solution, Zhang and J. Xu’ solution, and our solution. 
 
Figure 65: Performance comparison 
As Figure 65 illustrated, the time consumption of in our solution is significantly less 
than other multi-party authentication solutions. The number of the session members (users 
and services) that the experimental systems can support is influenced by several factors. 
 A critical factor is the security protocol which the authentication system is combined 
with. When used with different security protocols, the performance of ES1 varies noticably.  
For example, when ES1 is deployed and uses the security protocol, the time 
consumption increases nonlinearly after over 940 instances are generated. When ES1 is 
combined with the secure message protocol, the system can execute stably even after 
generating more than 10,000 instances. Another critical factor is the memory space. This also 
affects the performance of an experimental system. Information of sessions, session members 
and experimental services need to be stored in memory. As the amount of such data, the free 
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space of physical memory decreases. For this reason the operating system detects lack of 
physical memory and frequently attempts memory swap. Thus the performance will reduce. 
But when an experimental system is deployed in a distributed environment, the SAC 
and the experimental services do not need to utilize the same limited memory. The 
performance of experimental systems therefore becomes much better. 
The experiments introduced in this chapter were conducted using OPNET modeller to 
assess the scalability of the Multi-party authentication system for BI on cloud, the 
compatibility of the system with other message-level security protocols, and the runtime 
overheads of the mechanism under different conditions. The experimental results show that 
the time consumption increases linearly as the number of session members increases. Our 
solution is therefore potentially applicable for Cloud computing with a large number of 
participants. Various public key algorithms are also compared and evaluated during the 
experiments in order to select the most suitable one for our new protocol. 
In addition, the overheads of the Multi-party authentication system for BI on cloud are 
comparable with other standard multi-party solutions. In the experiments deployed in                     
a distributed environment, the experimental services collaborate over a local area network. 
The time consumption of experimental systems is very small, and most of the runtime 
overhead is imposed by the cryptographic key generation. In such environments, the 
performance of the proposed system can be improved by employing effective cryptographic 
algorithms. However, in a real-world application, session members may be geographically 
distributed and communicate over the Internet. In these applications, the time consumption 
can be much larger than that in our experimental systems.  For example, in some 
experiments, it may take several seconds to transfer a message between countries which are 
geographically remote from each other. In such cases, the performance of distributed 
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applications is largely affected by the geographic location of session members and the 
broadband of networks, and it is a reasonable method to improve the performance of the 
proposed authentication system on cloud by reducing additional messages introduced by 
authentication processes. 
When compared a final model with the benchmark model, the experiment was carried 
out with the same environment in terms of hardware specifications and bandwidths. So that 
we can confirm that the improvement of performance is resulted from our proposed security 
protocol/architecture it is not because hardware.  
5.8.3 Validation Results 
The validation of results is an essential part of the research process. The author has 
validated the results in two ways. First, the correctness of framework has been verified 
theoretically by using the well-known BAN logic to analyse authentication protocols by 
deriving the beliefs that honest principals in protocol. Second, the framework was practically 
implemented through developing a prototype system using Eclipse. The prototype system 
was developed to implement the five multiparty authentication protocols in the multiparty 
authentication system. In addition, the performance of the proposed framework was evaluated 
by comparing with two state-of-the-art methods. The comparison results show that our 
proposed method achieved better performance than these two state-of-the-art methods. 
Risk Assessment 5.9 
An assessment of risk is about acknowledging that risks may occur during the 
research work, whether enough precautions have been taken and whether more precautions 
are necessary to prevent risk (Ashworth, 2012).  Risk assessment is very important and 
should be completed in any research project because it is essential to keep data secure and 
ensure that critical data are protected against loss through hard-drive failure, corruption or 
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equipment damage. Another potential risk for this project is that the work is not completed on 
time. In order avoid risk during a project, the author ensured that data were backed up 
securely at the end of each day; kept copies of data on multiple secure storage devices; used 
an anti-virus software and keep it updated to protect the computer against malicious computer 
viruses, Trojans and other mal-ware; and built in extra time at key stages of the project and 
monitor progress against the project’s Gantt chart. Risk assessment was carried out at the 
beginning of my PhD project. Risk assessment has also been approved by the College 
Research Committee in my RD5 and RD7 reports. Due to immense care and consideration, 
none of these risks happened during my PhD.  
Ethical and Legal Issues 5.10 
In recent years, ethical and legal issues have come to the forefront of many scientists’ 
attention. Ethical and legal concerns are very important and should be considered in any 
research project because they may help us decide whether the research should even be done, 
and if so, how it should be pursued (Davenport, 2008). As the importance of ethical scrutiny 
of research projects has grown, formal ethical approval must take place before PhD 
researchers are allowed to conduct research projects. Ethical approval has been secured by 
the College Research Committee in my RD5 and RD7 reports prior to the commencement of 
fieldwork. There are no ethical or legal issues arose during the work presented in the PhD 
project, and there is no involvement of either human beings or animals. Any companies that 
want to implement my framework also need to fully consider ethical and legal issues. 
Summary 5.11 
In this chapter, the multiparty authentication system for BI and the mechanisms for 
hosting it on cloud computing were discussed and five core protocols of our multiparty 
authentication system have been presented. The correctness of the protocol is formally 
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analysed and proven using the well-known BAN logic. A comprehensive empirical study is 
performed to evaluate the scalability and the runtime overhead of the authentication system.  
The author address this problem by designing and implementing a new multiparty 
authentication protocol for dynamic authentication interactions when members of different 
security realms want to access distributed BI services through a trusted principal.  This 
mechanism can help Cloud session users authenticate their session membership so as to 
largely simplify the authentication processes within multi-party sessions.  
Finally in this section, risks, ethics and legal implications are considered including 
mitigation factors and recommendations. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Directions 
Introduction 6.1 
This chapter discusses the major contribution of the thesis, conclusions and future 
directions of this study. The experimental analysis highlights the contribution and the 
productive results. In addition, this section highlights limitations of this work that have been 
identified as the work progressed. The limitations are not failings, but do provide scope and 
opportunity for further research and development. 
Major Contributions of the Study 6.2 
This research has considered problems associated with reliable, timely and secure data 
transfer mechanisms necessary for shared Business Intelligence data processing networks. 
The stated aim was to develop a multi-party authentication model for securing business 
intelligence on cloud computing. This aim has been achieved through the definition of a 
multi-party authentication system framework. Suitability and robustness of the framework 
has been shown through simulation and experimentation. 
Overall, the most significant contribution has been to propose a system and procedure 
which simplifies the authentication process which is undertaken between two unrelated 
secure business environments prior to allowing data interchange. The simplification improves 
the speed of authentication, thereby reducing overall transaction time and is achieved without 
compromising the security of either party.    
• Major components of the system include:  
– A unique set of management and authentication protocols  
– A cloud based session authority 
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The set of protocols that were designed specifically to enable multi-party session 
management and cross-realm authentication were implemented to satisfy the following list of 
requirements: 
• Address scenarios of Business Intelligence (BI) application access on cloud platforms 
when members of different security realms need to access distributed BI services 
through a trusted principal. 
• Help session users authenticate their session memberships to simplify the 
authentication process in multiparty sessions without reducing security. 
• Support fine-grained session key management where session cloud users join and 
leave the session frequently. 
• Prevent the service instances in a multi-party session from communicating outside of 
the session; the multi-party session authentication mechanism therefore partially 
achieves the functionality of a protocol firewall. 
The session authority cloud (SAC):  
• Control sessions in the clouds,  
• Authorise sessions based on matching keys which are forwarded by multiparty 
session handler.  
• Serve as the cloud certification authority. 
Conclusions 6.3 
Cloud is an important part of future BI and offers several advantages in terms of cost 
efficiency, reliability, flexibility and scalability of implementation. Moreover, it offers the 
opportunity to take advantage of enhanced data sharing capabilities. Cloud has the potential 
to offer a new lease of life to BI and OLAP frameworks. Cloud computing comprises three 
primary methods of provisioning services – software-as-a-service (SaaS), platform-as-a-
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service (PaaS) and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS). These complementary but contrasting 
services may be provided by the same or different providers depending upon the business 
arrangements. However, regardless of the contractual arrangements, the SaaS provider needs 
the settings on the PaaS and IaaS Clouds to be defined as per the application services 
provided through the web services architecture components. Cloud provision includes the 
service provisioning and routing engines that can effectively sense the loading pattern on the 
underlying resources to determine the requirement to undertake migration.  
The security risks and solutions for cloud computing environments have been 
presented; the NIST recommendations on managing risks on cloud computing are reviewed 
and analysed in detail. More specific to the purpose of this research, the techniques of 
deploying Business Intelligence on cloud computing platforms and the security threats facing 
business intelligence have been discussed. Furthermore, the modelling scenarios related to 
cloud security, BI on the cloud, and BI security on the cloud have been presented and 
critically reviewed. 
In this research, the lower level modelling activity helped in preparing the 
fundamentals for the definitive model to be developed as the final outcome of this research.  
The author have proposed a new authentication mechanism model for multi-party 
authentication for BI, mechanisms for hosting on cloud computing and five core protocols all 
of which combine to form the multiparty authentication system.  
This multiparty authentication system for dynamic authentication interactions is 
effective when members of different security realms want to access distributed BI services 
through a trusted principal. This mechanism can help Cloud session users authenticate their 
session membership so as to largely simplify the authentication processes within multi-party 
sessions. In addition, there is an improvement in the performance of the proposed 
authentication system on cloud due to a reduction in the additional messages introduced by 
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the authentication processes. The correctness of the protocol is formally analysed and proven 
using the well-known BAN logic. 
 
To achieve these goals, the authentication protocols are designed in the following 
way: 
• Assign each session user a Diffie-Hellman key pair. The public key is used as the 
identifier of the instance while the key is kept privately. All such sessions will be 
identified by the SAC. 
• Assign a session authority cloud to control sessions in the clouds, and to authorise the 
sessions based on matching of keys forwarded by multiparty session handler. It also 
serves as the cloud certification authority. In addition, to maintain the status 
information about session cloud users. 
• Allow each pair of session cloud user to verify each other’s identity under the 
assistance of the Session Authority Cloud and then generate a shared secret key for 
exchanging information confidentially to secure their communication.  
The multi-party authentication mechanism can prevent the service instances in a 
particular multi-party session from exchanging messages with the outside so that the multi-
party session authentication mechanism can partially achieve the functionality of the 
firewalls. This mechanism solution supports fine-grained session key management where 
session cloud users join and leave the session frequently. Also, with our solution the 
management of session key can be more readily facilitated. Finally, empirical evaluation is 
carried out to assess the scalability and the runtime overhead of the authentication system. 
The objectives of the multiparty authentication protocols are proven to achieve the intended 
goals theoretically and experimentally. The experimental results clearly indicate that the 
proposed protocol and its implementation have a sound level of scalability and impose only a 
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modest degree of performance overhead which is comparable with other security related 
overheads.  
Future Research Directions 6.4 
The research aim and objectives have been achieved; scope remains for further 
interesting development of the multiparty authentication system. Although in our 
authentication mechanism the amount of communications between the cloud users of a 
session and the session cloud authority is limited, there is potential for the performance 
overheads to cause practical concern in a practical network. Greater functionality and 
reporting could be achieved if the SAC communication message content were to be extended; 
however, there would be a probable increase in communication overhead would also need to 
be assessed and addressed if necessary. 
While this research has presented the framework, additional research and 
development are needed to implement a practical hybrid model of BI security on the cloud. 
The application of XML data structures could be investigated as a means to standardise and 
improve communication efficiency and assist with developing a full production 
implementation. Research into the continually developing state-of-the-art methodologies 
which pertain to service provisioning, service routing, schema partitioning and load balancing 
would all be beneficial for implementing an enterprise level RDBMS system with the aim of 
achieving a massively parallel processing RDBMS server system for taking BI to the Clouds. 
Cloud computing offers significant computing power and capacity. Hence, BI is 
expected to enter many complex domains (business and non-business related) which were 
impossible for it in a self-hosted environment. Applications like context-awareness, location-
aware automation, massive scale semantics, advanced science and technology databases, real 
time disaster and crisis management, city management, global finance and economy reporting 
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and the global monitoring of industries and sectors are just a few of the areas where BI or BI 
like systems offer tremendous potential when combined with Cloud computing. The size, 
scale, dynamism and scope of data marts and data warehouses on Clouds may exceed even 
the Petabytes scale (one of the the emerging challenges of Big Data). Such data systems 
cannot be managed using traditional systems and tools. The security challenges at such 
massive scales will be different and much more complex. Hence, it is imperative to establish 
ways to increase the security of the cryptosystem without compromising the temporal 
functionality, which are foundation elements to our solution. 
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Appendix A: Experimental configuration in Eclipse 
 
1. Configuration 
 Sac 
Sac consists of “sac.jar” file and “certs” folder. 
There are cloud folders in “certs”.  i.e, “cloudA”, “cloudB” and so forth. 
The cloud folder includes its root key file(i.e, “cloudA.key”) and uer 
folders(i.e, “user1”). 
The user folder has a user key file. (i.e, “user1.key”) 
The size of every key file is all 1024 Bytes. 
 
 
Example: 
[SAC]  
  |_____ sac.jar 
  |____ [cloudA] 
  |     |_____[user1] 
  |     | |____user1.key 
  |     |_____[user2] 
  |     | |____user2.key 
  |     |_____cloudA.key  
  |  
  |____ [cloudB] 
… … 
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 Cloud 
Cloud consists of “cloud.jar” file and “cert” folder. 
The folder “cert” has one user key file - “key.dat” and one ID file - “ID.dat”. 
The size of key file “key.dat” is 2048 Bytes, where the first 1024 Bytes block is 
cloud root key and the next 1024 Bytes block is sub-domain key. 
The ID.dat has two lines in it, where the first line is cloud ID (i.e, cloudA) and the 
next is sub-domain ID(that is, the user’ s ID. i.e, user1). The cloud ID matches with 
the name of cloud folder, and the other with the name of user foloder. 
The first block matches with the cloud root key in SAC, and the second with user 
key. 
Example: 
[user1]  
  |_____ cloud.jar 
  |____ [cert] 
        |____ID.dat    
      |____key.dat 
 Service 
Services consist of only one file “service.jar” 
Well, so far we can understand the folder trees of each part. 
2. Running and Testing protocols 
See the folder “bin” and run programs in it. 
 Running 
 Firstly, run the sac.jar once, and turn on the SAC service state. 
 Next, run the service several times (let us assume each instance is a different serv
ice.) and give SAC IP addresses, service names and service ports. Then click “Co
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nnect”. For each run, give service names and ports differently. 
     
Figure 66: Cloud users connecting to multiple services 
 Then, look at SAC, you can see that services are registered to SAC by clicking       
All “services” tab. 
 
 
Figure 67: SAC services state 
 Next, run cloud. Give SAC IP address and click “Connect”. Then the services are     
listed 
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Figure 68: Accessing a SAC services after exchanging public the key 
 Create session 
To create session, select services from the service list you want and give 
session name and then click “Create session”. If the keys are valid, a new session 
is created and the available services are listed. 
 
Figure 69: Creating a new session 
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If want to send request to a service, select a service from this list and click 
“Send Request”. Then the response of the service will be displayed.
 
Figure 70: Cloud services request 
See the SAC. You can see the information about sessions and services. 
 If want to exit session, click “Exit session”. Then the session created will be 
disappeared in the session list. 
 Join to session  
First run another “cloud”. And connect to SAC. 
To join to a session, select a session from the list and click “Join 
Session”. 
Then the cloud that created the session(session creator) will show a 
CONFIRM dialog. If the CREATOR wants to accept, click “YES”. If not, “NO”. 
According to it, the new user(cloud) may be allowed or not to join. 
If allowed, the list of services in the session will be displayed. 
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Figure 71: Joining a session 
 
  
Figure 72: Accept or deny a joining session by Cloud user 
 
This is the joiner‘s 
This is the session 
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Figure 73: Creating a session 
 
 In SAC you can see the info of sessions and services. 
 
 
This is session creator‘s 
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Figure 74: Session created by Cloud user (Creator) 
 
 
Figure 75: SAC services and sessions state 
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Appendix B: Experimental configuration in OPNET 
 
Table 8: Application, database and security services modelled in OPNET for 
applying to server objects in the cloud hosted BI group and the UTM 
 
Table 9: Profiles created in the OPNET model for BI security on the cloud 
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Table 10: Creating the two applications–Protocol_Tasks (for all nodes), and database  
(for SAC-DB) 
 
Table 11: Destination preferences of A and F 
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Table 12: Destination preferences of SAC-SH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
